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World Separation of Religion and State Into the 21st Century

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This study examines the extent of separation of religion and state (SRAS) between 1990 and 2002 in 152 states using the Religion and State database. The results show that when using a strict interpretation of SRAS—no state support for religion and no state restrictions on religion—no state has full SRAS except the United States. Even when discounting moderate amounts of government involvement in religion (GIR), greater than three quarters of states do not have SRAS. The findings also show that GIR has increased slightly between 1990 and 2002, economic development is associated with higher levels of GIR, states with Muslim majorities have higher levels of government support for religion, and democracies have higher levels of SRAS than do autocratic states but rarely have full SRAS. This contradicts the idea that SRAS is an essential element of democracy and predictions that religion will cease to be an important political and social factor in modern times.

Keywords: *separation of religion and state; democracy; Islam; Christianity; modernization; economic development; secularization*

In the past, the dominant paradigms of most branches of the social sciences have posited that religion is becoming an epiphenomenal force in society, having no relevance in the modern era. This includes the argument that in modern times, religion is having a decreasing impact on the public sphere, which implies higher levels of separation of religion and state (SRAS). Although recently these basic assumptions have been reevaluated, few quan-

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titative studies have attempted to assess globally the impact of religion in the public arena. Accordingly, this study uses the Religion and State (RAS) database to assess the extent of SRAS in all 152 states with populations of 1 million or more.¹ More specifically, I address three questions, all of which are elements of the larger question of whether religion is becoming less important in modern times. First, what is the extent of SRAS in the world today? Second, did the extent of SRAS change between 1990 and 2002? Third, does economic development influence SRAS?

This study defines SRAS as no government support for religion and no government interference in the religious practices of both the majority and minority religions in a state. Both aspects of this definition are crucial to defining SRAS. Few dispute that government support for religion violates SRAS, but many would consider government regulation and restriction of religion signs of increasing secularism. I argue that this is not necessarily true. Government restriction and regulation of minority religions is often a sign of the dominant religion's influence in a state. Also, any government involvement in religious issues contradicts the argument that religion is an epiphenon. If religion is irrelevant, why regulate it? When governments restrict and regulate the state's dominant religion, it is often an acknowledgment of the continuing importance of religion in the public sphere. Many governments that regulate religion fear its power and feel the need to keep it in check in order to rule. In other cases, this regulation is the outcome of government and religious institutions being intertwined, which results in the two mutually influencing each other.

Clearly, other definitions of SRAS exist, as do multiple definitions of secularization. Although I discuss below these varying definitions, I want to emphasize that the SRAS variables used in this study, and therefore this study's results, are based in this definition.

It is important to note that the variables in this study technically measure government involvement in religion (GIR), which can be described as the opposite of SRAS. That is, full SRAS (defined as no GIR) is set at 0, and as GIR increases, the variables increase in value. I measure six aspects of GIR: (a) state support for one or more religions either officially or in practice; (b) state hostility toward religion; (c) comparative government treatment of different religions, including both benefits and restrictions; (d) government restrictions on the practice of religion by religious minorities; (e) government regulation of the majority religion; and (f) legislation of religious laws.

1. A detailed description of the Religion and State (RAS) database is provided in the research design section of this study.

I use this multifaceted approach because the relationship between religion and the state is complex, and although each of these measures is informative, each of them is incomplete when examined individually. For example, both the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia have official state religions, yet the extent of GIR in these two states is obviously different. This comes out especially when looking at the treatment of religious minorities, regulation of the majority religion, and religious legislation. Thus by examining several aspects of GIR, I can provide a clearer picture of its true extent.

The Debate Over Secularization

The trend of ignoring religion as a social factor dates back to the foundation of the social sciences, including thinkers such as Comte, Durkheim, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Voltaire, and Weber (Appleby, 1994, pp. 7-8; Shupe, 1990, p. 19; Turner, 1991). Although the individual understandings of these scholars on religion differed, they all believed that a modern rational scientific age of enlightenment would replace religion as the basis for understanding and running the world.

This attitude coalesced into more formal theories. Political science's modernization theory posited that several of trends inherent in modernity would lead to the demise of primordial factors such as religion and ethnicity in politics. These processes included mass education, growing rates of literacy, urbanization, economic development, pluralism, the increasing importance of modern secular social and political institutions, and advancements in science and technology.² Sociology's secularization paradigm predicted the demise of religion as a social factor for similar reasons.³ As states become more modern, science and rationalism replaces religion. This happens both on the social and institutional level, with people becoming less religious and secular institutions replacing religious ones (Hadden, 1987, p. 588). International relations is distinct among the social sciences in that it had no theory for why religion was unimportant; rather, this was simply assumed to be fact (Fox, 2001). It is important to note that many of these predicted causes of religion's demise are linked to economic modernization.⁴

2. For a survey of the literature on modernization, see, among others, Almond (1960), Apter (1965), Deutsch (1953), and Smith (1970, 1974).

3. For a survey of the literature on secularization, see, among others, Beckford (1985), Westhus (1976), and Wilson (1966, 1982).

4. For a detailed argument on the link between modernization and secularization, see Norris and Inglehart (2004).

These predictions have been coming under question. Political scientists began to accept religion's continuing relevance around 1980 after events such as the Iranian revolution and the rising importance of the religious right in the United States.⁵ Yet political science studies of religion focused mostly on narrow topics, which were treated as exceptions to the more general rule of secularism or on religion and politics outside of the Western world. Until the events in Waco, Texas in 1993, few academics considered religious violence in the West likely (Kaplan, 2002, p. 2). Even those who accept religion's importance do so only in certain circumstances and contexts and consider political manifestations of religion a deviation from the norm⁶ (Beit-Hallahmi, 2003).

Perhaps the most potent criticism of religions's predicted demise is the argument that modernization is causing a resurgence of religion. Modernization has undermined the traditional community, causing an organized political effort to preserve that community (Haynes, 1994; Sahliyah, 1990; Thomas, 2000). Failed efforts at modernization by secular governments have increased religions's legitimacy as an alternative ruling ideology (Juergensmeyer, 1993). All of this is especially true of religious fundamentalists (Appleby, 2000). Those dislocated by modernization are among the most likely to join fundamentalist movements (Sahliyah, 1990). Modernity has seen increased mass participation in politics, allowing religious individuals to place religion on the political agenda (Rubin, 1994, pp. 22-23). Modern communications technology has enabled religious groups to better coordinate and export their ideas. Also, modernity has increased the ability of both religious and political institutions to involve themselves in more areas of life, causing more clashes between them (Shupe, 1990, pp. 22-26).

These two opposite predictions can be distilled to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: More modernized states will have lower levels of GIR.

Hypothesis 2: More modernized states will have higher levels of GIR.

A factor complicating the debate over *secularization* is that there is no agreement on the definition of the term. For example, a recent edition of *Soci-*

5. Demerath (2001, p. x) dates the awareness of political scientists of religion to 1979 based on four events from that year: The Pope at the Puebla Conference in Mexico addressed Liberation Theology, the Pope went to Poland to bless the link between the solidarity movement and Catholic Church, the Camp David Accords, and the Iranian Revolution. He notes that this was followed by Ronald Reagan's election to the U.S. presidency with the help of the moral majority.

6. For further discussion of the evolution of the modernization debate in political science, see Fox (2002, pp. 31-64) and Gill (2001).

ology of Religion highlights the debate over whether secularization is a decline in religiosity—whether individuals are religious—or it is a decline in religion’s influence in the public sphere, particularly on political and social institutions. Thus as an element of the public sphere, GIR is central to many sociologists’ definitions of secularization (Beyer, 1999; Dobbelaere, 1999, p. 232; Lambert, 1999, p. 329). However others focus on individual religiosity as secularization’s primary measure (Stark, 1999; Swatos & Christiano, 1999; Voye, 1999). It is important to emphasize that even those that support secularization theory in this volume have retreated from past claims that religion is becoming completely irrelevant and argue that religion’s influence will decline but not disappear (Beyer, 1999; Dobbelaere, 1999; Lambert, 1999).

The definition of secularization is further complicated by different interpretations of what constitutes secularization in the political sphere. Madeley (2003a) differentiates between “neutral political concern,” which means that the state neither helps nor hinders any particular ideal more than others, and “exclusion of ideals,” which means that the state should not base its actions on a preference for any particular way of life. Monsema and Soper (1997) further complicate this set of competing definitions by pointing out that “state neutrality” is biased in favor of secularism. Both of these definitions are part of a more general liberal ideal that the state should be separate from religion, which is an ideological manifestation of secularization. Although these definitions are more recent developments, they are based on classical liberal thought (Madeley, 2003a).

An even further complication of this debate is the supply-side theory of religion, which posits that less state involvement in religion causes people to be more religious. That is, institutional secularization leads to higher religiosity among individuals. This is because a free religious “market” allows people to find a religion or denomination more suited to them. Furthermore, religious “providers” have an incentive to provide a more attractive “product.” In contrast, state-supported religious monopolies rely on the government for support and have less incentive to make themselves attractive to the masses. Also, the enforcement of the state religion can cause resentment. All of this leads to less religiosity (Iannaccone, 1995; Madeley, 2003b). This helps explain why countries such as the United States have low GIR but high levels of religiosity.

This theory has been hotly debated. Many question whether religion can be explained by a theory that is based on rational behavior and is, perhaps, oversimplified. It ignores the role of socialization, people switching religions

for social benefits that do not involve religiosity, and the finding that lone individuals are less likely targets of recruitment than people hooked into social networks (Demerath, 1995; Ellison, 1995; Williams, 1994, pp. 788-789). Also, state religions linked to nationalism or past independence movements are linked to increased religiosity. This can explain high levels of religiosity in states such as Ireland and Poland (Madeley, 2003b, p. 38).

Another aspect of mass support for state religions is mass attitudes toward governments. Gill (1998) points out that when governments are unpopular and state religions are challenged by alternative religions, the state religion may often switch its allegiance to the opposition to retain its congregants. Fawcett (2000) similarly argues that religious institutions must sometimes alter their stands on political issues to remain relevant to their congregants.

Be that as it may, the definition of SRAS used in this study focuses on the “neutral political concern” definition of SRAS. This is not to deny that religiosity and the “exclusion of ideals” definition of SRAS are important aspects of secularization. Rather it is because the data that are used here focus on institutional SRAS.

Finally, the general predictions made by the secularization literature, taking into account the focus of this study on SRAS, can be distilled into the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: There will be a low level of GIR worldwide.

Hypothesis 4: Between 1990 and 2002, GIR will decrease.

The predictions of the religious resurgence school of thought discussed above can be distilled into the following two hypotheses, which predict the opposite of the previous two:

Hypothesis 5: There will be a high level of GIR worldwide.

Hypothesis 6: Between 1990 and 2002, GIR will increase.

The results presented below falsify Hypotheses 3 and 4 but support Hypotheses 5 and 6.

Previous Quantitative Studies

To my knowledge, there are no previous studies that examine the extent of GIR on a worldwide basis, but some do touch on the issue. Chaves and Cann (1992) and Chaves, Schraeder, and Sprindys (1994) measure SRAS for 18

Western European countries and find that government regulation of religion lowers church attendance.⁷ Norris and Inglehart (2004) expanded the Chaves and Cann (1992) measure to 20 components and find support for the supply-side theory of religion discussed above. Price (1999) measures religion's influence on politics for 23 Muslim states and 23 non-Muslim states and finds that Islam neither supports nor hinders human rights.⁸ Barret, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) collected data on whether states have a "religious character." Barret et al. did not systematically analyze the data, but Madeley (2003a, 2003b), in a simple analysis of these data for Europe, showed an increase in state support for religion between 1980 and 2000. Although all of these studies focus on the influence of religion on government institutions, the measures they use are not as comprehensive as the ones used in this study.⁹

Most other cross-sectional studies that address religion focus on religion and conflict. Most of them focus on religious identity. That is, they focus on whether religious diversity within a state causes conflict or whether conflicts are more likely or intense if the two groups involved belong to different religions. Rummel (1997), Roeder (2003), and Reynal-Querol (2002) link religious diversity to higher levels of ethnic and domestic conflict, but Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that religious diversity does not influence the extent of domestic conflict. Henderson (1997) found that states that belong to different religions are more likely to go to war.

In previous studies, I link more specific religious factors to ethnic conflict. These variables include religious discrimination, religious grievances, demands for more religious rights by minority groups, religious legitimacy, and religious institutions as well as religious identity. The aspects of ethnic conflict influenced by these factors include ethnic rebellion, discrimination against minorities, and international intervention in ethnic conflicts (Fox, 2002, 2004). Some studies link Islam with autocratic government (Fisch, 2002; Midlarsky, 1998).

There is also a large body of survey-based studies that link individual religiosity, religious participation, and religious identity to various forms of

7. These measures included the following: the presence of a single officially designated church; the presence of official state recognition of some denominations and not others; whether the state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders; whether the state directly pays church personnel salaries; the presence of a state system of ecclesiastical tax collection; and whether the state directly subsidizes, beyond tax breaks, operating expenses, capital, or maintenance for churches (Chaves & Cann, 1992, p. 280).

8. Price measures the extent to which Islamic law is used as the law of the land in five spheres: personal status, regulation of economic matters, prescribed religious practices, criminal law, and guide for government.

9. Fox and Sandler (2005) also analyze an earlier version of the RAS data set focusing on the data from Western democracies and the Middle East.

political and conflict behavior. For example, Barro and McCleary (2003) link a high level of belief in heaven and hell to higher economic performance but church attendance to lower economic performance. Norris and Ingleheart (2002), based on cross-national survey data, found a link between Islam and support for religion in government. Both of these studies focus on religiosity using survey data, primarily from the World Values Survey. In these surveys, religiosity is measured using questions on religious behavior and attitudes, including church attendance and belief in God.¹⁰

One problem with this type of study is that many of them focus on political behavior in one country, although this is not true of the two noted above. Those that focus on multiple countries are limited by the availability of survey data, which is available for only some countries, with a bias toward Western states. For example, Barro and McCleary (2003), using all of the data available from the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Program, have data on only 63 countries and no more than 43 countries in any given year.

In sum, this body of work demonstrates a link between religion and political behavior, but it is based on either survey data or relatively crude macro-level religion variables and often is limited to only a fraction of the world's states.

Research Design

This study examines the extent of SRAS on a worldwide basis for all 152 states, with populations of 1 million or more using the RAS data set. The RAS data set includes information for 1990 to 2002. Each variable other than the population variables is coded yearly. All these variables are coded primarily based on the behavior of a state's national government. They do not include the behavior of regional and local governments unless the majority of such governments engage in a practice. The codings also do not include societal practice because the focus of the data set is on government involvement in religion and not general societal practices.

All the variables described below set full SRAS at 0, with GIR increasing as the variable increases. Although the intent of the variables is to measure both the presence and lack of SRAS, for purposes of consistency in the discussion, I try to use the term *GIR* when directly discussing the results of the data analysis.

10. For a further listing of survey-based studies that link religion to political and conflict behavior, see Fox (2001, pp. 60-61).

These variables are influenced by previous studies. The religious discrimination variable is based on one I previously developed (Fox, 2002). The religious legislation variable is inspired by Chaves and Cann (1992), although it contains many more items. Barrett et al. (2001) and Chaves and Cann (1992) inspired the need for an official GIR variable, and the coding scheme is based on Durham (1996).¹¹ The other two variables, which measure the comparative treatment of different religions and regulation of the majority religion, have no real precedent in the quantitative literature, but I argue that these dimensions of GIR are as important as the other three.

This analysis has three parts. The first examines the legal SRAS using the following ordinal measure called "official GIR":¹²

0. Hostile: This is the hostility and overt prosecution of all religions (i.e., the ex-U.S.S.R.)
1. Inadvertent insensitivity: There is little distinction between regulation of religious and other types of institutions.
2. Separationist: There is official SRAS, and the state is slightly hostile toward religion.
3. Accommodation: This refers to official SRAS and a benevolent or neutral attitude toward religion.
4. Supportive: The state supports all religions more or less equally.
5. Cooperation: The state falls short of endorsing a particular religion, but certain religions benefit from state support more than others (such support can be monetary or legal).
6. Civil religion: Although the state does not officially endorse a religion, one religion serves unofficially as the state's civil religion.
7. The state has more than one official religion.
8. The state has one official religion.

This measure actually measures two aspects of GIR: whether the state supports religion and whether it is hostile to religion. However, because these two are mutually exclusive in this coding scheme, they are incorporated into the same measure. Full SRAS on this measure is the accommodation category. Governments in the separationist category are those that in their endeavors to keep the state separate from religion end up regulating and restricting religion.

It is important to note that this measure focuses on the treatment of the majority religion. That is, although it is possible for a state to support some

11. Although Durham (1996) developed an official government involvement in religion (GIR) variable, to my knowledge it was never collected.

12. This variable is based on one developed by Durham (1996).

religions and be hostile to others, this variable does not reflect this. I argue that states that support any religion are not hostile to the concept of religion. This is a critical distinction that differentiates states such as Saudi Arabia, which supports Wahabbi Sunni Islam and is hostile to all other religions, and states such as the former U.S.S.R., which was hostile to all religions. The coding scheme for this variable reflects this aspect of GIR. I assess the treatment of minority religions, another aspect of GIR, in a separate variable, which I discuss below.

The test performed on this variable is a simple one. The percentage of states that fall into each of the above categories are assessed for 1990 and 2002, the beginning and end of the period covered by the RAS dataset. This is to assess whether there has been any change during this 13-year period and, if so, in what direction. This includes an evaluation of the overall score as well as one that divides states into four categories based on the religion of the majority of people who reside in each state: Catholic, other Christian,¹³ Muslim, and other states. Although clearly there is a diversity of traditions within many of these categories, they are the most specific categories possible that contain a sufficient number of states for meaningful comparison.

It is also important to note that data for 1990 were not available for some states. Most of these cases are former Soviet republics that were not yet officially independent. In this and subsequent tests, when the 1990 data were not available for a state, the value for the earliest year for which data were available was used.¹⁴ Although clearly a longer time period would be preferable to test whether secularization has occurred, this type of test is important because it still provides a 13-year time span for testing using data more detailed than previously available. Although any changes over time detected by this test may not be definitive, they can certainly be suggestive.

The second set of tests examines GIR, both for all states and for each of the religious categories mentioned above, using five additional variables. In this set of tests I assess the mean for each variable for 1990 and 2002. I also note the percentage of states that score greater than 0 for 1990 and 2002. The mean value shows the average level of GIR, and the percentage that scores above 0 shows how many states do not have full SRAS based on these measures.

13. The "other Christian" category is also coded if the majority of the state's population is Christian but no single denomination holds a majority.

14. The codings for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan begin in 1991; the codings for Afghanistan begin in 1992; the codings for Eritrea and Slovakia begin in 1993; and the codings for Bosnia begin in 1995.

These measures are as follows: The first, general restrictions, measures whether the state in general restricts religious practices. It is measured on the following scale:

0. No (other) religions are illegal and there are no significant restrictions on (other) religions.
1. No (other) religions are illegal but some or all (other) religions have practical limitations placed on them.
2. No (other) religions are illegal but some or all (other) religions have legal limitations placed on them.
3. Some (other) religions are illegal.
4. All (other) religions are illegal.

The word *other* is in parentheses because states with preferred religions will restrict other religions, but states with no preferred religion may restrict all religions.

The second variable, religious discrimination, focuses on restrictions on the practice of religion by minority groups. This variable measures restrictions that are placed on minority religions but not the majority religion in a state. Restrictions placed on all religions are coded separately in the next variable. Each of the following restrictions is coded individually:

- restrictions on public observance of religious services, festivals, and/or holidays, including the Sabbath;
- restrictions on building, repairing, and/or maintaining places of worship;
- restrictions on access to places of worship;
- forced observance of religious laws of another group;
- restrictions on formal religious organizations;
- restrictions on the running of religious schools and/or religious education in general;
- arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, and/or members of religious parties;
- restrictions on the ability to make and/or obtain materials necessary for religious rites, customs, and/or ceremonies;
- restrictions on the ability to write, publish, or disseminate religious publications;
- restrictions on the observance religious laws concerning personal status, including marriage, divorce, and burial;
- restrictions on the ordination of and/or access to clergy;
- restrictions on conversion to minority religions;
- forced conversions;

- restrictions on proselytizing;
- requirement for minority religions (as opposed to all religions) to register; and
- restrictions on other types of observance of religious law.¹⁵

Each of these components is assessed on the following scale:

0. Not significantly restricted for any.
1. The activity is slightly restricted for some minorities.
2. The activity is slightly restricted for most or all minorities or sharply restricted for some of them.
3. The activity is prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all minorities.

The results are then totaled to result in a composite variable that ranges between 0 and 48.

It is important to emphasize that I weight each of the components in this measure equally (and do the same for the measures described below) not because I feel that each is equally important. Rather, it is because I feel that there is unlikely to be any consensus as to exactly what weight should be given to each of these 16 measures. Given this, weighting each equally is the most transparent alternative. Because each of these component variables is coded separately, other researchers who wish to weight them differently will be able to do so.

The third variable, religious regulation, measures whether the government regulates all religions or the majority religion. Each of the following is coded separately:

- restrictions on religious political parties;
- arrest, continued detention, or severe official harassment of religious figures, officials, and/or members of religious parties;
- restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties;
- restrictions on the public observance of religious practices, including religious holidays and the Sabbath;
- restrictions on public religious speech, including sermons by clergy
- restrictions on access to places of worship;
- restrictions on the publication or dissemination of written religious material;
- people are arrested for religious activities;
- restrictions on religious public gatherings that are not placed on other types of public gathering;

15. Fox (2002) uses eight of these items for a religious discrimination variable that focuses on the treatment of ethnic minorities. This study has added an additional eight items to the list.

- restrictions on the public display by private persons or organizations of religious symbols, including religious dress, nativity scenes, and icons; and
- other religious restrictions.

Each of these components is assessed on the following scale:

0. No restrictions.
1. Slight restrictions, including practical restrictions, or the government engages in this activity rarely and on a small scale.
2. Significant restrictions, including practical restrictions, or the government engages in this activity occasionally and on a moderate scale.
3. The activity is illegal, or the government engages in this activity often and on a large scale.

The results are then totaled to result in a composite variable that ranges between 0 and 33.

The fourth variable, religious legislation, examines whether the government legislates religion. That is, it examines whether the government enforces religious precepts through law. Each of the following types of law is coded separately:

- Dietary laws (restrictions on producing, importing, selling, or consuming specific foods)
- Restrictions or prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages
- Personal status defined by clergy
- Laws of inheritance defined by religion
- Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion
- Restrictions on interfaith marriages
- Restrictions on public dress
- Blasphemy laws or any other restriction on speech about religion or religious figures
- Censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being antireligious
- Mandatory closing of some or all businesses during religious holidays, including the Sabbath or its equivalent
- Other restrictions on activities during religious holidays, including the Sabbath or its equivalent (“blue laws”)
- Religious education is standard but optional in public schools
- Mandatory religious education in public schools
- Government funding of religious schools or religious educational programs in secular schools
- Government funding of religious charitable organizations

- Government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations (religious taxes)
- Official government positions, salaries, or other funding for clergy
- Funding for religious organizations or activities other than those listed above
- Clergy and/or speeches in places of worship require government approval
- Some official clerical positions made by government appointment
- Presence of an official government ministry or department dealing with religious affairs
- Certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by virtue of their political office
- Certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious position
- Some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order to hold office
- Presence of religious courts that have jurisdiction over some matters of law
- Seats in legislative branch and/or cabinet are by law or custom granted, at least in part, along religious lines
- Prohibitive restrictions on abortion
- The presence of religious symbols on the state's flag
- Religion listed on state identity cards
- Religious organizations must register with government in order to obtain official status
- Presence of an official government body which monitors "sects" or minority religions
- Restrictions on women other than those listed above
- Other religious prohibitions or practices that are mandatory

Although there are 33 components to this variable, the optional and mandatory religious education components are mutually exclusive. Thus when totaled, this measure ranges from 0 to 32.¹⁶

The final measure, overall GIR, is a composite measure of the above four variables and the official GIR variable. It provides an approximate measure of the overall relationship between religion and state. I rescaled each of the four variables from this set of tests to measure from 0 to 20. For example, the religious legislation variable, which ranges from 0 to 32, is divided by 32 then multiplied by 20. I included the official GIR variable in the composite measure as follows: I divided it into two variables, setting "accommodation" as 0. The first variable, official support, includes accommodation and all val-

16. Chaves and Cann (1992) collected 12 component variables similar to the ones collected here.

ues higher than it in a scale of 0 to 5; and the second, official hostility, includes accommodation and all values lower than it in a scale of 0 to 3. I rescaled each of these to 0 to 20. I added all six rescaled measures to form a scale of 0 to 100 (both of the rescaled measures based on the official GIR variable cannot be greater than 0 at the same time). I weight each of these measures equally for the same reasons as described above for weighting the individual components of these measures equally.

Some may argue that it is problematic to combine measures of several different aspects of GIR into a single measure due to the qualitative differences between the phenomena measured by these variables. Although this objection clearly has some validity, I argue that the advantages to using this measure outweigh the disadvantages. Each individual measure looks at a different aspect of GIR and does not present the entire picture. Combining these diverse measures creates a variable that in my judgment, provides a more accurate assessment of GIR. Also, because all the tests performed in this study are also performed on each of the individual measures, those who disagree with this decision are able to evaluate the impact of these individual measures.

The final set of tests uses multiple regressions to test the impact of economic development on GIR. The dependent variables are 2002 versions of the five variables used in the second set of tests (the original and not the rescaled versions) and the two variables that are derived from the official GIR variable, which are described above (also the original and not the rescaled versions).

To test for economic development, I use two variables: the log of per capita GNP for 2001¹⁷ and infant mortality for 2000. Both were obtained from the U.N. Statistics division.¹⁸ Because these two variables are strongly correlated (.812, $p < .001$), I use each of them in separate tests.

The control variables used in this study are as follows: First, I include variables that measure the specific religion of the majority population in each state, including Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Protestant Christian, other Christian,¹⁹ and Muslim. Each of these variables measures 1 if the majority of

17. I use the log of per capita GNP because this is the accepted methodology in the development literature. Regressions not presented here using the simple per capita GNP produced results that were similar to those presented here in Table 3.

18. Downloaded from <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm> on February 1, 2004. To test for curvilinearity, in regressions not presented here, I replaced this variable both with its log and with its square. The results were consistent with those presented here but weaker.

19. This category includes Christian denominations that do not fit into any of the other categories, states where no one Christian denomination is in the majority, and states where information on denomination is unavailable or unclear.

Table 1
Extent of Official Government Involvement in Religion in 1990 and 2002 (in percentages)

Variable	Percentage of States That Fall Into This Category Within				
	Catholic	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	All States
1990 ^a					
Established religion	13.5	11.1	51.3	12.9	22.4
Multiple official religions	0.0	4.4	0.0	0.0	1.3
Civil religion	43.2	17.8	15.4	6.5	21.1
Cooperation	16.2	22.2	10.3	25.8	18.4
Supportive	2.7	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.3
Accommodation	13.5	35.6	15.4	29.0	23.7
Separationist	10.0	6.7	7.7	3.2	7.2
Inadvertent insensitivity	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.9	2.6
Hostile	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.7	2.0
2002					
Established religion	10.8	11.1	51.3	12.9	21.7
Multiple official religions	0.0	4.4	0.0	0.0	1.3
Civil religion	43.2	17.8	15.4	6.5	21.1
Cooperation	18.9	26.7	10.3	29.0	21.1
Supportive	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
Accommodation	16.2	37.8	12.8	32.3	25.0
Separationist	8.1	2.2	10.3	3.2	5.9
Inadvertent insensitivity	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.9	2.6
Hostile	0.0	0.0	0.0	3/2	0.7
Number of cases	37	45	39	31	152

Note: Significance (chi-square) = .000 for both the 1990 and 2002 analyses.

the state's population is of the specified religion and 0 if it is not. This controls for the potentially different extent of SRAS across different religions.²⁰

Second, I measure the religious diversity of the state using two measures: the percentage of the population of the largest religious denomination in the state and the number of smaller denominations that constitute 5% or more of

20. A variable measuring the "other" category in the religious population variable is not necessary because the variables for Catholic, other Christian, and Islam, when used together, effectively control for this final category. This set of measures contains more details on Christianity than the bivariate analysis because the small number of cases in some of the categories does not pose as significant a problem as it does for the bivariate analysis.

Table 2
Comparative Levels of Government Involvement in Religion in 1990 and 2002

Type of Test	Year	Majority Religion of State					All States
		Catholic	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	All States	
General restrictions Mean	1990	0.81***	1.04	1.77***	1.29	1.22	
	2002	0.81***	0.96*	1.85***	1.32	1.22	
Percentage greater than 0	1990	64.9	60.0	84.6	71.0	69.7	
	2002	67.6	57.8	87.2	77.4	71.7	
Religious discrimination Mean	1990	1.89***	3.02**	9.51***	6.03	5.03	
	2002	1.86***	4.18	10.41***, †	6.26	5.64, ††	
Percentage greater than 0	1990	64.9	68.9	84.6	74.2	73.0	
	2002	70.3	73.3	87.2	80.6	77.6	
Religious regulation Mean	1990	0.92***	0.87***	3.82**	5.67***, †††	2.29	
	2002	0.92***	1.36***, *****	4.06*	4.16	2.93, †††	
Percentage greater than 0	1990	27.0	31.1	71.8	61.3	46.7	
	2002	29.7	46.7	84.6	67.7	56.6	

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Type of Test	Year	Majority Religion of State					All States
		Catholic	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	All States	
Religious legislation Mean	1990	4.89**	4.18***	11.79***	4.48**	6.37	
	2002	5.32** ^{††}	4.69*** [†]	12.28*** ^{††}	4.74**	6.80 ^{†††}	
Percentage greater than 0	1990	100.0	95.6	97.4	100.0	98.0	
	2002	100.0	97.8	100.0	100.0	99.3	
Overall government involvement in religion Mean	1990	18.38**	16.79***	35.69***	22.88	23.37	
	2002	18.23***	17.62***	38.29*** ^{†††}	22.96	24.16 [†]	
Percentage greater than 0	1990	100.0	97.8	100.0	100.0	99.3	
	2002	100.0	97.8	100.0	100.0	99.3	

Note: For all variables, 0 means full separation of religion and state. *Significance = significance (*t* test) between the marked mean and the mean for all other groups in the same row.

a. In countries for which data were not available in 1990, the earliest available year was used.

Significance (*t* test) between the marked mean and the mean for all other groups in the same row: *Significance < .05. **Significance < .01. ***Significance < .001.

Significance (*t* test) between the marked mean and the mean for 1990: [†]Significance < .05. ^{††}Significance < .01. ^{†††}Significance < .001.

the country's population estimates.²¹ I include these variables because several studies link religious diversity to political phenomena.

Third, I include a variable for regime type to control for the likelihood that democracies engage in less religious discrimination and because the value of SRAS is believed by some to be an element of liberal democracy. I use the polity variable from the polity data set, which ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 being the most autocratic and 10 being the most democratic. I rescaled the variable by adding 10, scoring the most autocratic states as 0 and the most democratic as 20. The variable is based on the regulation, openness, and competitiveness of executive recruitment; constraints on the executive; and the regulation and competitiveness of political participation.²²

Fourth, I include a measure taken from the polity data set for a regime's political stability. It measures how many years a regime has persisted without a change in the polity measure. Finally, to control for state strength, I use the log of military spending by a state in 2003.

This set of tests helps to determine whether more modernized states have a different level of SRAS than do less modernized states.

Data Collection and Reliability

All RAS variables were collected as follows: A research assistant wrote a report on each country based on general sources, such as the U.S. State Department Religious Freedom reports and Barret et al. (2001); journalistic sources from the Lexis/Nexis database; and country-specific academic sources, including journal articles and books. After I approved the report, the same research assistant filled out a code sheet that I reviewed in tandem with

21. The RAS project's population estimates are based on Barrett et al. (2001), the CIA world *Factbook* (available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>), and country-specific sources. In general, an average of all available sources was used, weighted for estimated reliability of the various sources. For the most part, this weighting was based on a general impression that Barrett et al. (2001) tends to be optimistic in its estimate of the number of Christians in some states. This impression is based on the fact that in most cases, Barrett et al. counted more Christians than do other sources combined with the fact that the study focuses on Christianity.

22. For more details, see Jagers and Gurr (1995) and the Polity project Web page at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm>.

Table 3
Multiple Regressions Predicting the Level of Government Involvement in Religion in 2002

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable											
	Official Support		Official Hostility		General Restrictions		Religious Discrimination					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2				
Majority Catholic	-.008	-.099	-.140	.089	-.167	-.141	-.177	-.158				
Majority Orthodox	.110	.138	-.175	-.122	.078	.126	.195**	.241				
Majority Protestant	.053	.032	-.168	-.151	-.163	-.163	-.134	-.138				
Majority other Christian	.055	.033	-.299**	-.279**	-.075	-.074	-.032	-.135				
Majority Islamic	.194*	.167	-.298**	-.296**	.081	.068	.104	.088				
Percentage of largest religions	.548***	.582***	-.131	-.099	.122	.161	-.008	.031				
Number of minimum religions	.036	-.063	.040	-.046	-.066	-.084	-.096	-.077				
Polity	-.066	-.094	-.420***	-.387***	-.492***	-.486***	-.544***	-.543***				
Regime stability	-.013	-.061	.068	.121	-.040	-.032	.069	.068				
Log of military expenditures	-.014	-.041	-.009	.091	.111	.152	.107	.133				
Log per capita GNP	—	.260*	—	-.027	—	.119	—	.145				
Birth mortality	-.179	—	-.223*	—	-.237**	—	-.230**	—				
<i>df</i>	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151				
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.351	.360	.164	.135	.358	.331	.471	.448				

Majority Catholic	-.274**	-.220*	-.105	-.120	-.209*	-.190*
Majority Orthodox	-.102	.045	-.075	-.049	-.048	.107
Majority Protestant	-.174*	-.157	.004	-.018	-.105	-.115
Majority other Christian	-.190*	-.170	.086	.064	-.087	-.095
Majority Islamic	.044	.045	.440***	.412***	.173*	.148
Percentage of largest religions	-.023	.012	.390***	.424***	.337**	.389***
Number of minimum religions	-.043	-.037	.092	.119	-.038	-.067
Polity	-.482***	-.448***	-.201**	-.231**	-.467***	.437***
Regime stability	-.081	-.026	.005	-.055	-.005	-.017
Log of military expenditures	.100	.205*	.193**	.146	.107	.128
Log per capita GNP	—	-.025	—	.262**	—	.226**
Birth mortality	-.238**	—	-.175*	—	-.307***	—
<i>df</i>	151	151	151	151	151	151
Adjusted R^2	.400	.367	.498	.508	.559	.525

Note: All values are beta values. Means were substituted for missing values. For all dependent variables, 0 means full separation of religion and state.

*Significance < .05. **Significance < .01. ***Significance < .001.

the report. The primary purpose of the second review was to ensure consistency in codings between coders.²³

To ensure intercoder reliability, approximately 25% of the cases were recoded. I selected these cases so that about 25% of cases from each region and 25% of cases from each coder were recorded; 40 of the cases included in this study were recoded. The recoders were all research assistants from the project who had coded other cases. I did not review these codings in order to avoid any bias.

The correlations between the backup and regular codings provide high levels of confidence in the codings. The results for the variables described above for the year 2002 are as follows: official GIR, .925 ($p = .000$); general restrictions, .935 ($p = .000$); religious discrimination, .988 ($p = .000$); religious regulation, .936 ($p = .000$); religious legislation, .983 ($p = .000$); and overall GIR, .974 ($p = .000$).

Correlations between the measures and frequencies of each measure are provided in the appendix.

Data Analysis and Discussion

The first two sections of the data analysis focus on Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 6.

The analysis of the level of official GIR, presented in Table 1, shows that the majority of states have measurable levels of GIR: 76.3% of states in 1990 and 75% in 2002 either support religion or are hostile to it. In 2002, fewer states were hostile to religion, and a few more were supportive than was the case in 1990. In 1990, 11.8% of states were hostile to religion, and 64.5% were supportive of religion; and in 2002, this changed to 9.2% and 65.9%, respectively. The majority of states that were supportive of religion in both 1990 and 2002 did not have official religions. The overall percentage of

23. Although clearly there was more information available for some countries than others, I am confident that the data closely reflect reality for two reasons. First, the general sources, including the U.S. State Department and Barret et al. (2001), contain good information of most states, even if these nearly always accurate sources did often omit information. Second, even in the less covered Third World states, including many African states, religious issues drew considerable attention by human rights groups and the media. Thus when the general sources indicated that religious issues were relevant in a country, the additional sources usually provided additional detail. Although it is certainly possible, and even likely, that the data set is missing some information, I am confident that the data very closely resemble the reality on the ground as well or better than do data sets that focus on similar topics. See, for example, the Minorities at Risk project's data set on ethnic conflict at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar.

states that had official religions remained stable at 22.4% in 1990 and 21.7% in 2002.

This analysis shows some significant differences between religious traditions. Not surprisingly, Muslim governments are considerably more supportive of religion than are other governments; 76.9% of Muslim states support Islam, including 51.3% that declare Islam as their official religion. Catholic states have a similar level of states that support religion, that is, 76.5% in 1990 and 75.7 in 2002, but much fewer Catholic states have official religions. The other categories have considerably lower levels of overall support. Also, the various categories of non-Muslim states, including Catholic ones, have a similar percentage of states that have official religions, ranging between 11.1% and 13.5%. Thus on this measure, Muslim states are the most religious, followed by the Catholic states.

The analysis of the other five variables measuring separation of religion and state, presented in Table 2, produces several interesting results. First, although the changes between 1990 and 2002 in these measures are small, nearly all of them show an increase in GIR over time. In the analysis of all states, the mean levels of four of five variables rose between 1990 and 2002, with these results being statistically significant. The fifth variable, general restrictions, remained exactly the same. Similarly, for four of the five variables, the percentage of states that score above 0 rose between 1990 and 2002, and on the fifth variable, overall GIR, only one state scored a 0 in both years. These results support Hypothesis 6 and contradict Hypothesis 4. Because the time period tested is only 13 years, these results cannot be considered definitive regarding the long-term process of secularization but they do suggest that if such a process occurred before 1990, since 1990 the process has stopped or even reversed.

Second, the finding that only one state, the United States, scored a 0 on the overall GIR measure is particularly important. It means that both in 1990 and 2002, no state other than the United States had full SRAS based on the RAS measures. In an analysis not presented here, this was also true of every individual year between 1990 and 2002. Thus in the post-cold war era, full SRAS is far from the norm; rather, it is a rare exception to the more general rule that governments involve themselves in religious issues. In fact it is a unique exception. Thus these results clearly support Hypothesis 5 and contradict Hypothesis 3.

However, there is a significant minority of states that have relatively high levels of SRAS. Using the overall GIR measure, including the United States, 16.4% scored lower than 5 and 21.1% scored lower than 10 in 1990. The scores for 2002 are 17.2% and 21.7%, respectively. Even so, this means that the vast majority of state governments, 78.9% in 1990 and 78.3% in 2002,

had substantial GIR if one uses a score of 10 on the overall GIR score as the cutoff.

Third, there is a significant difference in the level of GIR between different religious traditions. Similar to the results for official GIR, Muslim states scored statistically significantly higher on all five measures. However, the results for the other three categories of religious traditions differ from those in the previous set of tests. In general, "other" groups score higher than the groups in the two Christian categories. The only exception is that other groups have lower mean levels of religious legislation than "other Christians." The difference between Catholic states and other Christian states are mixed and show no overall pattern. Thus on these measures, Muslims have the most GIR and Christian states have the least.

The multivariate analysis, presented in Table 3, focuses on whether economic development influences separation of religion and state (Hypotheses 1 and 2), but it also addresses whether different religious traditions have different levels of separation of religion and state. The results show that economically developed states have lower levels of separation of religion and state. Log per capita GNP is positively correlated with GIR in all of the regressions, except for the one for official hostility. This relationship is significant in three of the regressions. Birth mortality is negatively correlated with all seven dependent variables, significantly so for all of them except official support. Thus as birth mortality drops, which is a sign of economic development, GIR increases. The overall result is that economic development is positively linked with GIR and, consequently, is negatively linked with SRAS. This finding supports Hypothesis 2 and contradicts Hypothesis 1.

As was the case in the binary analysis, this analysis shows that Islamic states have higher levels of GIR, significantly so in four of the regressions. However, for both regressions for official hostility, Muslim states score lower. Nevertheless this is consistent with the above results because they represent Muslim support for state involvement in religion, which includes an absence of hostility toward Islam. There are several other statistically significant results with regard to specific religions. Catholic states have lower levels of religious regulation and overall GIR. Orthodox Christian states engage in higher levels of religious discrimination. Both Protestant and other Christian states engage in less religious regulation. Finally, other Christian states have lower levels of official hostility.

The other independent variables also produce some interesting results. Religiously homogeneous states are significantly more likely to become involved in religion in six of the regressions. Countries with higher military expenditures have higher levels of GIR in two of the regressions. Also, on all

the seven measures except official support, democracies have significantly lower levels of GIR.

Although the focus of this study is not on SRAS and democracy, this final finding requires some further analysis. Although the multivariate analysis shows that democracies have higher levels of SRAS than do autocracies, the bivariate analysis clearly shows that no state other than the United States has full SRAS. Thus all democracies save one involve themselves in religion. Furthermore, even using a less restrictive measure of SRAS—scoring below 10 on the overall GIR measure—76.4% of democracies (55 of 72 countries that score 17 or higher on the polity measure) do not have SRAS. This is also true of 22 of 31 (71%) of states that score 20 on the polity measure, the measure's highest score, and of 16 of 20 (80%) of Western democracies in the data set.²⁴ Finally, using an alternative measure of democracy compiled by Freedom House,²⁵ 74.6% of 59 countries rated as “free” in 2002 do not have SRAS using the 10 cutoff on the overall GIR measure. Thus on four different measures of democracy, a large majority of democracies do not have even marginal SRAS.

Conclusions

There are three particularly important results from this analysis. First, in 2002, more than a century since the founders of the social sciences began to predict the demise of religion in modern times, SRAS is the exception and GIR is the norm. Using the strictest interpretation of SRAS—no support for religion and no restrictions on religious practices—only one country, the United States, has no GIR. Furthermore, even using a looser interpretation of scoring below 10 on this study's overall GIR measure, which ranges from 0 to 100, less than 22% of states have even marginal SRAS. However, even in the United States, one can find isolated examples of state support for religion such as the “in God we trust” inscription on U.S. currency.

Second, this study's results show that modernization is associated with higher GIR. Chronologically, between 1990 and 2002 there has been a slight rise in GIR that is consistent and statistically significant across all but one of the measures used here. Also, in the multivariate analysis the economic variables are strongly associated with GIR. If the predictions of the founders of

24. For the purposes of this study, Western democracies are the democratic states of Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

25. This measure rates countries as free, partially free, and not free based on political rights and civil rights. For more details, see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>.

the social sciences regarding religion's demise in modern times were correct, we would expect the opposite to have happened—that is, a decrease in GIR between 1990 and 2002 and for economically developed states to have lower levels of GIR.

Third, although there are variations between other religious traditions, one religious tradition that clearly stands out as being different from the others is Islam. In both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, Muslim states are shown to have significantly higher levels of GIR than any other category of religious tradition examined here, generally in the form of support for Islam. Using a less rigorous measure, 9 of the top 10 scores on the overall GIR measure belong to Muslim states, as do 12 of the next highest scoring 15 states. Thus more than half of the 39 Muslim states in this study are among the top 25 scores. Unlike the previous two findings, this finding is not particularly surprising, but perhaps the extent to which it is true is somewhat unexpected. Another trend that stands out is that the Christian states have lower levels of GIR. None of the top 25 scores on the overall GIR measure belong to Christian states, but Christian states include 16 of the lowest 25 scores.

These results are important because they run counter to two pieces of conventional wisdom. First they directly contradict the assumption that religion is disappearing in modern times or at least moving from the public sphere to the private sphere (Hypothesis 1). Because the variables in this study specifically measure the influence of religion in the public sphere, this study's results unambiguously show that religion has not disappeared from the public sphere.

As discussed earlier, this assumption is hotly disputed. In fact, many argue that for a variety of reasons, modernization is causing religion's importance to increase (Hypothesis 2). Two factors in particular, among the proposed causes of religion's modern resurgence, help explain why more economically developed states tend to have less SRAS: a religious backlash against modernization's undermining of the traditional community and an increased ability of both religious and political institutions to involve themselves in more areas of life and cause greater clashes between them. It is precisely in those states where modernity has most undermined the traditional community that religious elements within the state are most likely to try and legislate religious morals and traditions that were previously enforced at the social level. Similarly, it is precisely the most modern states that have the greatest ability to interfere in the daily lives of their citizens, including the regulation of religion.

The second assumption contradicted by this study is that democracies need SRAS to function.²⁶ This piece of conventional wisdom is disputed. Some argue that democracies are involved in religion (Stephan, 2000), religious institutions often have incentives to support democracy (Kalyvas, 1998, 2000; Linz, 1978, p. 29), and religion can provide an essential normative component for democracy (Fradkin, 2000, pp. 90-91). Yet the finding that full SRAS is nearly nonexistent among democracies and even marginal SRAS does not exist in a large majority of them likely comes as a surprise to most. Furthermore this is also true of nondemocracies. Accordingly, this finding in particular should be the basis for further research.

In sum, the findings here challenge basic assumptions made by major elements of social science and political science theory. They are sufficiently unequivocal and strong to warrant a major reconsideration of our assumptions regarding the role of religion in modern times in general and the role of religion in democracies in particular.

APPENDIX A

Correlations and Frequency of the Religion and State (RAS) Variables

The correlations between the various RAS variables are presented below. Although most of them are strongly correlated, none of them have full correlations, and 11 of the 20 correlations are less than .5. Excluding the overall separation variable, which is a composite of the other six variables, this is 71.4% of the correlations. This supports the contention that each variable measures a different aspect of separation of religion and state, requiring that they all be included in any study of the topic.

The frequencies of all of the variables except the official separation variable are presented in Tables A2 through A4. The frequency of the official separation variable is in Table 1 in this study.

26. See, for example, Huntington (1996, p. 70).

Table A1
Correlations Between Separation of Religion and State Variables

	General Restrictions	Religious Discrimination	Religious Regulation	Religious Legislation	Overall Separation
Official support	.350 (.000)	.367 (.000)	.090 (.269)	.703 (.000)	.723 (.000)
Official hostility	.225 (.005)	.254 (.002)	.496 (.000)	-.163 (.045)	.183 (.024)
General restrictions	—	.664 (.000)	.485 (.000)	.497 (.000)	.797 (.000)
Religious discrimination	—	—	.559 (.000)	.581 (.000)	.799 (.000)
Religious regulation	—	—	—	.325 (.000)	.593 (.000)
Religious legislation	—	—	—	—	.798 (.000)

Note: Correlations are two-tailed Pearson correlations. The numbers in parentheses are significance measures.

Table A2
Frequency of General Restrictions, Religious Discrimination, and Religious Regulation

General Restrictions		Religious Discrimination		Religious Regulation	
Value	Frequency	Value	Frequency	Value	Frequency
0	43	0	34	0	66
1	51	1	21	1	15
2	40	2	20	2	10
3	17	3	15	3	16
4	1	4	8	4	7
		5	7	5	9
		6	7	6	3
		8	1	7	4
		10	4	8	4
		11	4	9	2
		12	5	10	5
		13	4	11	5
		14	3	12	3
				13	1
				14	1
				16	1
				19	1

Table A3
Frequency of Religious Legislation

Value	Frequency	Value	Frequency	Value	Frequency
0	1	8	5	16	4
1	6	9	6	17	1
2	14	10	5	19	4
3	22	11	1	22	2
4	21	12	1	24	1
5	19	13	1	25	1
6	15	14	3	27	1
7	13	15	5		

Table A4
Frequency of Overall Separation

Value	Frequency	Value	Frequency	Value	Frequency
0 to 4.99	26	25 to 29.99	20	50 to 54.99	8
5 to 9.99	7	30 to 34.99	14	55 to 59.99	1
10 to 14.99	9	35 to 39.99	18	60 to 64.99	2
15 to 19.99	27	40 to 44.99	6	65 +	2
20 to 24.99	22	45 to 49.99	10		

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