

NASSERISM REVITALIZED.
A CRITICAL READING OF ḤASAN ḤANAḤĪ'S PROJECTS
"THE ISLAMIC LEFT" AND "OCCIDENTALISM"
(AND THEIR UNCRITICAL READING)¹

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One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that

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Abstract

Ḥasan Ḥanaḥī is often described as leading and original reformer of Arab thought, renovator of the Islamic cultural heritage (*turāth*) and advocate of political freedom. But these categorizations are based on insufficient analyses of his writings on both the Islamic and the Western intellectual heritage as well as his statements on current political issues. A critical reading of the first unveils that Ḥanaḥī misrepresents religious and philosophical doctrines and that he systematically passes over the fact that the relations between intellectual currents which he claims as role models for the "Islamic left" were marked by deep enmity. His writings on Marxism reveal that he merely condemns capitalism on moral terms without deeper analysis of the way it works. He himself proposes the idea of historical cycles determining the course of Eastern and Western civilization. This allows him to predict the imminent decline of the latter. The contradicting elements in Ḥanaḥī's thought do, however, gain coherence when analyzed in the context of his writings on the modern history of Egypt and the Middle East at large. Here he juxtaposes activist and progressive Nasserism to the religious quietism used by Sadat to legitimize his

¹ This article is based on an M.A. thesis at the "Orientalisches Seminar" of the Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen in 1996. A note on reference to Ḥanaḥī's writings: In the following, lower case Roman ciphers (i, v, x etc.) refer to the volumes of *Al-Dīn wa-l-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981*, whereas those in upper case (I, V, X etc.) indicate the volumes of *Min al-'Aqāda ilā l-Thawra*. See also the list of his writings at the end of this article.

² "Notes on Nationalism" quoted after *Collected Works* vol. xvii "I belong to the left—1945", London 1998, p. 154.

rule. From 1978 onwards he became an advocate of the Islamic revolution in Iran which he saw as rebirth of Nasserism and Tiermondism in general.

In 1981, Ḥasan Ḥanafī, professor of philosophy at Cairo University, published the first and only issue of the magazine *al-Yasār al-Islāmī*. The title was also intended to serve as the label of a new ideological movement. Profiting from the quest for a “Muslim Luther”³ Ḥanafī is a frequent guest at major international conferences⁴ and he served as program adviser at the International University in Tokyo. He is one of only 7 living authors to whom an article in “The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World” has been dedicated. This attention notwithstanding there is no comprehensive analysis of the major aspects of his thought in Western languages.⁵ Although Ḥanafī himself explicitly aims at bringing about political changes by his ideological activity, most of the western presentations of his thought deal with his project of *istighrāb* (“occidentalism”) or his reformulation of *turāth* without trying to assess their position in the context of Egyptian politics.⁶ The majority of authors dealing with Ḥanafī praises him as original rationalist thinker who presents Islam as enlightenment.⁷ Here, I will try to assess whether Ḥanafī is likely to come up to such expectations. A closer look at the actual intentions and concrete proposals of Islamic ideologists is most necessary in times when discussions in current Islamic studies increasingly center on the problem of how someone defines an “identity” on the most abstract possible level of “discourse”.

I will try to close this gap with an examination of the following works by Ḥanafī: 1. *al-Dīn wa-l-Thawra fī Miṣr*, an eight-volume collection of articles, interviews and speeches intended to have a direct political impact. They were written in the late seventies and early eighties, when Ḥanafī decided to favour political action over theoretical reflection

³ Kramer pp. 52ff.

⁴ Recent examples from Germany: “Fortschritt und Religion” hosted by the Goethe Institut <http://www.goethe.de/ins/vb/prj/fort/fur/hah/deindex.htm>. “Jewish and Islamic Hermeneutics als Cultural Critique” hosted by the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin <http://www.wiko-berlin.de/kolleg/projekte/AKMI/hermeneutik/akmiwsmysterium?hpl=2>.

⁵ Esposito & Voll pp. 68-90 focus on Ḥanafī’s biography.

⁶ The exceptions are Matthee and Yadlin pp. 41-62.

⁷ Cf. Schulze (1996) p. 286n27.

after being removed from his teaching-post in 1977.⁸ 2. The booklet *al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdūd* in which Ḥanafī explains the methodological premises and the objectives of his project to revolutionize culture and politics of the Islamic World in accordance with its “heritage”; 3. *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā l-Thawra*, a “reinterpretation” of *kalām* in the context of the aforementioned project; 4. *al-Muqaddima fī ‘Ilm al-Istighrāb*, another part of this project, combining a conventional handbook account of Western philosophy with the most extensive presentation of Ḥanafī’s views on the development of Western civilization; 5. *Huwār al-Mashriq wa-l-Maghrib*, the public correspondence with the Moroccan professor of philosophy al-Jābiri in the Paris based weekly *al-Yawm al-Sābi‘*. Ḥanafī’s recent writings dedicated to the issue of “globalization” will occasionally be touched upon.

Furthermore I will refer to writings on Ḥanafī by major critics in the Arab world. The three most important examples are refutations from different ideological points of view. But while his former student Abū Zayd concentrates on criticizing Ḥanafī’s methodological premises in *Naqd al-Khiṭāb al-Dīnī*, the Jordanian Communist Nāhiḍ Ḥattar and Jurj Ṭarābīshī, the exponent of psychoanalytical literary criticism in the Arab World, indulge in malicious polemics.⁹

An analysis of Ḥanafī’s writings poses several problems. The most severe one has been singled out by Ṭarābīshī: “When one reads Ḥanafī’s writings, what catches the eye first is the author’s almost infinite ability to contradict himself.”¹⁰ This article attempts to explain this

⁸ i.5 *Muqaddimat al-ṭab‘a al-ūlā*.

⁹ Ṭarābīshī’s theses would deserve a study of its own, but I will not deal with his arguments based on psychoanalysis, because of my lacking competence to evaluate this method and my doubts concerning its scientific value. His study on Ḥanafī is preceded by a theoretical outline and a demonstration of his theses with reference to a large number of intellectuals from different political camps (pp. 17-101): By paralleling individual and collective psychic development, Ṭarābīshī denounces the entire *turāth*-discourse as regressive (*nukūṣī*) reaction to the traumatic shock (*ṣadma, raḍḍa*) caused by the confrontation of the omnipotent overfather “West”, depicted with phallic symbols (*khanjar Isrā’īl*, with its air-force in 1967). This, he says, led to a neurotic flight towards collectives depicted with female, maternal images (such as *umma, jamāhīr*). These collectives allow the individual to merge with them and thus spare it the confrontation with reality. The manifestation of this flight reflex is a narcissistic compensation (*tarmīm narjasī*) marked by an idealization of collective identity and a regression towards pre-logical (*qabmantiqī*) and magical thought, which renders a realist approach towards reality impossible.

¹⁰ Ṭarābīshī (1991) p. 105; similar Zakariyyā’ pp. 57, 61, 73, 95.

inconsistency instead of searching for a coherent ideology where there is none. Another problem is Ḥanafī's tendency rather to evoke than to explain.¹¹ He reduces complex systems of thought to one or two catchwords, or he even confines himself to name-dropping. To imagine what the actualized *turāth* should look like is left to the reader. On the other hand, where Ḥanafī deals with the Islamic heritage, he often cites doctrines by referring to "the elders", "the 'ulamā'", "the Islamic thinkers", thus suggesting that certain doctrines represent Islam as such. Moreover, he takes theological and philosophical terms (especially *tawḥīd*¹²) out of context and gives them a suggestive meaning.

Ḥanafī's understanding of the Terms "Ideology" and "Left"

In the editorial of his magazine *al-Yasār al-Islāmī*, Ḥanafī declares that the project of an "Islamic Left" continues al-Afghānī's and 'Abduh's efforts to unite the *umma* in resistance to imperialism and to modernize the Islamic creed by taking into consideration the political and social needs of the Muslim masses.¹³ But Ḥanafī's objectives are more far-reaching: he aims, as a *'ālim multazim* (= *engagé*), at designing a new ideology. For him this term implies a positive notion. He stresses this by equating it with "science" in a Third World context. Due to his intention of founding an ideology on the basis of *turāth* instead of a "museum of thoughts" he refutes methods that would question the relevance of theological, legal and philosophical concepts for the present.¹⁴ He underlines the main intention of his ideological activities

¹¹ Hildebrandt p. 46.

¹² i.143ff. *muqawwimāt al-shakḥṣiyya al-'arabiyya*, speech in Tripolis, 1984 (henceforth *muqawwimāt*); in an interview by Navid Kermani following the German edition of his *Naqd al-khiṭāb al-dīnī*, Abū Zayd (1996) p. 206 does not explicitly refer to Ḥanafī, but it is obvious at whom his criticism of the associative and anachronistic use of religious terminology is directed.

¹³ viii.3, 75, *mādhā ya'nī al-yasār al-islāmī*, 1981 (henceforth *yasār*) the name of the magazine project was intended to be *al-'Urwa-l-wuthqā al-jadīda* or *al-Manār al-jadīd* first; vii.5 *al-yasār wa-l-yamīn fi l-fikr al-dīnī*, 1976 (henceforth *yamīn*, the article is a *talkhīṣ* of *Min al-'Aqīda ilā l-Thawra*).

¹⁴ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* pp. 23f, 24n12, against historian, analytical and projective (*isqāṭī*) methods and the search for influences (*minhaj al-athar wa l-ta'aththur*) p. 82ff, against a "*mathaf li l-afkār*" (p. 89); the description of ideology as "neutral and objective" science also: Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 71-3ff.; Scheffold pp. 87, 92 wants to see "Historisierungsbambitionen" but

by reformulating Feuerbach's statement that all theology is anthropology and he deplures:

...the lacking ability to develop theology (*ilāhiyyāt*) into theoretical thought and further into an economic and political ideology with clear characteristics, which can only be brought forth in a rational and practical way. ... Therefore the desire to attempt to confront ideologies of today with an Islamic ideology is still alive in our thought.¹⁵

In the introduction to *Min al-ʿAqīda ilā l-Thawra*, he alludes to Marx by stating that it is not his aim to improve the understanding of the World but to change it. In *al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdīd*, he describes revolutionary change as the result of ideological activity¹⁶, and with a sideswipe at al-Ghazālī he calls for an *ihyāʾ ʿulūm al-dunyā*.¹⁷ The use of the term “Left” is justified by Ḥanafī as a terminological convention with reference to the “Hegelian” and the “Freudian Left”. He considers all those political or philosophical currents as leftist that side with the oppressed masses against the *status quo*, thus disassociating the term from the exclusive association with Marxism.¹⁸

The *Umma*'s Seven Challenges and the four National Currents

According to Ḥanafī the Islamic *umma* is currently facing seven major challenges (*tahaddiyāt al-ʿaṣr*) to which a new revolutionary ideology is supposed to develop adequate responses¹⁹:

some peripheral remarks cannot neutralize the practice of several volumes; according to Campanini p. 117n28, Ḥanafī's anti-historism is due to the influence of Husserl. But this philosopher's anti-historism is one aspect of his anti-relativist epistemology: Husserl pp. 323-341. As will be shown, Ḥanafī can in no way be considered an anti-relativist; for a critical assessment of Ḥanafī's reception of Husserl cf. Jum'a pp. 139ff.

¹⁵ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 38, also vi.264f. *muḥāwala ḥawla sīra dhātīyya*, (*sīra*); Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” p. 26; II.556ff.: *ʿilm al-kalām ʿilm maqlūb*; Ḥanafī's use of the pronoun “we” is not the *pluralis modestatis* of traditional Arab authors. It reflects his ambition to act as the spokesman of the *umma*.

¹⁶ I.32, 6f; Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 58.

¹⁷ viii.254 *aḥādīth fi l-yaṣār al-islāmī*, 1984; cf. also the frequent quotation of the following verse by Maḥmūd Darwish: “*wa ḥtamā abūka bil-nuṣūṣ ja jā'a l-luṣūṣ*” e.g. Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 118n60.

¹⁸ viii.7 *yaṣār*.

¹⁹ Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hīwār* p. 26f.; vii.307 *al-ʿilmāniyya wa-l-fikr al-inqilābī wa tahaddiyāt al-ʿaṣr*, 1984.

1. *Tahrīr al-arḍ*: all occupied Muslim territories, particularly Palestine, are to be liberated from non-Muslim rule. He explicitly counters “Erets Israel” as the central topos of Zionist ideology.²⁰
2. The liberties: Ḥanafī draws a bleak picture of an Arab world suffering from tyranny and the absence of freedom.
3. Social justice: Ḥanafī calls for the abolition of the blatant inequality inside the Islamic societies and of the gaps between the rich and the poor Islamic states.
4. Unity instead of fragmentation: A united *umma* ought to replace the present assembly of small artificial Arab states. These are proud of their flags and anthems but their borders are artificial, and their existence is not justified by any national identity. Therefore he rejects rivalling ideologies like tribalism (*qabāʾilīyya*), confessionalism (*tāʾifīyya*) and particularism (*qutriyya*).
5. Identity instead of Westernization: he calls for the creation of a real synthesis between modernity and tradition, instead of the Western model of a “total break with the past”, or the eclecticism prevailing in the contemporary Muslim world.
6. Material progress for the masses.
7. Mobilization of the masses against passivity.

The second main objective of the “Islamic Left” is a united front of action composed of Egypt’s “four national currents” (*al-tayyārāt al-waṭaniyya al-arbaʿa*): Liberalism, Marxism, Nasserism and the “Islamic movement”. Liberalism, which Ḥanafī equates with the bourgeois nationalist movement, receives the least attention. He praises its role in the development of modern educational institutions in Egypt as well as its leading role in the formation of a national consciousness. Earlier generations of liberals, like al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, generally receive a more favourable treatment, because they did not yet question Egypt’s Islamic identity, whereas Ḥanafī criticizes later representatives, like Ṭāhā Ḥusayn or the neo-Wafd for propagating Westernization and reconciliation with imperialism.²¹

Revolutionary and Reactionary Religion

“Religion is the opium of the people and the cry of the wretched creature”

²⁰ Explicitly in Ḥanafī, “Berlin” p. 105.

²¹ viii.69 *yasār*; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* pp. 59f.; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 50ff.; on the Neo-Wafd: Ḥanafī, “Berlin” p. 86.

This quotation from Marx's *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* is the major leitmotif of Ḥanafī's writings.²² Ḥanafī slightly rearranges the sentence to make it appear more antithetic, and he also interprets it in a way that distorts its original context but supports Ḥanafī's own thesis: religion is not reactionary as such but may also harbour revolutionary interpretations and traditions that can bring about political change.

In the editorial in *al-Nasār al-Islāmī* Ḥanafī sets out to discover the revolutionary potential of religion. First he states that religion as such means revolution. Muḥammad and the prophets before him were revolutionaries: Ibrāhīm revolted against *shirk* in the name of *tawḥīd*, 'Isā revolted against matter and materialism in the name of spirit, Muḥammad led the revolt of the downtrodden in Mecca against the Quraysh nobility in the name of "liberty, equality and fraternity". Therefore they had to suffer persecution and death at the behest of the worldly rulers,²³ whose vested interests they attacked. But the prophets were not only revolutionaries, they were also the "teachers (*murabbūn*) of mankind", a hint at Ḥanafī's understanding of Islam as the true Enlightenment. He alludes to Lessing's treatise *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* which he has translated and commented upon. Ḥanafī interprets Lessing's triadic concept of religious history from Judaism via Christianity towards the religion of reason in the light of Muḥammad 'Abduh's superficially similar concept in *Risālat al-Tawḥīd*. According to Ḥanafī, the final revelation of Islam corresponds to the natural religion of the Enlightenment philosophers because it provides mankind with an amount of rationality that renders any further revelation superfluous.²⁴

Ḥanafī discovers revolutionary tendencies not only in the Islamic heritage but also in other religions. He cites the rebellion of Bar Kochba against Roman oppression, Thomas Müntzer as the leader of the sixteenth century's peasants' war in Germany, the "revolutionary priests" in Latin America, but also Mao and Ho Chi Minh as revolutionary

²² *Al-dīn afyūn al-sha'b wa-ṣarkhat al-muḍṭahad*, e. g. viii.178 *al-tanwīr al-dīnī wa-l-tanzīm al-siyāsī*, 1976.

²³ Note the deviation from traditional Islamic prophethology.

²⁴ viii.58f *yasār*; vi.265 *sīra*; vii.157ff *mādhā tā'nī: ashhadu allā ilāha illā l-Llāh*; I.17, apu ff., IV.111, 5ff., V.419; cf. also his annotations to Lessing pp. 206, 209ff., 305; "intervista" p. 71; cf. 'Abduh pp. 448ff.

Confucians and Buddhists! In addition he invokes a variety of political movements from the history of Islam like the Qarmatians, the Sudanese Mahdī and the *zanj*.²⁵ But for him the main source for a revolutionary interpretation of Islam is to be found in its theological, philosophical and juridical doctrines.

In his attempt to reinterpret *turāth*, Ḥanafī divides it into different branches, in each of which he singles out “leftist” and “rightist” schools of thought. He pays most attention to the field of theology, where he strictly opposes “rightist” Ash‘arism “*firqat al-sultān*” to “leftist” Mu‘tazilism, “the open opposition from the inside”. The “Islamic Left” ought to be a “radical Mu‘tazilite movement”.²⁶ Ḥanafī criticizes Ash‘arism, above all al-Ghazālī—allegedly its foremost representative—for defending the belief in miracles, which according to Ḥanafī wrought havoc on science and rationality and thus initiated the decline of the Islamic world. Furthermore, he holds the doctrine of *khalq al-af‘āl* responsible for the passivity prevailing in the Muslim societies.²⁷ In reverse, he praises Mu‘tazilism for promoting activism by defending free will, and for stimulating rationalism and scientific inquiry by stressing causality of natural processes. Ḥanafī equates ‘*adāla*, one of the five principles of Mu‘tazilism to social justice. *Al-khayr wa-l-sharr al-‘aqliyyān*, allegedly also standing for one of five principles (*sic*, actually replacing the *manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*), appear as antidote to scripturalism.²⁸ Ḥanafī interprets the Mu‘tazilite doctrine of *al-aṣlah* in a way that clears God of any responsibility for evil. The present deplorable state of affairs is to be considered manmade and hence removable by political action. In other places he reformulates the doctrine of *al-aṣlah* as a duty to improve the world through a revolution for the poor.²⁹ He praises the physical theories

²⁵ viii.60f. *yasār*.

²⁶ viii.18ff. *yasār*; on the three types of opposition and the *firqat al-sultān*: V.328n279, V.420-461.; The reappraisal of Mu‘tazilism can be traced back to Muḥammad ‘Abduh. The most important “neo-Mu‘tazilī” was Aḥmad Amīn. In our context it is noteworthy that he presented his reappraisal in a cyclical concept of the historical development of the Islamic World, Caspar pp. 178ff. and *passim*.

²⁷ vii.17f. *yamīn*; Campanini pp. 100ff.

²⁸ viii.317f. *ḥiwār ḥawl al-waḥda al-waṭaniyya*, in “Roz al-Yūsuf”, 1988 (henceforth: *waḥda*), III.353,5ff.; correct listing of *al-uṣūl al-khamsa* in Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” p. 38.

²⁹ vii.28 *yamīn*; Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” p. 32; III.449ff., III.471ff., III.484ff.; stress on human and economic causes of evil and human responsibility for relief: III.315ff.; if Ḥanafī’s interpretations fit the Mu‘tazilī teachings may be doubted cf. Ormsby pp. 219ff.

of the early Mu'tazilite *aṣḥāb al-tawābī*³⁰ like al-Nazzām, Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād, Thumāma b. Ashras and al-Jāhiz³⁰ for denying the existence of independent accidents. He often invokes their concepts in the defense of Marxist materialism, or he proposes their "naturalism" as an authentic alternative to Western materialist concepts, for example in the refutation of *al-Naza'āt al-Māddiyya fī l-Falsafa al-'Arabiyya al-Islāmiyya* by the Communist Party of Lebanon central-committee member Ḥusayn Muruwwa.³¹

Ḥanafī awards political relevance to the struggle against anthropomorphism which he equates with Ash'arism. He condemns the equation of God and worldly rulers as a justification for exploitation and for authoritarian political systems. Ḥanafī describes the behavior of worldly rulers by alluding to the *asmā' ḥusnā*: the ruler is rich (*Ghanī*) and donates generously (*Mu'ṭī*, *Wahhāb*). Ordinary men appear as humble petitioners towards both God and the rulers, although they should claim their rights from the capitalist system with self-confidence. Therefore Ḥanafī rejects the "hierarchical worldview" of traditional religion by denouncing the idea of God as supreme mover beyond this world as a product of capitalism, designed to inculcate the opinion that worldly affairs are beyond control and unchangeable.³²

Ḥanafī recommends Khārijism, the "opposition from outside", and Shiism, "the under cover opposition from inside" as further alternatives to Ash'arism without delving into details. The appraisal of Shiism is a reflex of the "Great Islamic Revolution in Iran", whereas the Khārijīs are described as exponents of revolutionary egalitarianism.³³

Contrary to what might be expected from an Islamic reformer, Ḥanafī does not consider medieval Islamic philosophy as such as progressive. He praises a rationalist current beginning with al-Kindī and reaching its zenith with Ibn Rushd. But he rejects the illuminationist concepts of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Ḥanafī attacks the neo-Platonic concept of a hierarchical state governed by a *ra'īs mulham* and he disapproves of any

³⁰ This designation is false cf. Van Ess (1991) vol. ii pp. 39ff., vol. iii p. 239.

³¹ viii.230ff. *al-dīn wa-l-turāth wa-l-thawra*, 1985; cf. Muruwwa vol. i pp. 755ff. on the "materialism" of al-Nazzām.

³² vii.48ff. *al-dīn wa-l-ra'smalīyya*, in "Roz al-Yūsuf" (1976) (*ra'smalīyya*); I.10, I.22ff., I.30; Ḥanafī, "Buḥūth" p. 30; Ḥanafī, "Théologie" p. 252.

³³ In this context it is worthwhile to note that in official Egyptian religious discourse the militant Islamist groups (*jamā'āt*) are denounced as Khārijīs: Jansen (1997) p. 33.

dualism of matter and form, body and soul. Combined with a preference for speculation over action, he holds these concepts responsible for the passivity and the neglect of the real world prevailing among contemporary Muslims. His siding with Ibn Rushd in philosophy is due to the latter's criticism of al-Ghazālī. Ibn Rushd's physical theory is described as another equivalent of materialism and is therefore used in the defense of Marxism.³⁴ By rejecting Ibn Sīnā in favour of Ibn Rushd Ḥanafī diverts markedly from a Marxist school of thought (Engels, Bloch, Ley, Tīzinī, Muruwwa) which considers both as precursors of European rationalism and materialism.³⁵ On the other hand Ḥanafī does not fall prey to the dilemma of other neo-Averroists who simultaneously stress Ibn Rushd's relevance for Western science and rationalism and his accordance with orthodoxy by referring to those theological writings that do not openly contradict widely accepted Islamic doctrines but were irrelevant for the intellectual development of Europe.³⁶ Another idea of Ibn Rushd that plays a major role in Ḥanafī's specialist writings is the denial of an individual afterlife, to which he opposes worldly salvation. But in his articles for dailies and magazines he refers to this aspect only once. There he declares that the only possible form of afterlife consists of the effects of one's actions and the memory one leaves in the collective mind of fellow men. The closest parallel in the Islamic heritage is the doctrine discussed in Ibn Rushd's major commentary on *de anima*, according to which the individual soul merges with the active intellect after death.³⁷

³⁴ viii.21f *yasār*, against dualism: IV.463ff.

³⁵ Von Kügelgen pp. 238ff.; Muruwwa vol. ii pp. 693-702 with some criticism of idealist elements in Ibn Sīnā's thought. The tradition can be traced back to Engels's remarks on the "Freigeisterei der Araber" in *Die Dialektik der Natur* (MEGA vol. I, 24a) p. 299.

³⁶ Cf. Von Kügelgen pp. 187, 194f., 204 on 'Imāra.

³⁷ On afterlife and salvation: vii. 28f *yamīn*; explicit: IV.539,-5ff: "*al-khulūd 'amalīyya sāhama fihā kull afrād, kull yukmilu l-ākhar hattā yakhluda l-dhihn al-basharī al-khāliq al-mubdī wa huwa mā sammāhū l-ḥukamā' khulūd al-'aql al-fū'āl wa inna l-khulūd al-fardī la-yaḥidu kamālahu illā fī khulūd al-jamā'a fi l-ḥadāra wa-l-ta'rikh*"; concepts of an afterworld as *ṣuwar fanniyya* IV.531ff.; human beings create their eternal existence by activism: IV.538,-11ff.; other extensive refutations of beliefs on death and resurrection: IV.384,4ff; worldly reformulations e.g.: "*fa-huwa (al-bā'th) wāqī'a shu'ūrīyya tumaththilu lahḥat al-yaqza fi l-ḥayāt muqābil lahḥat al-mawt wa-l-sukūn*" IV.450,5f., 467,-3ff.; Ḥanafī, "Buhūth" pp. 31, 34ff.; see also Von Kügelgen pp. 232f. and Campanini p. 112; the influence of Rudolf Bultmann's demythologizing Christian theology, cannot be

In the field of legal theory, Ḥanafī does not contrast “right” and “left” with equal strictness but he expresses his preference for Mālikism. Ḥanafī states that this school is based on the principle of *maṣlaḥa mursala*, which was formulated by al-Shāṭibī but which can be traced back to ‘Umar (i.e. his “nationalization” of the Sassanid domains).³⁸ Moreover Ḥanafī defines *tashrīf* as human activity and al-Shāṭibī was the only classical jurist to express a similar opinion.³⁹ Apart from his proposal to base legislation on *maṣlaḥa*, he joins in the reformist demand for the reopening of *ijtihād*. The qualifications he demands for a *mujtahid* are low: a thorough knowledge of Arabic, a knowledge of the *asbāb al-nuzūl* and the needs of the *umma*. The latter may again be a reflex of the thoughts of al-Shāṭibī, who declares the knowledge of the *maqāṣid al-shar‘* to be the main prerequisite for a *mujtahid*.⁴⁰ Ḥanafī’s dynamic concept of *ijtihād* is completed by a dynamic concept of *ijmā‘* which ought to change with every generation.⁴¹

Ḥanafī also pays his tribute to the scientific achievements of medieval Islam and advocates a fresh spirit of scientific inquiry. In other contexts, he describes these scientific efforts as essentially Islamic results of *tawḥīd*. He judges cosmological theories not in respect of their scientific tenability but their ideological utility: “Which of the ancient theories is the most useful in order to claim back *al-arḍ*? Creation, emanation or pre-existence of matter (*qidam*)?”⁴² In the field of humanities Ḥanafī compares himself to Ibn Khaldūn, “who recorded the first cycle of Islamic civilization”.

ruled out. Ḥanafī refers to him with approval: viii.62 *yasār*; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 261, 1ff.; Ḥanafī, “Théologie” p. 260.

³⁸ viii.14, 20f. *yasār* (instead of *madhāhib* Ḥanafī writes *madāris fiqhīyya*!); Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hūwār* p. 195; Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” p. 53f.; I.40: “*anā faqīh min fuqahā‘ al-muslimīn ujadiddu lahum dīnahum wa urā‘ī maṣāliḥ al-nās*”; III.473ff., III.484 pu f.; the reference to ‘Umar is a Nasserist propaganda formula quoted iv.117 *tamīya*, see p. 95, and Kassian pp. 194ff., 262ff.

³⁹ viii.268 *hūwār ḥawla l-fikr al-islāmī*, 1977; al-Shāṭibī vol. iv pp. 245f.: “*fa idhā kāna l-mujtahid anshā‘a l-aḥkām bi-ḥasab nazarihi awi jīhādīhi fa huwa min ḥādha l-wajh shār‘*.” for the uniqueness of this position see Masud/ Messick/ Powers p. 9.

⁴⁰ al-Shāṭibī vol. iv pp. 105ff., 114ff., 162ff.; viii. 223f, *al-Islām wa-l-qam al-khāmīs ‘ashar*, 1981.

⁴¹ *ibid.*; viii.15f *yasār*, viii.295ff *al-yasār al-islāmī lā yaṭlubu l-sulṭa wa lā yurīduhā*, 1982; Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” p. 65; Iqbāl pp. 116ff.

⁴² viii.24f. *yasār* (quotation); vii.9 *yamīn*; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hūwār* p. 26; most extensive: I.378ff. (*nazariyyat al-wujūd*), I. 521ff. (*unṭūlujjīyat al-wujūd*) esp. 547,5ff., II.5ff. (*al-barāhīn ‘alā wujūd al-wa‘y al-khālīṣ*); *tawḥīd* as inspiration for medieval Islamic mathematicians: Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p.188ff; ii.13 *al-ibḏā‘ al-fikrī al-dhātī*, 1981; ii.300ff. *al-‘ilm al-islāmī wa-l-gharb*, 1989, the review of a translation of Sigrid Hunke’s trivial *Allahs Sonne über dem Abendland*.

But he pays more attention to a renewal of the Islamic sciences like *tafsīr* and *ḥadīth* than to a renewal of secular sciences.⁴³ In the field of *tafsīr* Ḥanafī rejects the “historical” *tafsīr* of the past, according to which the Qur’ān only deals with bygone events. He favours a “thematical” *tafsīr*, in which the teachings of the Qur’ān on certain subjects are demonstrated by collecting the respective verses instead. This method of exegesis is to be the preparatory stage of a “*tafsīr* of consciousness” containing a comprehensive, revolutionary Qur’ānic *weltanschauung*.⁴⁴ He argues with reference to the *asbāb al-nuzūl* that the message of the Qur’ān deals with social reality but that it has to be reinterpreted⁴⁵ because of changed circumstances. *Ḥadīth* is not rated very high by Ḥanafī. He only accepts *mutawātir* traditions. Moreover, the judgment on the *tawātur* of *aḥādīth* has to be based on their accordance with reason, experience and the Qur’ān, and not only on the reliability of their *isnād*:⁴⁶ This might be a reflex of al-Shāḥibī’s theory that all juridically relevant *aḥādīth* have a foundation in the Qur’ān.⁴⁷ Notably similar opinions were discussed passionately among the *Ikhwān al-muslimūn* in the fifties.⁴⁸ In Ḥanafī’s eyes, a new kind of biography of the Prophet is also in demand, because the messenger’s message has been submerged in the veneration of his person. This threatens to lead Muslims astray like the *ahl al-kitāb*, who adore the messengers instead of following the message. Therefore Ḥanafī praises Wahhābism (*allatī nasha’at fī l-Ḥijāz!*) for its struggle against the veneration of Muḥammad.⁴⁹ Ḥanafī

⁴³ viii.25ff. *yasār*

⁴⁴ Examples for *tafsīr al-maḍmūn*: against private property: vii.121-45 *al-māl fī l-Qur’ān* (*māl*), 1979; English version: *The Method of Thematic Interpretation of the Coran*; on the evil character of Jews see pp. 84ff. Concerning *tafsīr* Ḥanafī does not name specific role models, but it is obvious that Sayyid Quṭb’s *Fī Zīlāl al-Qur’ān* is the model for a revolutionary *tafsīr*, whereas the method of thematic interpretation has been formulated by al-Khūlī (pp. 304ff.) and Maḥmūd Shaltūt, *shaykh al-Azhar* under Nasser: Zebiri pp. 150ff.

⁴⁵ The particular stress on the *asbāb an-nuzūl* (also I.19, apu f., I.345, 9ff.) may also be due to the influence of al-Shāḥibī vol. ii. (347ff.); the reception of his theories in modern Islam deserves a closer examination: cf. Masud (1995) pp. 109ff., 162ff., 167f.; Hallaq (1997) pp. 218ff.; al-Khūlī pp. 290ff.

⁴⁶ Ḥanafī, “*Buḥūth*” p. 59; IV.14,6ff., IV.144,7ff., IV.212ff.

⁴⁷ Vol. iv. p. 12ff., 29; Hallaq (1991) pp. 72f., 77f.

⁴⁸ Mitchell p. 238, reporting private conversation; on *ḥadīth*-criticism in modern Islam, mainly in the South Asian context: Brown.

⁴⁹ vii.164f. *maqālāt fī l-yasār al-dīnī*, 1978; IV.396, 5ff.; vii.155 *mādhā ta’nī ashhadu lā ilāha illā l-Lāh*, 1978; I.14, apu ff.

even goes as far as considering Muḥammad fallible in religious matters, for example with regard to invention of the “Satanic verses” in order to reach a temporary compromise with pagan tribes. Therefore Ḥanafī defends Salman Rushdie’s right to deal critically with this issue.⁵⁰

In the field of applied law Ḥanafī gives priority to social matters and *jihād* instead of rituals and purity, which he underlines by quoting Khumaynī’s statement that “we are not the *fuqahā’* of menses and childbed”. Ḥanafī does not elaborate a theory of *jihād* but considers warfare legitimate and calls *jihād* the “forgotten duty”. In line with his general preference for the *mu’āmalāt* over the *‘ibādāt*, Ḥanafī redefines the pillars of Islam with an activist meaning: *hajj* ought to be an annual international Islamic conference, fasting teaches the satiated compassion with the hungry, *zakāt* does not mean almsgiving but collective ownership (*ishtirāk al-māl*), prayer teaches a sense of the time, and *shahāda* does not mean to murmur a formula, but being aware of reality and the willingness to sacrifice oneself in the struggle against the idols (*tawāghīt*) of a materialist, egotistical attitude towards life like money, social status and lust.⁵¹

In *al-Yasār al-Islāmī* and other writings dedicated to a wider public, Ḥanafī condemns mysticism because it teaches patience, passivity and withdrawal from the world at a time when activism is most necessary. In his attacks on mysticism he advocates Iqbāl’s understanding of the Islamic message as an activist program of continual change against the attitude of leaving the world unchanged. As an antidote to the practical consequences of mysticism, especially the doctrine of the intercession of the *shaykhs*, he recommends neo-Ḥanbalite puritanism. Therefore he praises Wahhābism as revolution against saint worship.⁵² Nevertheless, Ḥanafī partly exculpates mysticism as an understandable overreaction of the pious to the failure of the Alid revolution against

⁵⁰ In the discussion following his speech: *al-wahy wa-l-wāqī’* in Adūnis et al.: *al-Islām wa-l-ḥadātha*, pp. 234f.

⁵¹ viii.27ff. *yasār*; on *jihād* as *farīda ghā’iba*: I.30,-6f.; viii.295 *sulṭa*; on the *shahāda* vii.151f. *mādhā ta’ni ashhadu lā ilāha illā Llāh?*; vii.54 *yamīn*; IV.380f.; Campanini p. 105; for the interpretation of the *shahāda* cf. Ibn Taymiyya pp. 42, 59.

⁵² viii.22ff. *yasār*; iv.313ff. *al-taṣawwuf wa-l-tanmīya*, 1981; V.324; Chartier p. 609; on Iqbāl and Sufism viii.297 *al-yasār al-islāmī lā yaṭlubu l-sulṭa wa lā yurīduhā*; for a general assessment of anti-Sufism in Egypt: de Jong.

the luxury of the Umayyad empire. The inability to save the world led to the egotistical attempt to save oneself/one's soul (*nafs*). In writings not aiming at immediate political impact, Ḥanafī admits that mysticism may be a useful device to build a personal relationship with God. As such it might find its deserved place in a world that has changed for the better.⁵³ Finally he uses the concept of *wahdat al-wujūd* in the defense of Marxist materialism.⁵⁴

Because Ḥanafī considers the message of Islam as thoroughly belonging to this world, he strictly opposes any speculation on supernatural and invisible phenomena. Instead, he favours “struggling for the people”, which he legitimizes by almost identifying them with God.⁵⁵ He accuses the capitalist system of reifying what is beyond perception in the material forms of *mawāṭid* and sufi orders in order to let religion appear as self-sufficient set of ceremonies apart from social reality. Ḥanafī brands all forms of outward, ritualistic (*shia'ā'irīn, mazharī*) religion as “capitalist religion”. With this he attacks phenomena that characterized the boom of popular devotion during the Sadat era, like mosque-building and religious festivals. According to him they are used by politicians and the upper-class to present themselves as pious Muslims and to divert attention from malpractice and the exploitation of the world's resources.⁵⁶ But not only the rich are accused of exploiting religion for their purposes: The Egyptian state abuses the ordinary believer's blind reverence for the *rijāl al-dīn*, although Islam disapproves of a clergy. Ḥanafī insinuates that both have struck a political bargain: the government protects vested interests of the *ulamā'* whereas they legitimize its policy with *fatwās*, peace with Israel included. Furthermore, the religious scholars play a major role in the defense of private property and the propaganda for a pro-Western alignment by preaching that

⁵³ On Alid revolution also Ḥanafī, *Tuwāth* pp. 14, 185; vi.222 *sīra*; for origin of this argument among the *Ikhwān*: Mitchell p. 214; on “Western” materialism: viii.41 *yasār*; positive evaluation of mysticism: Ḥanafī, *Tuwāth* p. 187f., cf. also Von Kügelgen p. 211; to which extent Ḥanafī's concepts concerning “Sufi hermeneutics” can only be discussed when Akhavi (1997) p. 378 explains what that is supposed to mean in this context.

⁵⁴ vii.230 *tashwīh*; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddīma* pp. 177f.

⁵⁵ vii.33 *yamīn*: “*Allāh wa-l-shā'b šinwān, lā yumkin taṣawwur Allāh bidūn umma*”; Ḥanafī, “Théologie” p. 260; I.30,2f.; Campanini p. 113.

⁵⁶ vii.48ff. *ra'smāliyya*; vii.253 *al-wathaniyya al-jadīda*, 1976; vii.267ff. *dhabab al-maqṣūra ... wa jaw' al-fuqarā'*, 1978.

the imperialist West may be rapacious and oppressive, but unlike the atheist East, at least respects religion.⁵⁷

Anachronisms and Contradictions in Ḥanafī's Invented Tradition

Anybody slightly acquainted with the political and intellectual history of Islam will be stunned at how easily Ḥanafī projects several currents, the actual relations of which were marked by deep enmity, back into the past as one "Islamic Left". The most striking example is the simultaneous appreciation of Mu'tazilism and Ḥanbalism.⁵⁸ This does not result from a lack of knowledge of Ibn Ḥanbal's fate. Ḥanafī praises his steadfastness towards oppression, but suppresses the fact that this occurred during the *mihna*.⁵⁹ Although no leading Mu'tazilī theologian took part in the persecution of opponents,⁶⁰ the fact that Mu'tazilī doctrines were used for repression would hardly fit the democratic, freedom-loving image of Mu'tazilism which is designed by Ḥanafī.

In the case of al-Ghazālī, Ḥanafī grossly exaggerates his occasionalism by taking the arguments from the 17th chapter of *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* out of context and accusing him of teaching that the world is totally incalculable at any time.⁶¹ Furthermore he withholds the fact that al-Ghazālī's arguments belong to a tradition that started with the Mu'tazilī Abū Hudhayl.⁶² Nor does he mention al-Ghazālī's opinion that anyone who sets out to

⁵⁷ vii.65f. *ra'smāliyya*; cf. Zeghal pp. 238ff.

⁵⁸ Most Western authors neglect the Ḥanbalite influence on Ḥanafī whereas for his secularist critics in the Arab world it is a major bone of contention cf. Khulayf quoted in Hildebrandt p. 119; Zakariyyā' pp. 51ff.

⁵⁹ viii.14 *yasār*.

⁶⁰ Van Ess (1991) vol. ii pp. 180f., 164, vol. iv p. 672; Ṭarābīshī (1992) p. 229 criticizes Ḥanafī's misinterpretation of Mu'tazilism as opposition movement and reproaches him of overestimating the rationalist aspect of their theology.

⁶¹ A detailed reappraisal of al-Ghazālī's theories of miracles that dissects the traditional clichés is presented by Rudolph pp. 57ff. Moreover he and his collaborator Perler conclude that in the West occasionalism has played a decisive role in overcoming Aristotelian hylemorphism and thus paved the way for Hume's empiricism with its theory of causality as empirical regularities, *ibid.* pp. 257f.

⁶² vi.354 *al-thawra al-muḍādda mu'āmara isti'māriyya*, 1987; for the origin of the 'āda-concept: Van Ess (1966) p. 214 a now more detailed id. 1991ff.: vol. iv. , and Rudolph pp. 28ff.; for the problematic labeling of al-Ghazālī as "Ash'arite" see Frank pp. 15ff., 36ff., 95ff.

defend cosmological doctrines that contradict mathematical proofs does a disservice to Islam.⁶³ Occasionally Ḥanafī even pretends that there was a *miḥna* against Mu‘tazilism, and that al-Ghazālī refuted logics.⁶⁴ The doctrines of the “leftist” Ibn Taymiyya on miracles, cosmology, the attributes of God as well as his attacks on logics ought to be considered even further “to the right” according to Ḥanafī’s own criteria.⁶⁵ In his writings, the relationship between Wahhābism and the Saudi monarchy is conspicuous by absence. He considers the latter completely illegitimate and even writes ‘Hijāz’ where he lists contemporary states.⁶⁶

Three factors account for Ḥanafī’s selection from the Islamic heritage and thus for his anachronisms and ahistorical presentations:

First of all, the choice of the currents which Ḥanafī discovers as the “Islamic Left” in the past is due to superficial parallels to those Western religious movements, philosophical doctrines and ideologies which he himself considers progressive. Mu‘tazilism is frequently equated to European Enlightenment, in particular to the teachings of Spinoza,⁶⁷ in spite of obvious differences like an immanentist versus a transcendentalist concept of God, or the Mu‘tazilite concept of *al-aṣlah* (as understood by Ḥanafī) versus Spinoza’s clockwork-like *deus sive natura*, the perfection of which may affect mankind quite negatively. In this context Ḥanafī makes use of widespread anachronistic clichés in apologetical writing which let the Islamic past appear as an idealized anticipation of modernity. In spite of his outspoken elitism he describes Ibn Rushd as a popular orator who directed his enlightening messages to “the masses” of Cordoba: If Ibn Rushd ever preached to the masses it is likely that it

⁶³ *Tahāfut* pp. 80, 84. Moreover he passes over the fact that the way for al-Shāṭibī’s *maṣlaḥa*-theory was prepared by al-Ghazālī’s concept of the *maqāṣid al-shar’*: al-Ghazālī, *Muṣtaṣfā*, vol. i pp. 283-315, al-Shāṭibī: vol. ii pp. 8-12, 49-52, 176-180, vol. iv pp. 27-32, Ḥanafī ascribes them to al-Shāṭibī alone: Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” pp. 53f. or to Mālikism as such (viii. 295 *sultā*); cf. Hallaq (1997) pp. 89f., 112f., 168ff.

⁶⁴ viii.318 *waḥda*, correct on his attitude towards logic: Ḥanafī, “Buḥūth” p. 52.

⁶⁵ A spot check at some Ḥanbalī essentials shows that this observation also applies to *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā l-Thawra* with its extensive references as well: II.226ff. (*istiḥā’*<7:54 et al.>), IV.148ff. (*shaqq al-qamar*), IV.411ff. (*adhāb al-qabr*). At one place (V.550n363), he turns Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim into Ash‘arites. In I.368,-7ff. he admits that there is a conflict between his own position on *hadīth* and the position of the *salafīyya*.

⁶⁶ iv.151 *ḥaraka*.

⁶⁷ Ḥanafī’s translation of Spinoza’s *Tractatus theologico-politicus* was not available to me.

would have been that kind of corporealism and scripturalism that Ḥanafī rejects.⁶⁸

The second factor is the influence of Latin-American liberation theology, with which Ḥanafī is thoroughly acquainted. In 1967, he wrote a biographical article on the Colombian priest Camilo Torres, who was killed after joining a guerrilla movement. He dedicated his edition of Khumaynī's *al-Hukūma al-islāmiyya* not only to 'Alī Sharī'atī and the victims of the Shah, but also to the martyrs of the "religious revolution" in Latin America. The parallels are not restricted to the transformation of religious formulas into political slogans. Both Ḥanafī and the exponents of liberation theology advocate a this-worldly reinterpretation of religion to promote revolutionary change. Both attack the hierarchical clergy for forging the initially revolutionary message of the Scriptures into a conservative tool of repression. Both explicitly reject ("Platonic") body-soul dualism, advocate a unitarian vision of man instead and replace eschatological concepts by this-worldly salvation. The preference of orthopraxy over orthodoxy is a common cliché, but Ḥanafī's equation of the latter with social activism again betrays the influence of Latin American concepts. In accordance with them he replaces the concept of sin with that of social evils. For Ḥanafī as well as for liberation theologians, the interpretation of the Scriptures has to begin with an analysis of the social situation and the demands of "the masses". It therefore comes as no surprise that both are accused by their respective opponents of practicing eisegesis instead of exegesis.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ iii.18 *al-judhūr al-ta'rikhiyya lil-ghazw aṣ-ṣahyūnī fi l-turāth al-islāmī (ghazw)*, speech in Tunis 1984. This anachronism appears in an article where Ḥanafī sets out to prove that under Islamic rule Jews and Christians were treated as equal citizens. Thus Maimonides, expelled from his home town as a boy, appears as the second popular orator of the Andalusian metropolis; on the "Andalusian model" of coexistence of Muslims Jews and Christians also: Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* pp. 99ff. Nobody seems to have informed Ḥanafī about the biography of Maimonides in the meantime: "Die Globalisierung", part 2; on the neglect of Ibn Rushd's elitism: Von Kügelgen p. 214. For Ibn Rushd's opinion on the kind of exegesis suitable for the masses: *Faṣl*, pp. 28ff.

⁶⁹ *Kāmīlū Tūrīz al-qiddīs al-thā'ir, in Qaḍāyā mu'āsira* vol. i pp. 281-318 (notably the volume *fi fikrinā al-mu'āsir* not the volume *al-fikr al-gharbī al-mu'āsir*, see p. 101); most explicit on his intention to create an Islamic liberation theology: vi.256ff *āsira*; viii.291 *al-yasār al-islāmī*; Von Kügelgen pp. 207, 218f.; Boullata (1992) p. 82 and Mughīth pp. 238f.; for refusal of dualism in liberation theology cf. Frieling (1995) p.104; Silva-Gotay pp.76ff.; the "seven challenges" as *kabā'ir al-ʿaṣr*: V.135f.; orthopraxy instead of orthodoxy: Frieling (1995) p. 109ff.;

Western and Latin American concepts are important in another respect. In his articles Ḥanafī never explains what God actually is. But in *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā l-Thawra* he expresses a variety of opinions which betray the influence of various Western philosophical or modernist Christian theological doctrines: A *deus sive natura* like Spinoza’s,⁷⁰ a Hegelian God as consciousness of humanity in history,⁷¹ a Marxian alienated human self-consciousness thrown beyond this world⁷² or a purely cognitive principle that ought to be realized by revolutionary practice.⁷³ This impersonal God does however communicate with mankind via revelation.⁷⁴ Ḥanafī frequently describes revelation as merger of consciousness and reality, a product of reality and as a mission to fulfill,⁷⁵ as a discourse and a work of art (*khalq fannī*)⁷⁶ and he stresses that it is identical with reason,⁷⁷ but he never bothers to explain how the revealed text has come into existence. Most likely this is not due to the fear of hostile reaction alone, but reflects the dilemma which most modernists are facing in a monotheist tradition: On the one hand he almost abolishes God, on the other hand the normative foundation of his project is “revelation” i.e. a text that, unlike the intellectual products of fallible humans, is beyond criticism.

Thirdly, with reference to the antagonism between Ash‘arism and Mu‘tazilism, Ṭarābīshī has pointed to the fact that Ḥanafī promotes religious currents that play no role in modern Islam, or at least in contemporary Egypt. Therefore they appear as “magical crowbar” able to open the deadlock of a bleak reality.⁷⁸ This also explains why al-Ghazālī, the most influential theologian of Sunni Islam, appears as personalized evil. This point, with which Ṭarābīshī deals only briefly,

interpretation of scriptures according to the needs of the “masses”: *ibid.* pp. 8ff., criticism of “eisegesis”: *ibid.* pp. 22ff. and Abū Zayd (1994) pp. 155, 179f., respectively.

⁷⁰ I.423f.

⁷¹ I.83,12ff.

⁷² II.609,5f.: “*Allāhī*” *huwa wa‘y al-insān bi-dhātih madfū‘an khārīj al-‘ālam ba‘īdan ‘an al-insān munfaṣīlan ‘anhu mutahajjiran jāmidan*“.

⁷³ I.82,10ff., I.343,1ff., II.557,2ff.

⁷⁴ II.558,-9ff.

⁷⁵ II.465,2ff., 476,8ff.; V.325,6ff.

⁷⁶ II.466,1ff.

⁷⁷ IV.55,2ff.

⁷⁸ Ṭarābīshī (1991) pp. 227ff.

will be discussed more extensively in the context of Ḥanafī's writings on the recent history of Egypt.

Ḥanafī and Marxism

Ḥanafī's "Islamic Left" is not a simple blend of Marxist and Islamic elements.⁷⁹ He justifies his opposition to capitalism in a completely different way. Compared to Marx, Ḥanafī's notion of capitalism is ahistorical, non-economic and undialectic. It never appears as a progressive and necessary stage in the course of history. He excuses Marx's positive evaluation of the role of capitalist imperialism in the destruction of the "Asiatic mode of production" as a youthful fault resulting from lack of knowledge.⁸⁰ He does not blame the logic of the system for the evils of capitalism. Instead he holds the neglect of timeless moral values responsible for these evils. His criticism of capitalism is, on the rhetorical level, directed against *ribā*, usually usury, the "sphere of circulation", and not against the "sphere of production". Thus his arguments correspond formally to a criticism of capitalism that is widespread among Islamists as well as Western fascists.⁸¹ But when the content of the slogans is scrutinized more closely, differences become apparent. In Ḥanafī's texts the Qur'ānic term *ribā* is not used to combat honest "productive" capitalism with "unproductive" financial operations. He defines *ribā* as "profit without work" and thus explicitly includes the profits resulting from the exploitation of labor into that notion.⁸² In his rejection of private ownership of the means of production, Ḥanafī also agrees with Marxism and differs from the majority of Islamists. He proves its illegitimacy by the means of *tafsīr al-madḥūn* with reference to verses which mention God, not men, as *mālik al-samawāti wa-l-ard*. According to Ḥanafī, the Qur'ān describes *māl* as that which belongs to God: He puts it at man's disposal in order to encourage production and to fulfill vital needs collectively (*shuyū' al-amwāl*), but not for

⁷⁹ Cf. also Mughīth *passim*.

⁸⁰ vii.217, 219 *tashwīh al-Mārksiyya*, 1987 (*tashwīh*), revised version of an unpublished response to attacks against the Tajammu-party by Aḥmad Mūsā Sālim in the 1976 election campaign.

⁸¹ iii.63 *Banū Isrā'īl*.

⁸² vii.138 *māl*, 1979; against "Islamic banking": viii.305 *kayfa yufakkir...*

accumulation.⁸³ Another argument put forward for collective ownership is derived from the *ḥadīth* according to which fire (industry), water (energy), salt (mining) and fodder (agriculture) are common goods.⁸⁴

Another point in which Ḥanafī differs markedly from Marxism is his purely idealist view of history. In his accounts of Western history, Ḥanafī hardly ever discusses events and developments beyond the realm of mere thought.⁸⁵ When he deals with the history of Islam, he explicitly rejects any consideration of social and economic factors relevant to the development of thought. Ḥanafī justifies this neglect with the assertion that Islamic civilization is determined by revelation.⁸⁶ Whereas Ḥanafī strictly opposes the separation of substrate and accident in metaphysics, Islamic thinkers appear as mere substrates to which the accident “thought” merely subsists.⁸⁷ According to him, Islamic history is the result of the attempt of Islamic thinkers to direct society according to revelation. Thus, the Islamic world of the past appears as socialist utopia where revelation made Islamic scholars and rulers aware of social justice and the demands of the poor. They passed rulings and took decisions in their favour, like the confiscation of excessive riches or the *aḥkām al-sūq*.⁸⁸ His refusal to look into social history allows Ḥanafī to project anachronistic political concepts into Islamic history: Salāḥ al-Dīn does not appear as the commander of an efficient professional

⁸³ vii.123ff., 135ff., 141, 145 *māl*; nowadays he uses the same verses to legitimize environmentalism: *On the Thematical Interpretation of the Coran*, p. 209.

⁸⁴ i.157 *muqawwimāt*.

⁸⁵ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 77, 15ff.

⁸⁶ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* pp. 95ff.; see also Ḥattar pp. 124ff. and Jum‘a pp. 137f., 143ff.

⁸⁷ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 89: *lil-fikr masāruḥū fi l-ta’rīkh, wa mā l-af’iād illā ḥawāmīl laḥu*; viii.248 *al-dīn wa-l-turāth wa-l-thawra*, 1985; criticized by Abū Zayd p.162f., 185f.; ironically his attitude is exactly the one his admirer Schulze expects to have been overcome by him (1992, pp. 74f.): “Ein letzter Punkt, der mich bedrückt, ... die Feststellung, dass wenn vom Islam gesprochen wird, der Islam zum Subjekt gemacht wird, und die Menschen die eigentlich Muslime sind, als Objekte des Islam gesehen werden.” In the case of Schulze it is a further proof for the paucity of reading on which his far-reaching conclusions are based. However with regard to their relentless reinterpretation of terms until they fit their own purposes (Radtke 2000), Schulze and Ḥanafī show a striking similarity that produces even more striking dissimilarities *en détail*.

⁸⁸ On *muṣādara*: vii.225 *tashwīḥ*; vii.197-202 *aḥkām al-sūq*, 1978, III.334,3ff.; when Western Orientalists like Bernard Lewis dare to challenge such an opinion by writing on slavery and racial prejudice in the Islamic World, this is an obvious part of the Zionist conspiracy against Islam: iii.28 *ghazw*.

army but as modern nationalist leader, mobilizing “the masses” against the Crusaders and their Fatimid collaborators.⁸⁹

The rejection of the materialist and “Darwinist” Marxism of the 19th century leads Ḥanafī to a high esteem of European intellectual Marxisms, which restored the realm of ideas to its well-deserved place. Furthermore he appreciates the theoretical adaptation of Marxism to the conditions of non-industrialized countries by Lenin and Mao.⁹⁰ In Ḥanafī’s eyes, revolutionary change in the pre-industrial Islamic world with its uneducated masses cannot be brought about by the working class, but only by intellectuals and officers.⁹¹ Although no influence of Maoist theory is apparent in his thought, he refers in some writings to the “east wind” concept of his friend Anwār ‘Abd al-Malik, according to whom revolutionary China will lead the revolt of the whole non-Western World against both “Western” political systems, capitalism and Soviet communism.⁹²

Ḥanafī explains away Marxist atheism in the same way as Western criticism of religion in general and, as already mentioned, he defends Marxist materialism with reference to various “materialist” concepts in the Islamic heritage. In this context Ḥanafī insists on the differentiation between the terminological and the colloquial understanding of materialism, of which he himself makes use in his criticism of the “West”.⁹³

Ḥanafī counts Marxism as one of the four “national currents” in Egypt. He praises the Egyptian communists for their achievements in organizing workers and students and for their courageous struggle against the British.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, Ḥanafī considers the implementation of Marxist-Leninist politics in Islamic countries disastrous. His opinion is based on personal experiences in Afghanistan, where he had observed

⁸⁹ viii.218 *mashrū‘ jarīda islāmīyya yawmiyya*, 1976.

⁹⁰ vii.216, 230 *tashwīh*; vii.220f.: Sartre, Althusser, Kojève and the “Frankfurt school”; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 311f.

⁹¹ ii.277 *mādhā l-tanwīr*, 1981; Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 65.

⁹² viii.12 *yasār*; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 41, 10ff., p. 531, 1 ff.; For the ideas of this Coptic writer and former Marxist critic of Nasser, who currently advocates an eclectic mix of Maoism, Third Worldism, Nasserism and Islamic revivalism, see his article “Riḥ al-sharq” or Boullata (1992) pp. 92ff.

⁹³ vii.217ff. *tashwīh*; viii.178 *al-tanwīr al-dīnī wa-l-tanzīm al-siyāsī*, a reference to Engels’s positive judgements on various religious traditions; materialism as egotism and hedonism opposed to Islamic idealist collectivism e.g.: viii.41f *yasār*.

⁹⁴ viii.66 *yasār*.

a tiny, culturally alienated minority imposing an agenda that the traditionally minded population of a pre-industrial society was not prepared to accept. Their resistance led to the Soviet invasion, which was even more devastating than the crusades of Western imperialism. In *Min al-‘Aq̄da ilā l-Thawra*, however, he himself proposes a revolutionary avant-garde party as the appropriate reformulation of *imāma* in classical Islamic political theory for the present.⁹⁵

Ḥanafī’s Writings on the Jews and Judaism

The analysis of Ḥanafī’s writings on capitalism has already shown that he makes use of the rhetorical repertory of conservative anti-capitalism. In Islam, as well as in the Western world, this kind of anti-capitalism is almost always accompanied by the negative stereotyping of Jews as the ruthless force behind this system. This is also the case with Ḥanafī. With the exception of Yadlin, all Western authors pass over this disturbing aspect of Ḥanafī’s œuvre! Furthermore his attacks urge to question the alleged progressive character of his supposedly new hermeneutics of the Qur’ān: His article “Hal yajūzu shar‘an al-ṣulḥ ma‘a Banī Isrā’īl” in which he lashes out at Jews in general is one of the examples for *tafsīr al-maḍmūn*.

The article is conceived as a *fatwā*. Ḥanafī states that he just wants to address the problem from a legal point of view. Moreover, it is exclusively based on the Qur’ānic statements on Jews.⁹⁶ His intention is to counter the propaganda of the state-controlled media who depict Israel in a favourable light, as well as the opinions of “some of us” (authors and movie directors) who depict Jews as ordinary human beings, and not as “hooked nosed Shylock-like figures”.⁹⁷

Ḥanafī singles out all negative statements of the Qur’ān on Jews. He particularly dwells on the accusation that they always rejected the

⁹⁵ v. 28-43 *al-Muslimūn fī Āsiyā*, 1981, (*Āsiyā*); V.325,6ff.; also Akhavi (1997) pp. 379f.

⁹⁶ iii.33 *Banū Isrā’īl*.

⁹⁷ iii.38 *Banū Isrā’īl*, maybe with “some of us” Ḥanafī aims at intellectuals and artists. One might think of Yousef Chahine’s autobiographical movie *Iskandariyya layh?* the protagonist of which, a young Christian cinéphile in World War II Alexandria, falls in love with a Jewish girl.

revealed truth and even attacked those who conveyed it to mankind.⁹⁸ This forces him to take an affirmative stance on aspects that he himself denounces as “conservative religion” in other contexts: The mental orientation of the Jews is exclusively this-worldly, they even “cling to this world with their molars” and they do not believe in the angels of death.⁹⁹ Another of their foremost features is their egotism and greed. It is derived from their role models, the rabbis (9:34). Therefore it is no accident that the Jews trade in gold or work as goldsmiths, moneylenders and bankers. Unsurprisingly they do not show any reluctance to take interest (5:161).¹⁰⁰

Ḥanaḥī deals with Jews and Judaism also in another text, a speech held in Tunis in 1984 at a congress dedicated to the “Zionist Crusade against the Islamic Heritage”. He begins with the observation that two tendencies are to be observed in Judaism, a universalist and a particularist one. The universalist tendencies may be seen in the teachings of the prophets and the Jewish philosophers. These tendencies have been preserved in Islam.¹⁰¹ During the centuries however, the other tendency has been more forceful. It found its expressions in two phenomena: the exploitation of other peoples’ intellectual heritage, and the infiltration of their teachings with Jewish superstitions. The first example can already be observed in the Ancient Near East where the Israelites constructed their religion with elements stolen from the Ancient Babylonian mythology. This notwithstanding, they developed the concept that they were elected and hence deserve superiority.¹⁰² They rejected the teaching of the prophets who had come to admonish them, but afterwards they took every opportunity to distort these teachings. St. Paul infiltrated Christianity with this intention.¹⁰³ Later, they tried to undermine Islam, initially by creating Shiism, then by introducing *isrāʾīlīyāt* into the science of *tafsīr*.¹⁰⁴

In recent history they continued this policy: the main examples are Freemasonry and internationalist socialism. Freemasonry came into

⁹⁸ iii.40ff *Banū Isrāʾīl*.

⁹⁹ iii.61f. *Banū Isrāʾīl*, with reference to Qurʾān 2.86, 44: 34ff., 23.35ff.; and iii.79 *ibid*.

¹⁰⁰ iii.63 *Banū Isrāʾīl*.

¹⁰¹ iii..4 *ghazw*.

¹⁰² iii.7ff. *ghazw*.

¹⁰³ iii.11 *ghazw*.

¹⁰⁴ iii.14ff. *ghazw*.

being as a movement to promote the equality of mankind regardless of their national background. Then it was hijacked by the Jews as a tool for destroying national identities by propagating cosmopolitanism and thus to further their own particularist agenda. Then they propagated socialism. By calling for universal brotherhood they could promote their own capitalist objectives even more effectively. In the Middle East Ḥanafī discovers a similar attempt in Bahaism “which discourages the Muslims from *jihād*”. Obviously Ḥanafī’s scenario is far from original. Our “enlightened” Islamic thinker shows no reluctance to name his source: *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.¹⁰⁵ As the most evil device in the Zionist Crusade against the Islamic heritage he names the alleged key-position of Jews in Orientalism. They control the major research institutes and use this opportunity to spread lies about Islam and to deny its originality.¹⁰⁶

However, in the context of contemporary Arab discourse his ideas may be regarded as relatively moderate. In other writings the “Andalusian model” has been proposed as a solution to the Palestine conflict. The main objective should be to regain Palestine for the Palestinians. After that the Jews could live there as citizens with equal rights and a fertile cultural synthesis could come into being again.¹⁰⁷ Ironically, he received scathing criticism for such a proposal in a tone closely resembling his own invectives presented above.¹⁰⁸

“East” and “West” in Ḥanafī’s Writings

According to Ḥanafī, Western civilization derives from four sources: Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, Ancient Eastern and the “barbarian milieu”. Whereas Western scholars acknowledge the first two sources, a conspiracy of silence led to a denial of the latter two. This insinuation does not keep Ḥanafī from proving the influence of the Ancient

¹⁰⁵ iii.25ff. *ghazw*. On anti-Jewish conspiracy theories in general: Pipes; Wild who appears too optimistic with regard to the spread of critical attitudes towards the *Protocols*: p. 523: “Die arabische Linke hat sie seit langem entweder ignoriert oder sich mit ihnen polemisch auseinandergesetzt...“; Hamzawy pp. 358ff.; on anti-freemasonry Landau.

¹⁰⁶ iii.23f.

¹⁰⁷ Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hiwār* pp. 99ff.

¹⁰⁸ al-Daghshī pp. 159ff.

East on Europe with extensive references to the works of Western scholars. Whereas the Ancient Eastern influence entailed purely positive consequences (including Eastern polytheist cults in Rome), the Judeo-Christian and the Greco-Roman heritage are to be considered ambivalent, whereas the effects of the “barbarian milieu”, i.e. Celtic and Germanic tribalism combined with the negative effects of Europe’s bad climate, are condemned. Roman imperialism, combined with the Jewish concept of the chosen people and racism originating from Germano-Celtic tribalism laid the foundations of Europe’s aggressive expansionism. He sees in barbarian tribalism, which imbued every European nation with a spirit of superiority, the cause of the cruelty that marks the history of Europe.¹⁰⁹ Besides racism and materialism, individualism and egotism distinguish the West from the idealist and collectivist East.¹¹⁰

Ḥanafī holds Western imperialism responsible for an insurmountable enmity between the peoples of the “East” and those of the “West”. This conflict predates the advent of Islam. Its origins are to be seen in the conquest of Palestine by the Israelites, Alexander’s conquests and Roman imperialism: Ḥanafī calls Augustine an agent of Roman imperialism fighting Donatism, an African liberation movement. With reference to Ḥanafī’s labelling of Greek antiquity as “Western”, Ṭarābīshī rightfully dismisses this projection of the opposition between “East” and “West” back into the past as pseudo-revisionist, because Ḥanafī simply re-evaluates what Westerners have used to construct their identity, instead of scrutinizing its historical tenability.¹¹¹

Although Ḥanafī justifies his negative judgment of the West by referring to its conquering nature, a closer look at his writings shows that this is not based on a condemnation of conquests as such, but on the fact that the wrong conquerors were more successful: Of course he

¹⁰⁹ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 81-111, esp. p. 104, l. 6ff.; conspiracy of silence: p. 109, l. 10ff.; Judeo-Barbarian merger: p. 107; in the elder version viii.32f. *yasār*, the Ancient East does not yet play any role; iii.8ff. *ghazw* on Ancient Eastern influence on the Old Testament; if Western scholars trace back Qur’ānic stories to the Bible it is *inkār al-wahy*: iii. 24 *ghazw*; furthermore Ḥanafī sympathizes with Afrocentrists like Martin Bernal who names Ḥanafī’s friend ‘Abd al-Malik as a supporter of his project (p. xxiii). Ḥanafī refers to his “Black Athena” in Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 483; on Bernal see Lefkowitz, Roth.

¹¹⁰ ii.204 *taḥarrur al-‘aql al-‘arabī*, 1977; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 519.

¹¹¹ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 102, -4ff, 551, 4ff.; Ṭarābīshī (1991) pp. 193f; ‘Alī Ḥarb quoted by Hildebrandt pp. 56f.

generally approves of Islamic conquests. The best example is an article about Islam in South Asia, where he replaces the white man's by the Muslim's burden: The Muslims rightfully conquered and united the subcontinent in the name of *tawḥīd* and began to convert the Buddhists, Brahmins (*sic*) and Hindus who evidently lack the right to cultural authenticity. Movements of any non-Muslim population directed against Islamic rule are therefore generally considered illegitimate. When he condemns British imperialism in the South-Asian context, he does not charge it of exploiting India and suppressing its people, but merely of depriving Islam of the opportunity to complete the conversion of its population to Islam. By inciting the Sikhs against the Muslims (*sic*), appeasing the Hindus with the partition of the subcontinent (*sic*) and through the integration of Kashmir and the "independent Islamic state of Hyderabad" into India, in which the Muslims had become a minority (*sic*), the British completed the defeat of Islam.¹¹²

Nevertheless, Ḥanafī's condemnation of the "West" is neither absolute nor does he deal with the "West" as a homogenous block. He distinguishes markedly between various countries. Apart from Israel the Anglosphere is treated with the least favour. Ḥanafī does not only reject British imperialism and American support for Israel, Sadat and the Shah, he also disapproves of the thought of the anglophone world because of its tendency towards sensualism and empiricism.¹¹³ He judges France and especially Germany more favourably. He praises German idealism and nationalism as models for the Islamic world. In the tradition of Arab nationalists like al-Ḥuṣṣrī, he declares himself indebted to Fichte "*faylasūf al-arḍ al-muḥtalla*" whose *Reden an die deutsche Nation* he frequently refers to. The parallels of thought are unmistakable: both deplore the fragmentation of their respective communities and accuse the elites of their societies of abandoning their authentic culture for fashionable foreign values and modes of behaviour. Both plead for economic autarchy and denounce universalist ideologies.¹¹⁴ But in his admiration for German

¹¹² iv. 65ff. *Āsiyā*. Whereas the fact that the partition of British India was a Muslim demand can be considered as generally known, it seems necessary to note for the sake of historical accuracy that the defeat of the Sikhs by the British in 1846 enabled the Muslim population of the Punjab to practice its religion properly. The Muslim dynasty in the princely state of Hyderabad ruled over a Hindu majority of 88%.

¹¹³ vi. 260 *sīra*.

¹¹⁴ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 243f.; i.142 *muqawwimāt*; vi.211 *sīra*, on the German model

nationalism Ḥanafī never goes as far as showing sympathy for Nazism or Arab movements with fascist tendencies like *Miṣr al-fatāt*.¹¹⁵

Ḥanafī's negative judgment of the contemporary West, and particularly the Anglosphere, cannot be traced back to negative personal experiences. In this respect, the Western countries are judged much more favourably than the Islamic societies. Sometimes he even becomes euphoric, for example, in his account of the achievements of a free press and its courageous representatives in the Watergate affair, or in his description of the BBC as "the pulpit of the people".¹¹⁶

When Ḥanafī deals with the relationship between the "East" and the "West", he follows two different concepts: an "*ex oriente lux*" theory and a historicist¹¹⁷, morphological concept of "East" and "West" developing in opposing cycles. Both concepts are, however, not clearly kept apart. Sometimes both of them appear in the same article or even intermingle from sentence to sentence.¹¹⁸

In an obvious response to the tendency to find non-Islamic roots for all aspects of Islamic civilization, the *ex oriente lux* theory traces every positive phenomenon of Western civilization back to Eastern roots: in the Middle Ages Islamic philosophy was taught in universities which were designed after Islamic models the West had come to know during the Crusades. The influence of Islamic rationalism paved the way for

in general; Ḥanafī, "Berlin" p. 105; Fichte (1978) pp. 8ff., 22ff., 57f., 82f., 172; Al-Ḥuṣrī; Cleveland pp. 85ff., 140f., 180); Tibi (1987) pp. 113-189, (1997) pp. 116-52; on the influence of Fichte on al-Arsūzī: Carré pp. 45, 54. One might tend to think that Ḥanafī's appraisal of Fichte's nationalism is due to the fact that Germany as well as Egypt confronted the evil "West" in the person of Napoleon. But with whom Ḥanafī sides in Western thought and history is as contradictory as in the Islamic heritage: the admirer of Fichte also praises Napoleon: Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hiwār* p. 100; Ḥanafī's simultaneous admiration for Luther and Thomas Müntzer may be cited as a further example.

¹¹⁵ Ḥanafī distances himself from his sympathies for the Axis as a small boy: I.46n; on *Miṣr al-fatāt*: i.20 *fi l-thaqāfa al-waṭaniyya*, 1980.

¹¹⁶ vi. 261 *sīra*.

¹¹⁷ In the sense of Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism*, where the epistemological fallacies and political dangers of this kind of ideologies are treated in full. The persistent popularity of morphological concepts in the Islamic world deserves attention, see Yazbeck Haddad pp. 81, 124ff. Western political philosophy with a strong anti-totalitarian tendency has not received much attention. Only in 1992 al-Sāqī, London, has published translations of Popper's essay as *Bu's al-īdiyūlijīyya. Naqd Mabda' al-Anmāt fi l-Taṣawwur al-Ta'rikhī*, Hannah Arendt's *On Violence* as "Fi l-'Unf" and Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" as "Ḥudūd al-Ḥurriyya".

¹¹⁸ The most striking example: viii.36ff. *yaṣār*.

Reformation. The deep impact of Islam on Protestantism cannot be overlooked: both refute saint-worship, intercession and the clerical monopoly to interpret the scriptures. Above all Luther (wrongly alleged to be versed in Arabic) promoted the Islamic principle *sola scriptura* (he passes over the latter's rather "Ash'arite" *sola gratia* and *sola fide*).¹¹⁹ Enlightenment appears as a transfer of basically Islamic rationalist principles: Ḥanafī compares the historical-critical study of the Bible to 'ilm al-ḥadīth and he labels the philosophy of religion since Spinoza a belated offshoot of Mu'tazilism.¹²⁰

In this context, Ḥanafī uses 'Abd al-Malik's term "civilizational surplus value". In the light of this theory the achievements of Western civilization are to be considered as results of the accumulation of profits from an imperialist exploitation that was not restricted to the field of economy.¹²¹ By ascribing inventions and scientific discoveries collectively to "East" or "West" and not to individuals, Ḥanafī stresses the right of Easterners to reclaim the scientific achievements of the "West": "Now as we physically exist among the applied inventions of the West, we are harvesting the fruits of a tree in the planting of which we have taken part".¹²² In the case of Islamic civilization Ḥanafī denies any external influence. He admits that the terminology of Islamic philosophy has been borrowed from the Greek tradition, but he considers this a "*pseudomorphologie*" (*tashakkul kādhībī*, correct would be "*pseudo-morphose*"), because the terms are supposed to mean something completely different.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 167ff., esp. 168,-10f.

¹²⁰ viii.38 *yasār*; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 92, -8f., p. 445, -13ff.; further examples pp. 544ff.; Lessing p. 313.; criticized by al-'Ālim pp. 171f.

¹²¹ Boullata (1992)p. 95f.

¹²² ii.257 *al-'aql al-'arabī waḥdahū l-qādir 'alā ṣun' al-mu'jizāt*, 1980; Ḥanafī, "Berlin" p. 106; With his thoroughly essentialist description of the West and Islam and, on the other hand his appraisal for Said's attacks on Orientalism, Ḥanafī provides a good example for the selective reception of the latter in the Arab world cf. E. Said: p. 331 (new afterword to "Orientalism"); Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 41n. (on Said) p. 77,-4ff. (justification of essentialist <*māhawī*> approach); severe criticism of his essentialism by pp. 31f, 91, 143f., 154f (reply without reference Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 76ff.); Salvatore's (1995) p. 213 "escape from an essentialist attitude" which he attributes to Ḥanafī results from wishful thinking combined with insufficient reading. Such a superficial understanding of the progress of science since the late Middle Ages and its role in Western society is not uncommon in contemporary Arab discourse: Radtke (1989) pp. 75ff.

¹²³ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* 194f. esp. n108; He pretends that although he borrows Spengler's ter-

The impact of Ḥanafī's identification of Islam with rationality has political consequences. Ḥanafī dismisses European criticism of religion for Islam: The denial of God's existence is an understandable overreaction towards clericalism and irrational anthropomorphism in Christianity. But that the Bible is not to be held true was not discovered by Spinoza, Voltaire and Strauß first, but can already be read in the Qur'ān and the works of Ibn Ḥazm, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya.¹²⁴ Because of the rational and secularist character of Islam, the political model of laicism/secularism (*'almāniyya*) is superfluous: Where there is no church with priesthood, it cannot be separated from the state. Apart from this, the rational revelation of Islam allows Islamic civilization to remain centripetal (*markazī*), contrary to the centrifugal (*tardī*) Western civilization.¹²⁵ Anyhow, religions in other parts of the World are rather counterparts of ideologies in the West.¹²⁶ Ḥanafī accuses Levantine Christian intellectuals lacking firm roots in Islam as a religion and civilization of spreading the idea of a separation of politics and religion in Egypt.¹²⁷ His arguments from the apologetical tradition fail to convince secularist critics who consider them a contradiction to his objective of constructing a religious ideology or consider them illogical and ahistorical nonsense resulting from a "thought-strike" (*idrāb 'an al-tafkīr*).¹²⁸

The cyclical model, reminiscent of Ibn Khaldūn, as understood by Ḥanafī¹²⁹ and Spengler ("Decline of the West", insimultaneous analogies) presents the development of the "West" and the "East" as adverse

minology, he means something completely different; cf. Spengler pp. 784ff.; On the denial of external cultural influences (*taṭahhurīyya thaqāfiyya*) also Ṭarābīshī (1991) pp. 189ff., 199ff. It is noteworthy that the "Islamic leftist" is inspired by several concepts of the extreme right in the West. For example he pays respect to Fouillé's "peoples psychology" Ḥanafī, *Muqaddīma* p. 108,6ff.

¹²⁴ vi.244f. *sīra*; criticism of his epistemological relativism: p. 149.

¹²⁵ viii.32 *yasār*; Ḥanafī, *Turāth* pp. 177f.

¹²⁶ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddīma* p. 109,-6ff.

¹²⁷ Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hūwār* p. 43.

¹²⁸ According to Ḥattar p. 151n, Ḥanafī distinguishes between good (Islamic) and bad (Christian) theocracy, whereas Ṭarābīshī states a lack of formal logic, because the whole "religion" is subordinated to the particular "church" Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hūwār* pp. 137ff., 142f.

¹²⁹ vi.321, *allādhīna yaqīfūna dīd aṣ-ṣahwa al-islāmīya lā yaṣhamūna qānūn al-ta'rikh*, 1988, in "al-Khalīj".

sine curves. The climax of one civilization coincides with the other's awakening from its nadir.¹³⁰ In this concept, the "West", identified with Christianity, is the model prefiguring the development of the East. Its development starts with an upward movement from AD 1 until about AD 400, when decline set in with the establishment of Christianity as a state religion. The curve crosses the x-line with the coronation of Charlemagne and reaches its low-point at about 1200, when scholasticism marked the beginning of a period of revival with the study of Islamic rationalism (the second era of translations). The x-line is surmounted again at about 1600, when the Reformation laid the foundations for the Renaissance.¹³¹ After the Renaissance, Enlightenment paved the way for a new climax of Western civilization with German idealism. The contemporary Western world is described as being in a state of decline, comparable to the Mamluk age, because it has lost its rational foundations.¹³² This is reflected in the contemporary arts and in post-modern thought: music has become atonal and painting abstract, the *nouveau roman* and the movies of the *nouvelle vague* have given up the Kantian categories of time and space, deconstructivism (*tafkikiyya*) proclaims the "death of the author" and replaces him by impersonal discourses, Foucault is preoccupied with folly instead of reason.¹³³

The development of Islamic civilization is described in a strictly analogous way. It began with a heyday during which the sciences flourished after the translation of the knowledge of Antiquity into Arabic (the "first era of translations"). But then the Islamic world took the fatal

¹³⁰ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 496ff.; Hildebrandt pp. 29ff.; Campanini pp. 118ff.; according to Chartier p. 610, Ḥanafī has been propagating this concept in his lectures since the early 1970s.

¹³¹ Ḥanafī states that he insisted on this periodization even in his Ph.D.-exam: Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 171n261. In the historical part of the "Muqaddima fi 'ilm al-istighrāb" Ḥanafī notably places Renaissance in the 15th and Reformation in the 16th century, according to the convention.

¹³² Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 434, -3ff.: "*Al-wa'y al-ūrubbī al-ān yamurru bi-fitrat al-‘aṣr al-mamlūkī al-turkī, yūjadu min ‘adm, yā‘dam bu‘d wujūd li-ḥaḍārat al-markaz. Fī ḥim yubashshiru ‘al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdīd’ bi-milād ‘aṣr jadīd li-ḥaḍārat al-aṭrāf’*"; Ṭarābīshī (1991) p. 167.

¹³³ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 429-ff., 506ff., 62, -1ff.; Campanini p. 118f; criticism of the reception of cultural pessimism: Ḥattar p. 161.; it is not devoid of irony that Ḥanafī's admirers among Western orientalisists are outspoken post-modernists and consider him a kindred spirit: e.g. Martin & Woodward p. 211, also Schulze, Salvatore.

decision to follow al-Ghazālī instead of Ibn Rushd, thus initiating its own decline.¹³⁴ The period between the decline of Islamic civilization and its second rise is described as being dominated by a combination of Ash‘arism and Sufism which, in his account, resemble Catholicism. The Wahhābī struggle against saint worship is described as the Islamic religious reformation that will lay the basis for a renaissance.¹³⁵ A third era of translations, which began with al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, al-Afghānī and Shiblī Shumayyil has laid the foundation for a renaissance of the East.¹³⁶ His hope for a cultural and political renewal of the Islamic World, resulting from a religious reformation, accounts for the deliberate false dating of Renaissance and Reformation in the West and the doubtful causal connection. Ḥanafī admits that he borrowed this comparative vision of the development of Islam and the Western world with the stress on the need for an Islamic reformation from his role-model al-Afghānī.¹³⁷

Preliminary Conclusion

Up to now, Ḥanafī’s project has presented itself as an inconsistent assemblage of heterogeneous ideological elements which he never tries to systematize. Ṭarābīshī has pointed out that Ḥanafī’s writings are characterized by two different aspects: a critical or compensatory (*tammīmī*) view of Islamic culture and history, and a megalomaniac (*ta’zīmī*, *‘azā’imī*) or twaddle (*hidhā’ī*) discourse, an uncritical and unreflected affirmation of Islamic identity.¹³⁸ When Ḥanafī deals with the development of Islamic thought, he deplores that Ash‘arism in the service of “the power” has suppressed rational thought in Islam. But men of power like Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Maḥmūd Ghaznawī are praised for their heroic conquests, notwithstanding their support for “conservative religion”.

Nevertheless, one cannot explain the inconsistencies in Ḥanafī’s “heritage” discourse out of itself alone. It is essentially intertwined with

¹³⁴ viii.228 *al-Islām wa-l-qam al-khāmis ‘ashar*.

¹³⁵ viii.267ff. *ḥiwār ḥawla l-fikr al-islāmī*: “*al-iṣlāḥ idhan sharṭ al-naḥḍa*”; ii.201f. *taḥarrur al-‘aql al-‘arabī*, interview “Rawz al-Yūsuf” 1977; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* p. 61f.

¹³⁶ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 149, 496ff., 500ff.

¹³⁷ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 167n248; cf. Keddie pp. 45, 83, 171.

¹³⁸ Ṭarābīshī (1991) p. 273f.

his political intentions. This becomes obvious if one studies his writings on Egypt's contemporary history and on the "Great Islamic Revolution in Iran", where many of the discussed elements will reappear.

Revolution: Nasser

Ḥanafī's writings about the contemporary history of Egypt deal with three major subjects: the presidents Nasser and Sadat, and with the "Islamic movement" with which both were at odds. In his account of Nasser's policies, Ḥanafī stresses the roots of the Free Officers in the "nationalist currents". Among those with inclinations towards the *Ikhwān* he mentions Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'ūf and Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥusayn, but not Sadat. According to him, the supporters of the revolution among the population were mobilized by the *Ikhwān* for mass rallies in the streets of Cairo.¹³⁹

Ḥanafī praises Nasser's policies for two major achievements: the fight against imperialism, Zionism in particular, and the struggle for social justice. He enthusiastically refers to Nasser's liquidation of British rule and his relentless resistance to Zionism and Western block-building, which he countered by promoting Arab unity. He approvingly relates Nasser's posing as a new Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, uniting the Asian and the African wing of the Arab nation.¹⁴⁰ But when Ḥanafī praises Nasser's pan-Islamic activities, one looks in vain for the man in charge: Sadat.¹⁴¹ Nasser is not only exalted as an Arab and Islamic leader but as an outstanding Third World figure, with reference to his performance at the Bandoeng conference and his leading role in the non-alignment movement. When Ḥanafī himself pleads for non-alignment, he uses an argument Nasser had already used: the equidistance to the Eastern and the Western block corresponds to the struggle of the early Islamic *umma* against the Eastern and the Western super-powers of its time.¹⁴² Ḥanafī's own wavering between pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism and Third-

¹³⁹ iv.10ff. *tanmiya*.

¹⁴⁰ viii.218 *mashrūf jarīda islāmiyya yawmiyya*, 1976; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* p. 55; cf. for example Youssef Chahine's movie *al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn*; Sivan pp. 23-65.

¹⁴¹ iv.24f *tanmiya*.

¹⁴² Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 502.

Worldism, always based on Egyptocentrism, is an obvious reflection of Nasser's theory of the three circles (Arabic, Islamic and Afro-Asian) centered around Egypt.¹⁴³

Ḥanafī also praises Nasser's struggle for social justice, the abolition of "feudalism" and the "Egyptianization" of enterprises. He quotes Nasser's justifications for these policies, which resemble his own economic ideas: 1. The *ḥadīth* according to which salt, water and fodder are common goods, and the reference to the "nationalizations" of 'Umar. 2. Islam teaches the abolition of the differences between the classes. 3. No *ribā*, in the sense of profit without work 4. Inequality is atheism 5. Islam is a program for social revolution, not a solace for afterlife.¹⁴⁴ Ḥanafī's reinterpretation of the *ḥajj* as an annual convention of Muslims from all over the world is a concept Nasser had already propagated in his *Falsafat al-Thawra*.¹⁴⁵ Nasser's acolytes justified his socialist policies by praising him as a follower of the prophets, who were revolutionaries¹⁴⁶, and above all the term "Islamic Left" is already to be found in Nasserist propaganda.¹⁴⁷

Nevertheless, Ḥanafī mercilessly criticizes the failures and deficiencies of the Nasserist system. As the first major shortcoming he singles out the lack of democratic legitimacy. This point can be divided into two sub-points: dictatorial political practice, including the suppression of every opposition, and lack of an autonomous mass support: the "Free Officers" took decisions for the welfare of the masses, who in return appreciated them, but because they received those favours by decree, they were not prepared to defend them when Sadat abolished them in the same way. The second major point is connected with the lacking mass support: the lack of an authentic ideology able to motivate the people. Although

¹⁴³ v.3 *Āsiyā*; Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 529, 1ff.

¹⁴⁴ iv.226-30, 218 *al-ʿamīl al-dīnī*; 231n; similar iv.115ff., 120 *tanmīya*.

¹⁴⁵ 'Abd al-Nāṣir (1962) pp. 72f.

¹⁴⁶ Kassian pp. 259f., 270ff; Yazbeck Haddad p. 32.

¹⁴⁷ Ṣāliḥ. In the introduction to his *al-Yamīn wa-l-Yasār fi l-Islām* concepts similar to Ḥanafī's can be found: Ibn Rushd as a source of inspiration for Western enlightenment and al-Ghazālī as the nemesis of Islamic rationalism (pp. 11f.). However, the largest part of the book consists of a vulgar materialist analysis of Meccan society and the conflicts in the first decades of Islam. See also: Kassian pp. 263f. The Nasserists were not the first to apply the right-left dichotomy to categorize intellectual currents in Islam. As far as I could fathom it was Goldziher p. 100.

Ḥanafī cites Nasser's Islamic justifications for his socialist measures with approval, he doubts their honesty and credibility and describes them as merely tactical and inconsistent. According to him, Nasser first took decisions by trial and error. His personal charisma alone was sufficient to gain mass approval. But when Saudi Arabia and Syria indulged in polemics against his "atheist communism" by appealing to conservative religious sentiments, Nasser had to refer to Islam in order to legitimize his regime with religious slogans. Moreover these arguments were not used consistently by Nasser: After the Communist-backed Qāsim had gained power in Iraq, Nasser indulged in polemics against him with the very same arguments which the reactionary forces had previously used against him.¹⁴⁸

Religion: Ḥanafī on the *Ikhwān* and Sayyid Quṭb

For Ḥanafī the way out of this dilemma would have been closer cooperation with the *Ikhwān*, whom he himself had joined in 1952,¹⁴⁹ and with Sayyid Quṭb in particular. Therefore he considers the reconciliation of Nasserism and the *Ikhwān*, or of *dīn* and *thawra*, his main objective.¹⁵⁰ He praises the *Ikhwān* for a number of achievements: In their version of Islam, cleansed of the accretions of bygone centuries, he sees the signs of an ideology able to confront the contemporary Western ideologies on equal terms. Moreover, he describes the *Ikhwān* as the first authentic mass movement in the history of Egypt. He praises the efficacy of their "hierarchical family system" in organizing mass resistance to imperialism. The combination of these two factors facilitated the emergence of a new kind of intellectual committed to *turāth*, caring for the needs of the masses and speaking to them in a language they can understand. By attracting Islamic thinkers and activists from other parts of the Islamic world, like Abū l-Ḥasan Nadwī, 'Allāl al-Fāsī, Nawwāb Ṣafawī, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, Arafat and Boumedienne, they also made Egypt the core of

¹⁴⁸ iv.222 *al-ʿāmil al-dīnī*; similar viii.68f. *yasār*.

¹⁴⁹ vi.217f. *sāra*, before he was a Saʿdist in the tradition of his family, vi.214.

¹⁵⁰ viii.64f. *yasār*; vi.200ff. *ḥaraka*; Abū Zayd (1994) pp. 150ff.: *tawfiqīyya*.

the Islamic world.¹⁵¹ It is of course no coincidence that this list, with the latter two, comprises later allies of Nasser.

This generally positive assessment notwithstanding, Ḥanafī severely disapproves of other aspects of their ideology and their political methods. He condemns their anti-modernism and their “sexual worldview”, which expressed themselves in the resistance to the emancipation of women promoted by Nasser in the Act of 1955, and their disdain for theatre, cinema and music. Ḥanafī blames these aspects of their ideology—in combination with the striving for power of the conservative wing of the *Ikhwān* led by Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī an ally of General Najīb—for the final rift with Nasser. Ḥanafī praises Nasser’s refusal to become *ḥākīm bi-amr Allāh* by succumbing to narrow-minded demands like enforcing the veil or closing down theatres and music-halls.¹⁵² When Ḥanafī relates his youth, he mentions his participation in actions in support of imprisoned *Ikhwān* but no hatred for Nasser, which suggests that Nasser’s break with the *Ikhwān* must have been a most serious disappointment for him.¹⁵³ When writing about his studies in Paris, he states that his thoughts were with the Revolution. But this did not keep him from publicly questioning a delegation of Egyptian officials at the Sorbonne about the fate of the *Ikhwān* and about the names of those who withheld information on such acts of injustice from the *raʿīs*.¹⁵⁴

When Ḥanafī praises the formulation of a coherent ideology by the *Ikhwān* he is referring to the writings of Sayyid Quṭb. His study of Quṭb is a contribution to the *Markaz al-qawmī lil-buḥūth al-ijtimāʿiyya wal-jināʿiyya*. Although less a biography than an analysis of the development of Quṭb’s thought, Ḥanafī stresses the importance of the personal and historical background for the development of ideas in this particular

¹⁵¹ viii.105ff. Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hawār*; similar vi.300ff. *mādhā kasabat Miṣr min jamāʿat al-ikhwān al-muslimīn*, 1976; Zakariyyā’ pp. 58ff. criticizes Ḥanafī for two historical inaccuracies in this context: He exaggerates the following of the *Ikhwān* among students before 1952 and conceals their temporary alliance with the monarchy.

¹⁵² iv.72ff. *tanmiya*; iv.14ff. *tanmiya*: positive evaluation of the Act of 1955 proclaiming the equality of the sexes; viii.108-16 *waḥda*; attacks against *taṣawwur jinsī li l-ʿālam*: Ḥanafī, *Turāth* pp. 42f.

¹⁵³ vi.220f. *sira*.

¹⁵⁴ vi.247f. *sira*; in I.46n he states that he was a follower of Najīb first, but sided with Nasser after 1956.

context.¹⁵⁵ Ḥanafī divides Quṭb's thought into four phases: literary (1930-51), social activist (1951-54), philosophical (1954-62) and political (1962-66). Ḥanafī does not neglect the first phase. On the contrary, he stresses the importance of the young Quṭb's aesthetic approach to the Qur'ān in *al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī fī l-Qur'ān*. By praising Quṭb's early love lyrics, Ḥanafī implicitly criticizes the concentration of contemporary Islamists on the regulation of sexuality and gender relations.¹⁵⁶ He also stresses the nationalist commitment of the young Quṭb and the fact that he was in contact with almost all political movements and intellectual currents in Egypt, which distinguishes him from his own position later and the intolerant exclusivism of the recent terrorist groups (*jamā'āt*).¹⁵⁷

In the description of the second phase Ḥanafī portrays Quṭb as thinker devoted to the improvement of the fate of the poor. This led him to formulate an Islamic concept of social justice in *al-ʿAdāla al-Ijtimāʿiyya fī l-Islām* and *Maʿrakat al-Islām wa-l-Raʾsmāliyya*. Surprisingly, Ḥanafī refers only briefly to the relation between the Quṭb's economic thought and Nasser's justifications for his socialist policies:¹⁵⁸ Quṭb legitimized the nationalization of basic industries with reference to the Mālikite theory that *maṣlaḥa* in case of *darūra* urges exceptional interferences into property rights.¹⁵⁹ But Ḥanafī disapproves of Quṭb's defense of private property in general.¹⁶⁰ The young Quṭb's interpretation of *tawḥīd*, *shahāda* and *ḥākimiyya* are regarded by Ḥanafī as foundation for the "liberation of conscience" and the struggle against tyranny. He claims that Quṭb's definition of *ḥākimiyya* contains no positive notion in the sense of "divine government" but only the rejection of tyrannical

¹⁵⁵ v.167 *athar al-inām al-shahīd Sayyid Quṭb ʿalā l-ḥarakāt al-dīniyya al-muʿāsira* (Quṭb), 1980; SALVATORE (1995) p. 207.

¹⁵⁶ v.188 Quṭb. In this context it is worthy to note that even in *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān* Quṭb begins the analysis of some *sūras* with a praise of their rhythmical beauty: Quṭb (1983) pp. 3404f. (*sūra* 53), 3902f. (*sūra* 89); for a general account of aesthetic approaches to the Qur'ān: Kermani. However, his juxtaposition of fundamentalist legalists and those torn towards the Qur'ān by its beauty is a misleading simplification as Quṭb's remarks demonstrate.

¹⁵⁷ vi.44 *ḥaraka*; v.181f. Quṭb: support for Sa'd Zaghāl, quotation from *tijl min al-qarya*.

¹⁵⁸ v.219f. and 255f. Quṭb: comparison with Mao, Guevara and Ho-Chi Minh; also viii.292 *al-yasār al-islāmī lā yaṭlub al-sulṭa wa lā yurīduhā*, interview, 1982.

¹⁵⁹ v.191ff, v.199 Quṭb: *maṣlaḥa and muṣādara*; similar viii.67 *yasār*; cf. Quṭb pp. 152ff.

¹⁶⁰ v.221 Quṭb.

powers.¹⁶¹ Therefore, Ḥanafī labels Quṭb the first “Islamic leftist” and describes his own project as the continuation of Quṭb’s theoretical efforts during the late forties and early fifties.¹⁶²

Nevertheless, Ḥanafī does not overlook the fact that many aspects of the later Quṭb’s dualistic world view and intolerance are already to be found in this phase. Ḥanafī condemns his attacks on secularist intellectuals of Christian origin¹⁶³ and his refutation of “the West” which led Quṭb to a rejection of all currents of Islamic civilization influenced by non-Islamic sources. By rejecting the heritage of Islamic philosophy and Mu‘tazilism, Quṭb deprived himself of the opportunity to bolster his own thought with a more solid foundation. The total rejection of Western culture caused him to refute achievements like enlightenment and freedom of thought.¹⁶⁴

Ḥanafī explains Quṭb’s development from his “social” to his “philosophical” phase as a consequence of his incarceration after the break between Nasser and the *Ikhwān*. This forced him to divert his attention from direct political action towards theory. Instead of paying attention to urgent social problems he decided to fight Westernization.¹⁶⁵ This led him to the study of the works of Mawdūdī, whose isolationism was to dominate his thought later.¹⁶⁶

Ḥanafī completely rejects Quṭb’s thought in the “political” phase. But the refutation of his thought is mitigated by an exculpation of the person. He describes the negative development as the product of the “thought of the tortured” and accuses the political leadership:¹⁶⁷ “The Egyptian Revolution is responsible for the development from the struggle between Islam and capitalism into the struggle between Islam and *jāhiliyya*.”¹⁶⁸ This argument fails to convince Ḥanafī’s former student Abū Zayd. According to him Ḥanafī underestimates the internal logic of Quṭb’s

¹⁶¹ v.195f, 200, 209 *Quṭb*: *hākimiyya* and *shahāda*; v.216: *salbī, rafḍ li ‘ubūdiyyat al-bashar*; not yet influenced by Mawdūdī: v.205.

¹⁶² v.219 *Quṭb*; vii.283, 286f *al-yasār al-islāmī mashrū‘ haḍārī*, 1982 for “Majallat 15-21”, Tunis.

¹⁶³ v.202 *Quṭb*.

¹⁶⁴ v.195f *Quṭb*.

¹⁶⁵ v.251 *Quṭb*.

¹⁶⁶ v.238ff., 252 *Quṭb*.

¹⁶⁷ v.295 *Quṭb*.

¹⁶⁸ v.255 *Quṭb*.

thought, and moreover he fails to explain why similar ideologies were promoted or adopted by people not exposed to torture.¹⁶⁹

Ḥanafī traces the later Quṭb's *ḥākimiyya* theory back to Mawdūdī, whose concepts he refutes, not only because of his preoccupation with formalities, his reactionary stance concerning women and his defense of private property.¹⁷⁰ Above all, he rejects the “theocentrism” underlying Mawdūdī's political thought because it contradicts his own pretension to transform theology into anthropology, according to which *vox dei* ought to be *vox populi*. Mawdūdī's positive understanding of *ḥākimiyya* as the rule of God is therefore directed against any other form of government, tyrannical or not.¹⁷¹ Influenced by this conception, Quṭb began to denounce every form of government which does not conform to his own concept of an Islamic order as *jāhiliyya*.¹⁷² In the footsteps of Mawdūdī, it was logical to give up every notion of Islam that went beyond formalism and a static understanding of the *sharī'a*. Quṭb's struggle became a struggle of belief devoid of any social content.¹⁷³ Ḥanafī considers this isolationist tendency of the later Quṭb the main source of inspiration for the violent *jamā'āt* of the seventies.¹⁷⁴

Treason and Punishment: Sadat and the *jamā'āt*

Whereas Nasser's regime appears in Ḥanafī's writings as a failure, although the honorable intentions of the leader may not be questioned, the reign of Sadat (*thawra muḍādda*, or even *ridda*) appears as a humiliating sell-out of Egypt and the darkest phase in the country's history.¹⁷⁵ In

¹⁶⁹ Abū Zayd (1994) pp. 107f.

¹⁷⁰ v.154ff. *Athar Abī l-A'ālā Mawdūdī 'alā l-jamā'āt al-dīniyya al-mu'āšira*, 1979, (*Mawdūdī*), another contribution to the “Markaz al-qaumī lil-buḥūth al-ijtimā'iyya wa-l-jinā'iyya”; preface to Khumaynī p. xxviii.

¹⁷¹ v.126-31 *Mawdūdī*; similar against the preponderance of the *naṣṣ* over the *maṣāliḥ* v.132ff., v.160, and v.154ff. against Mawdūdī's stress on seclusion of women. Ḥanafī's arguments as well as Quṭb's reception of Mawdūdī are most likely due to the wrong translation of *ḥukūmat-i ilāhī* as *ḥukūmat Allāh*: Akhavi (1997) p. 378n7.

¹⁷² v.264f. *Quṭb*.

¹⁷³ v.272f. *Quṭb*.

¹⁷⁴ v.255, 288ff. *Quṭb*.

¹⁷⁵ *ridda*: Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 67, 7; viii.312 *kayfa yufakkiru l-yasār al-islāmī*, 1982, in *al-Aḥāli*.

most of Ḥanafī's writings Sadat enters the stage as *diabolus ex machina*, as has already been shown with reference to those passages where he has been eliminated from the picture of Nasser's regime. Ḥanafī's criticism of Sadat's reign can be divided into the criticism of concrete political actions and a deeper-lying aspect: the misuse of religion to justify them. An extensive discussion of the first aspect is unnecessary. Obviously *infītāh* and the pro-Western foreign policy culminating in the peace treaty with Israel could only be abhorred by Ḥanafī. On the other hand, the way in which Sadat exploited religion is the clue to Ḥanafī's heritage discourse which has to be considered an implicit criticism of that era: when Ḥanafī bashes al-Ghazālī he aims at Sadat. Ḥanafī rarely mentions the use made of these ideological elements by the regime, but for contemporary observers the allusions must have been obvious.

In comparison with Nasser's "charismatic" leadership, Ḥanafī describes Sadat's leadership as "traditional". He accuses him of exploiting the patriarchal and authoritarian aspects of the Egyptian popular heritage by praising the *akhlāq al-qarya* and by styling himself as a traditional rural leader, "thus the ruler began to appear as tribal chief or ancient Hebrew patriarch". This orientation towards rural conservatism implied, according to Ḥanafī, the rejection of everything young and innovative.¹⁷⁶

Ḥanafī's rejection of "conservative religion" refers to phenomena typical for the Sadat era. It is not difficult to see his refusal of illuminationist political concepts with a *raʿīs mulham* on top in connection with a president who used to justify his decisions with the formula: "*ulhima lī*".¹⁷⁷ Ḥanafī's struggle against Ashʿarism in favour of doctrines teaching the causality of natural processes has a point of reference in the propaganda of the regime. The president used to trace his success at the beginning of his tenure back to miraculous interventions of God. Legends witnessing the support of angels were woven after the Egyptian army had crossed the Suez Canal in 1973.¹⁷⁸ The struggle against social evils was discouraged by the promotion of a fatalist world-view

¹⁷⁶ viii.158 *mustaqbal Miṣr*.

¹⁷⁷ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 13; on Sadat: Abū Zayd (1994) p. 113.

¹⁷⁸ iv.276 *al-ʿāmil al-dīnī*; other examples: iv.188 *tanmiya*; vi.63ff *ḥaraka*.

ascribing them to the will of God.¹⁷⁹ Ḥanafī's agitation against the preoccupation with supernatural phenomena, diverting the attention from worldly affairs, aims at the TV sermons of Shaykh Sha'rawī.¹⁸⁰ Even his polemics against the import of scientific knowledge belong to this context. Sadat claimed for his government to be founded on “*ilm wa imān*”. Ḥanafī rejects this slogan, because it implies a contradiction between science and religion. Moreover the respective propaganda associated knowledge with the “West” and belief with the “East”, thus holding the Egyptian people back from being creative.¹⁸¹

The part of Islamic tradition of which the Sadat regime made the most extensive use was Sufism. The upsurge of splendid *mawlid*s is not the only indicator for this. Sadat founded *al-Majlis al-a'lā li-shu'ūn aṭ-ṭarīqāt* and thus rendered the Sufi orders a tool of the regime.¹⁸² On the ideological level, Ḥanafī's opposition against the promotion of Sufism has to be seen in connection with the regime's obvious intention to keep people from revolting against economic hardship by propagating the quietist values of *ṣabr* and *tawakkul*.¹⁸³ Moreover he claims that Sadat, who abused Islam for manipulating the Egyptian public, in his propaganda for the West gave up Islam for syncretism. He reports with disgust on the inter-religious center Sadat planned to set up in the Sinai, because this would mean propagating the reconciliation between Arabs and Jews and between “the peoples (*shu'ūb*) and imperialism”.¹⁸⁴ In his articles written in defense of Marxism Ḥanafī denies the intention of promoting a foreign ideology, but he insinuates that the attacks on Marxism by the regime were directed against the idea of social justice as such.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ iv.269 *al-‘āmil al-dīnī*; iv.172ff. *tanmiya*.

¹⁸⁰ Jansen (1986) pp. 121ff; Ḥanafī only criticizes his political function viii.303f *kayfa yufakkir*; Hildebrandt (p. 43n173) reports that in a private conversation Ḥanafī declared al-Sha'rawī his main enemy.

¹⁸¹ iv.184ff. *tanmiya*; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* p. 73.

¹⁸² iv.33ff. *tanmiya*; this is not correct, the institution was already founded at the beginning of the 20th century and continued to exist under Nasser cf. Johansen pp. 37f., but the Sadat regime passed to acts in 1976 and 1978 which lead to an extension of state control over the institution. Translations of both Ordinances: *ibid.* pp. 256-292.

¹⁸³ iv.168ff., 176ff. *tanmiya*; Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 14f., 187.

¹⁸⁴ vi.76 *ḥaraka*.

¹⁸⁵ vii.225 *tashwīh*.

Ḥanafī does not accuse Sadat of the misinterpretation of Islam alone. He stresses that during the first phase of his reign, Sadat left religious propaganda to members of the conservative wing of the *Ikhwān*, whom he had released from jail or allowed to return from exile. After their return they focused on Nasser-bashing. Above all, they propagated the opinion that the defeat of 1967 was the well-deserved punishment for the atrocities of Nasser's godless regime.¹⁸⁶ In his criticism Ḥanafī does not explicitly refer to the economic ideology of the *Ikhwān*, but for the contemporary observer their growing bourgeois outlook and the conservatism nurtured by their leaders during exile in Saudi Arabia could not be overlooked.¹⁸⁷

In his writings Ḥanafī dedicates considerable space to the terrorist *jamā'āt*, in particular *al-Jihād al-Islāmī*, out of which the assassins of Sadat emerged. His judgment of them varied considerably. The fact that they are considered primarily disastrous in his studies on Quṭb and Mawdūdī, and in *al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdīd* but praised heavily in articles published two years later in his series for the Kuwaiti daily *al-Waṭan* can easily be explained by the political context: in 1980 *al-Jihād al-Islāmī* had not yet assassinated Sadat.¹⁸⁸

Ḥanafī regards the *jamā'āt* a product of the isolationist thought of Mawdūdī and of Quṭb in the last phase of his life.¹⁸⁹ In his account of the *fitna ṭā'ifiyya* which marred Egypt's communal relations during the seventies, Ḥanafī condemns their intolerance and their violent methods. He contrasts their atrocities against the Christian minority with the national unity between Christians and Muslims during the Nasser era. Nevertheless, Ḥanafī holds two parties responsible for the *fitna*: On the one hand, he charges the *jamā'āt* with trying to enhance their popularity among the backward Muslim population of Upper Egypt by attacking wealthy Christians. Therefore he condemns the *fatwā* of 'Umar Abd al-Raḥmān, which legitimizes the expropriation of Christians. On the other hand, he accuses Sadat of exploiting the situation by presenting himself to the West as the savior of the Christians from Muslim

¹⁸⁶ vi.61f. *ḥaraka*.

¹⁸⁷ Kepel p. 105ff.

¹⁸⁸ A similar conclusion by Zakariyyā' pp. 78ff.

¹⁸⁹ v.140-54 *Mawdūdī*.

fanatism, and to the Egyptian public as a strong leader preventing a Lebanon-like civil war.¹⁹⁰

This condemnation of the *jamā'āt* is replaced by approval when Ḥanafī refers to the assassination of Sadat. In this context he praises them as the executors of the people's will. He seems, however, not to be quite sure about the degree of popular acceptance. On the one hand, he stresses that they were inspired by the Islamic heritage and that they expressed themselves in *fatwās*, a literary form the masses were acquainted with. On the other hand, he considers their doctrines extremist, preventing them from moving among the people "like a fish in water".¹⁹¹ Ḥanafī criticizes their preference for action in small elitist and hierarchical groups over mass mobilization, which made them fall prey to the "dialectic of all or nothing".¹⁹² Their legitimization of the murder with reference to Ibn Taymiyya's *fatwā* against the Mongols appears to him as insufficient *qiyās* based on the analysis of contemporary events in the light of the past.¹⁹³ But whatever his objections to their theoretical justification may be, he welcomes the deed. In Ḥanafī's description Sadat's funeral appears as final verdict on the traitor:

Only the West and Israel attended (the funeral), represented by three former American presidents and Begin, who insisted on coming on the Sabbath in order to fulfill his duty towards a friend who had granted Israel its birth certificate and endowed it with a guaranty of survival. But (the funeral took place) in the desert of Egypt, without people, apart from the security forces. In this moment Egypt remembered the funeral of Nasser, five millions in Cairo, carrying the bier on their shoulders, tearing it out of each other's hands; and they laid him to rest in the presence of two comrades, a brother from Sudan and a son from Libya.¹⁹⁴

According to Ḥanafī, the opposition against Sadat was not restricted to the *jamā'āt*, referred to as the legitimate heirs of the "Free Officers", but was shared by all "national currents".¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, only *al-Jihād al-Islāmī* was able to execute the people's will, because its adherents

¹⁹⁰ vi.83ff. *ḥaraka*.

¹⁹¹ vi.201 *ḥaraka*.

¹⁹² vi.153f., 186ff. *ḥaraka*; Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 40ff.; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* p. 36.

¹⁹³ vi.114-23 *ḥaraka*, esp. 118; Jansen (1986) p. 166-82; on the importance of Ibn Taymiyya as a role-model for contemporary Islamists: Nagel vol. ii pp. 109-142.

¹⁹⁴ vi.94ff. (quot. p. 96) *ḥaraka*; also vi.201 *ḥaraka*: "ikhhlās Miṣr fī Uktūbar 1981"; repeated in Ḥanafī/Jābirī, *Ḥiwār* p. 35 and I.47n.; cf. Esposito & Voll p. 79: "Although he did not condone the murder of Sadat in 1981, ...".

¹⁹⁵ vi.193f. *ḥaraka*.

alone had the chance to infiltrate the army—unlike the Nasserists who were purged at the beginning of Sadat’s reign. Thus, in the aftermath of Sadat’s assassination Ḥanafī saw the *jamā’āt* as the avant-garde of a united front of the “national currents”.¹⁹⁶

The Way to Bandoeng leads through Tehran: Khumaynī as a New Nasser

Ḥanafī hailed the “Great Islamic Revolution in Iran” with enthusiasm. Unlike other intellectuals in the West and the Islamic world, he did not disassociate himself from this euphoria later.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless his accounts of the revolution, which he partially witnessed, are not completely uncritical.

First, he considers the revolution the foremost sign of a general awakening (*ṣahwa*) of Islam and a severe blow to Western imperialism:

The Great Islamic Revolution in Iran was the authentic indicator for the awakening of the Muslims and the appearance of Islam.... It broke out totally unexpected, when Iran was an oasis of security for the West in the region.... And it occurred after the largest experiment in Westernization in the region, according to which Iran was to become a part of Europe, in the way *khedive* Isma‘īl had tried to deal with Egypt in the last century.... (The revolution) has developed into the greatest challenge to the West and into the strongest pillar of Islamic identity as national identity and into the strongest affirmation of national independence against a Western policy of block-building and expansionism.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ vi.92f. *ḥaraka*; Zakariyyā’ considers this description of *al-Jihād al-islāmī* dangerously naive because Ḥanafī does not consider their antidemocratic objectives exposed in *al-Farīda al-ghā’iba* (pp. 81ff.). For Zakariyyā’ the assassination of Sadat was an attempt to assassinate modernity as such, including “Ḥasan Ḥanafī as he expresses himself in other articles“ (p. 94).

¹⁹⁷ Those who come forward with this assertion give no reference from Ḥanafī’s writings: Von Kügelgen p. 207; Hildebrandt p. 12; cf. the continuing positive evaluation Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* pp. 528,-5ff. (on *wilāyat al-faqīh*), 548, 12ff.; with some good will a dissociation could be seen in a statement in “intervista” p. 78, but the interview addresses a European audience, and Ḥanafī criticizes the Āyatollāhs’ old fashioned beards, not the persecution, torture and murder of political opponents and religious minorities. Other Egyptian leftists did not sympathize with the Iranian Revolution longer than until October 1979; see a quotation from “Roz al-Yūsif” in Akhavi (1990) p. 149.

¹⁹⁸ v.9f. *Āsiyā*. The reference to Ismā‘īl seems to be an allusion to the common equation of Nasser and Sadat to Muḥammad ‘Alī and Ismā‘īl respectively, Schölch p. 368.

The anti-Western rage of the revolution is described as a new impetus for the struggle against Zionism, which has come to a standstill. Therefore: “The road to al-Quds leads through Tehran”.¹⁹⁹ In his accounts, Ḥanafī stresses the similarities between Nasser and Khumaynī, one time even calling the *imām* a “new Nasser”. In this respect his position differs markedly from the *Ikhwān*, who equated Khumaynī’s struggle against the Shah with Quṭb’s struggle against Nasser. Ḥanafī justifies this equation by describing Khumaynī as Muṣaddiq’s heir.²⁰⁰ He even goes one step further by presenting the Iranian revolution as a superior alternative, devoid of the crucial deficiency of the Nasserist system: the non-existent mass basis. In his account the Islamic revolution is characterized by a complete merger of leadership and masses.²⁰¹

Ḥanafī is less euphoric about the ideological aspect of the revolution. He mentions the efforts of Sharī‘atī and Banī Ṣadr to formulate a revolutionary ideology but does not delve into details.²⁰² Sometimes he considers Shiism as such a revolutionary movement. But hardly anywhere is Ḥanafī’s “almost infinite ability to contradict himself” more apparent than in his foreword to the Arabic translation of Khumaynī’s *al-Ḥukūma al-islamiyya*. He first praises the concept of effective leadership by alluding to al-Fārābī’s virtuous city.²⁰³ Later on, he criticizes Khumaynī for a concept conceived from top to bottom and thus resembling the authoritarian models of early modern political thought in the West and the reality of the Arab military regimes.²⁰⁴ He first praises Khumaynī for refraining from an explicitly Shiite argumentation and for appealing to the common Islamic heritage instead. Then he criticizes the obvious influence of Shiite metaphysics on his concepts, like the idea of the Twelve Imams and Fatima as pre-existing lights revolving around the Throne of God.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ v.15 *Āsiyā*; iii.331f. *thawra ṛāniyya*; for a similar slogan concerning Cairo among the Free Officers: Jansen (1997) p. 125.; the *Ikhwān* did praise the anti-imperialist aspect of the revolution in a similar fashion Akhavi (1990) p. 146.

²⁰⁰ v.15f. *Āsiyā*; Matthee p. 268; Akhavi (1990) p. 148.

²⁰¹ v.12 *Āsiyā*.

²⁰² iii.331f. *thawra ṛāniyya*; Ḥanafī does not know Farsi: viii.296 *al-yasār as-islāmī lā yaṭlubu l-ṣulṭa*

²⁰³ preface to Khumaynī p. xii.

²⁰⁴ preface to Khumaynī p. xxvii (on Machiavelli and Hobbes n14).

²⁰⁵ preface to Khumaynī p. xxv ff.

Ḥanafī's ambivalent attitude towards the specifically Shiite elements in the Islamic revolution corresponds to the attitude of the *Ikhwān*: both were surprised that it took place in Iran, whose Shiism both had previously considered the product of a Judeo-Persian conspiracy against Islam.²⁰⁶ On the other hand it is worth mentioning that the issue of *taqrīb* between Sunnism and Shiism was supported by the Nasserist regime.²⁰⁷ Ḥanafī defends the revolution against the attacks in the Egyptian media, which exploited the lack of knowledge about the different branches of Shiism by ascribing *ghulāt* views like *ḥulūl* to Iran's *Imāmīs*. But instead of demonstrating that the accusations are wrong, he stresses that the Iranian 'ulamā' are just about to return to common Islam by wiping out innovations.²⁰⁸ Nevertheless, Shiite popular devotion had obviously shocked him:

... and in Qumm the poor-, men, women and children- are crowded around the *rauḍa muḥtarama*, the grave of Fatima the daughter of Mūsā b. Jāfar, and they ask the people: "What is more honorable, all the gold, silver and crystal in the dome and the donations on the holy grave, or feeding, clothing and sheltering the poor?" Underdevelopment does not consist of poverty alone but of all the mental and psychological structures causing it and other evils. But the men and women cry and beg for *baraka* by striking its brass and its iron fence.... Then they leave as if their problems were solved. It seems as if the revolution cannot succeed without repeating the revolution of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb against the graves and the living places of the *awliyā'*.²⁰⁹

While he severely criticizes Shiite devotion, the repression of women, political opponents and religious minorities did not upset Ḥanafī. He even hails the persecution of the Bahai minority as eradication of a crypto-Zionist movement that wants to abolish *jihād*. He compares severe punishment, not only of representatives of the old system but also of ordinary criminals, favourably to the Western juridical systems, which he describes as too mild as well as corrupt and inefficient. This stance is slightly softened by the expectation that the revolution will

²⁰⁶ iii. 17 *ghazw*; Matthee p. 259ff.; initially the *Ikhwān* too were supporters of *taqrīb*, Brunner pp. 135ff., pp. 196f.; Akhavi (1990) pp. 139f.

²⁰⁷ Brunner pp. 208—232.; Ende *passim*, and id. in EI² s.v. "Taqrīb" and s.n. "al-Shaltūt".

²⁰⁸ v.22 *Āsiyā'*; preface to Khumaynī p. 25.

²⁰⁹ iii.333f. *thawra vāniyya*.

declare a general amnesty after its final victory.²¹⁰ Although Ḥanafī strictly opposes demands for Islamic clothing with respect to Egypt, he praises the imposition of the veil in Iran as a powerful affirmation of Islamic identity.²¹¹

The “Islamic Left” and “Peoples’ Nasserism”

Generally, Ḥanafī’s thought is discussed in relation to Western thought, *turāth* and Islamism. But as has been shown his main concern is obviously the revitalization of Nasserism,²¹² which he intends to reinvigorate by creating an ideology capable of mobilizing the masses for its support, thus rendering a second implosion like the one in 1970 impossible. Therefore Nasser’s tactical attempt to legitimize the revolution with religious slogans ought to be overcome by systematic ideological activity.²¹³ In several writings he articulates his desire for a *Nāṣiriyya shaʿbiyya*, cleansed of the deficiencies of the “bureaucratic” precursor; and the “Islamic Left” is identical with “peoples’ Nasserism”.²¹⁴ In the seventies, Ḥanafī associated with the Nasserist Tajammuʿ Party and not with the *Ikhwān*. He wrote a large number of his articles for its daily *al-Aḥālī*.²¹⁵ This does not contradict his intention to bring about

²¹⁰ iii.335f. *thawra ṭrāniyya*; v.18 *Āsiyā*; on Bahais also iii.27 *ghazw*; the *Ikhwān* took a similar stance: Matthee: p. 258.

²¹¹ iii.335 *thawra ṭrāniyya*; modernist attitudes exposed in vii.314-22 *al-marʿa al-ʿarabiyya maḥrūma min ḥuqūqihā ka muslima*, 1985; V.246,7ff. (on *imāma* of women) and V.288,8ff.

²¹² This is supported by his former pupil Abū Zayd: p. 146 ff.: “*al-yasār al-islāmī ibn sharʿī li l-madd al-qawmī ... wa hiya l-ḥaraka allatī wajadat tābīruhā fi nizām Yūliyyū*”; also Ḥattar p. 18ff; Boullata s.n. “Ḥanafī” in EMIW; Campanini supposes a certain influence of Nasserism, pp. 112n19, 119.

²¹³ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 59; the programmatic title of an article: *al-Ḍubbāt al-aḥrār am al-mufakkirīn al-aḥrār* ii.79, 1979.; I.36,7ff.

²¹⁴ viii.165ff., esp. 168, *al-yasār al-islāmī wa mustaqbal Miṣr*, 1981; Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār* p. 75ff.

²¹⁵ i.7 *muqaddima*, vi.268 *sīra*, because of tactical differences the cooperation was problematic, Ḥanafī preferred education of the masses to immediate political action: viii.175 *al-tawwīr al-dīnī wa-l-tanzīm al-siyāsī*, 1976; while lecturing in Morocco he was close to the *Istiqlāl* party, vi.275 *sīra*, in Tunisia the group around the “Majallat 15-21” is influenced by him see n162 and Hildebrandt p. 82n313. Currently he seems to have attracted a number of Indonesian intellectuals: Martin & Woodward pp. 150 and 156n32; Together with Shonhaji Sholeh he has published the volume: *Agama, Ideologi dan Pembangunan* (Religion, Ideology and Development), Jakarta 1991.

a unification of the four national currents: Nasser's propagandists had already presented Nasserism as synthesis of socialism without materialism and atheism, Islam without backwardness, and modernism without bourgeois dominance.²¹⁶

The desire for a more "democratic" variant of Nasserism is not at all to be understood as a demand for a Western-style multi-party system, which Ḥanafī rejects with contradictory arguments: on the one hand, parliamentary democracy is said to prevent any real change in favour of the majority, on the other hand it is accused of causing suppression of the minority by the majority.²¹⁷ In this respect Ḥanafī's position differs from the party-line of Tajammu', which has given up Nasserist resentment against parliamentarianism and parties.²¹⁸ Ḥanafī suggests a "pluralist one-party system" representing the different national currents in one single organization as the superior alternative. His concept of pluralism, too, must not be confused with the liberal idea of pluralism, because it does not imply the legitimacy of different interests or objectives. Not unlike the block-party system in pre-1989 Central Europe it rather means justifying one objective with different slogans: *tahrīr al-ard bismillāh, bism al-ḥurriyya, bism al-ṭabaqa al-ʿāmila, bism al-waṭan al-ʿarabi*.²¹⁹ Ḥanafī's rejection of the *ḥadīth* about the *firqa nājiyya* is usually interpreted as a plea for religious tolerance. This, too, should be scrutinized more closely.²²⁰ It is not valid for Ahmadis, Ismailis and especially Bahais whom he wants to see exterminated

²¹⁶ Cf. a presentation for a Western audience: A. Said pp. 24, 40; similar in the same book M. Samir Ahmed p. 73f, for the other aspects the translation of the National Charter of 1962 *ibid.* p. 97ff., 107f., 122f., 127f.; on the ideological background of the Charter: Carré: pp. 110ff.

²¹⁷ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 524; ii.219 *qaḍīyyat al-dīmūqrāṭiyya*, interview "end of seventies"; preface to Khumaynī p. xv; V.324, apu ff.

²¹⁸ Krämer pp. 62ff.; viii.189 *ma'sāt al-aḥzāb al-taqaddumiyya fī bilād mutakhallifa*, 1978/87.

²¹⁹ viii.201f. *ma'sāt al-aḥzāb al-taqaddumiyya fī bilād mutakhallifa*; ii.282f. *al-ta'addūdiyya 'alā l-mustawā al-nazarī, al-wahdāniyya 'alā l-mustawā al-ʿamālī*, 1983; Ḥanafī, "Berlin" p. 109.; most explicit: V.327,5ff.: "wa ammā al-ḥizb al-wāḥid fa huwa al-ḥizb al-ḥaqq al-mu'abbir 'an al-fikr wa-l-mudāfi'an maṣlahat al-jamāhīr wa-l-ḥarīṣ 'alayhā fī muqābil ḥizb mudādd wa lā yu-maththilu maṣlahat al-jamāhīr wa lā yu'abbūnhā." Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that Ḥanafī revolutionized academic teaching in Egypt by introducing a more democratic style based on discussion instead of rote-learning the professor's *dicta*: Abū Zayd (1999) pp. 96ff.

²²⁰ Von Kügelgen p. 221n826.

(as organizations). He does not deal with their teaching extensively because his condemnation is a *takfīr siyāsī*: their cardinal sin is their pro-Westernism.²²¹

Ḥanafī's attempt to revitalize Nasserism has to be considered in a larger context: it is the specific Egyptian formulation of his demand to endow Third-World ideologies with a more solid theoretical foundation:

It is the task of our generation, to bring forth a multitude of theoretical judgments, so that the civilizational development of the "self" (*masār al-anā*) comes close to the civilizational development of the "other" in respect of theoretical judgments, so that we read Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl with the intellect while in our hearts we are sympathizing with Nasser, Nkrumah, Senghor, Guevara, Kaunda, Kenyatta and Nyerere. Those are the experiences of our generation, which we did not reflect upon (*taraknāhā bidūn tanzīr*), and we moved toward ready-made theories without living their reality or undergoing their experiences (*dūna an nā'ish wāqī'ahā au namurr bi-tajribatihā*). We are challenged to elevate these writings (of the Third-World leaders) from the level of mere rhetoric to the level of theory and to elevate them out of the field of lived experiences (*tajārib ma'āsha*)²²² onto the level of concepts.²²³

The choice of words already shows that the longing for an upswing of theoretical thought in the Third World is derived from his morphological concept of history. But although Ḥanafī, when he deals with the past, only contrasts Islam as "East" in opposition to the "West", he suddenly speaks of the whole Third World as "East" when he deals with the present: in the index of his *Muqaddima*... even Tito and Latin Americans are listed among the Easterners!²²⁴ The main source for this upswing

²²¹ v. 71 *Āsiyā*: in the same context Ḥanafī ironically also condemns Sayyid Aḥmad Khān although he was the first to sing the tunes that Ḥanafī continues when he pleads for a re-appreciation of rationalist trends in early Islam, a reconsideration of the accord between *ḥadīth* and Qur'ān and above all for an understanding of revelation that eliminates the contradiction between the "Word of God" and the laws of nature, the "Work of God". Cf. Troll pp. 134ff., 172ff., 216f., 226f.; Brown pp. 33f.

²²² This awkward construct (Fr. *expérience vécue*) is generally used by non-German phenomenologists to render the associative aspect of "Erlebnis" cf. Gail Soffer s.v. "Relativism" in "Encyclopedia of Phenomenology", p. 595a.

²²³ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 529, 10ff.; similar I.75,-9ff.

²²⁴ Notably in Arabic letters only. On the other hand Japanese and all Jews, including those from Arab countries, appear as Westerners. This inconsistency has also been singled out by Qanṣuwwa, p. 220, who concludes that Ḥanafī fails to present objective criteria for the "self" and the "other". Recently, in an interview for a German online-magazine ("Die Globalisierung", part 1) and his debate with al-'Aẓm (1999), Ḥanafī (p. 41) seems to have become quite pessimistic with regard to the anti-Western identity of Latin America: "Li-

will be the seven thousand years of consciousness to which the Third World can look back, whereas the consciousness of the West dates back only two thousand or two and a half thousand years.²²⁵ His “Occidentalism” is also to be considered in this context: it is supposed to show that the “West is in no way superior to other world-cultures and that its history can never serve as role-model for their development, a theory which is hidden behind the legend of world-civilization”.²²⁶ Moreover, his historicist concept contains a serious warning for all Arab secularists: their attempt to stem the tide of Islamic awakening is doomed to fail because it contradicts the laws of history.²²⁷

The short, adverse comments by secularist intellectuals show that they share more or less the view of Ṭarābīshī and Ḥattar, who both stress his affinity to Islamism.²²⁸ Most critics disapprove of Ḥanafī’s instrumentalist eclecticism: Abū Zayd accuses him of borrowing relentlessly from rightist as well as from leftist schools.²²⁹ Ḥanafī’s concept of authenticity is questioned by Ḥattar from the Marxist point of view. Notwithstanding his dogmatic convictions, he convincingly demonstrates that Ḥanafī never pays attention to the fact that heritage is something men pass on and accept or reject. This leads him to the polemical assertion that Ḥanafī’s concept is mere biologism, because *turāth* seems to be inherent to genes.²³⁰ In *al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdīd* Ḥanafī himself frankly admits that he considers the potential for mobilization of ideological concepts their most important aspect by denying that they are true or false as such.

beration theology has weakened and the youth has Americanized (*sic*), its civilizations have become blurred, it is neither African nor Indian, neither Spanish nor Portuguese, nor North American”.

²²⁵ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 549,-2ff.

²²⁶ Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 30,11ff., p. 33,6ff., p. 39,-7ff, p. 40,1ff.

²²⁷ vi.320ff. *allādhīna yaqifūn didd al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmīyya lā yafhamūn qānūn al-ta’rīkh*, 1988 in “al-Khalīj”

²²⁸ al-Azmeh p. 48, 93; Arkoun pp. 183f.; interview of Arkoun by Koningsveld and Haleber in Koningsveld pp. 288f.; Zakariyyā’ p. 31; Ṭarābīshī in Jābirī/Ḥanafī, *Hiwār* p. 143 and Ḥattar p. 168f.: *wa’y būjuwāzī ṣaghūr, salafīyya*, pp. 179ff.; cf. Hildebrandt pp. 50ff for reviews of the Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* and two *nadwas* on this topic, 1994 pp. 64ff., Cairo 1995 pp. 71ff. and 119ff. (Arabic texts) where especially Khulayf, Zakariyyā’, ‘Irāqī and Qansuwwa polemized vehemently against Ḥanafī; positive reactions by Wafā’ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm (pp. 52ff.), Fakhri Ṣāliḥ (pp. 58f.), ‘Alī Zay’ūr (pp. 59f.).

²²⁹ Abū Zayd (1994) p. 178; similar Von Kügelgen p. 235.

²³⁰ Ḥattar pp. 91ff.

With this argument he explicitly justifies the usage of anti-Semitic stereotypes and his appeals to the yearning for a leader.²³¹

Whereas Marxists and other secularists express their refusal by restricting themselves to scorn and sarcasm, the long-lingering conflict with the “religious right” took a dramatic turn in spring 1997, when “*jabhat al-takfir*”, a faction of Azhar-scholars led by Mūsā Ismā‘īl, accused Ḥanafī of apostasy, with reference to a denial of the miracles and a statement that God is a mere projection. Ḥanafī defended himself by pointing to the fact that the accusations were based on quotations taken out of context, especially from passages where he quotes opinions of *fīraq* and does not express his own point of view. But unlike Abū Zayd, Ḥanafī seems to have found more support from Azhar scholars and State authorities, in which the fact that the attack on him was considered an attack on the “modernist faction” around Ḥanafī’s friend Zaqqūq and Shaykh Ṭanṭāwī, and hence the state, may have played a considerable role.²³²

Unlike his Arab critics, Western scholars, with the exception of Von Kügelgen and Hildebrandt, have paid astonishingly little attention to Ḥanafī’s logical flaws, the distortions of the doctrines which he refers to and the plethora of blatant historical mistakes, which they would—hopefully—mark red in their students’ papers. The less euphoric researchers express their disappointment about the discrepancy between Ḥanafī’s high pretensions and the lack of concrete analyses and proposals.²³³ Ḥanafī’s apparent hypocrisy with regard to the Western public i.e. preaching dialogue abroad, and declaring the clash of civilizations at

²³¹ Ḥanafī, *Turāth* p. 66: “*laysa lil-‘aqa’id šidq fi dhātihā, bal šidquhā huwa madā ta’rikkhī fi l-ḥayāt al-‘amaliyya wa taghyīruhā lil-wāqī’ ... wa laysa lahā ‘ayy muqābil mādī fi l-‘ālam al-khārijī ka ḥawādith ta’rikkhiyya aw ashkhāš aw mu’assasāt, illā min al-wāqī’ al-‘arīḍ alladhī huwa ḥāmil al-ma’ānī wa maydān al-ḥil’.*”; Salvatore (1999) p. 237: considers similar statements „a rejection of the reification of knowledge“; viii.312 *kayfa yufakkir*; iii.37f., 40 *hal yajūzu shar’an al-šulḥ ma’a Banī Isrā’īl?*, 1981; in the assessment of the intentions of Ḥanafī’s anti-Jewish polemics Yadlin is absolutely right: pp. 61f; on the popular admiration for leaders: ii.218f. *qadīyyat al-dīmūqrāṭiyya*; a similar conclusion by Hildebrandt pp. 36f.

²³² *al-Muṣawwar* 5.5. 1997, 12.5.; *Roz al-Yūsif* 12.5.; comment by Jābir ‘Uṣfūr in *al-Hayāt* 7.7.; *die tageszeitung* (Berlin) 14.5.; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 3.6.; *New York Times* 15.5.; for earlier threats: Abū Zayd p. 200 f.; Martin & Woodward: p. 219n50; Esposito & Voll p. 80.

²³³ Von Kügelgen p. 218; Akhavi (1997) pp. 388, 393; Hallaq (1997) p. 213n8.

home, has recently been singled out by Hamzawy.²³⁴ Most astonishingly, nobody in the Arab world or the West raises the questions in how far Ḥanafī's Wahhābīte Averro-Mu'tazilism is likely to be accepted by ordinary Egyptians as more "authentic" than any Western ideology.²³⁵ Actually Ḥanafī's intention to bring about a unification of secularist Left, Liberals and Islamists has not yet met with any success on the political level. Notwithstanding the lack of influence in the realm of day-to-day politics, the impact of Ḥanafī's writings on educated people in Egypt and the Maghrib should not be underestimated.²³⁶

In conclusion, the main problem with Ḥanafī is his diffuseness, which cannot be attributed to his eclecticism alone. Rather, it is due to a relentless instrumentalization of ideological elements for an objective which itself has not been sufficiently thought through. He calls for resistance against a despised West. But simultaneously he implicitly admits that he considers the latter superior by choosing it as the yardstick against which to measure the Islamic heritage. In this respect Ḥanafī has a well-known predecessor: his role-model al-Afghānī. So if one replaces the word technology by ideology, Keddie's statement on the teacher, equally suits the disciple: "The conflict between the urgent need to adopt Western techniques and the equal need to combat dumb admiration of the West accounts for many of al-Afghanis contradictions".²³⁷

²³⁴ Hamzawy p. 359.

²³⁵ A certain exception is Ḥanafī himself who occasionally admits that the reception of Western culture has become an integral element of Egypt's heritage during the last century and a half: Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima* p. 57.

²³⁶ The evidence for this is rather impressionistic: Tibi (1992) p. 120 relates that his arguments are often repeated by Egyptian students in discussions.

²³⁷ Keddie p. 96; similar conclusions by Hattar p. 161; and Hildebrandt p. 99ff. (on the difficulties of original production in the Arab "intellectual field", following Bourdieu).

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