One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that

George Orwell²

Abstract

Hasan Hanafi is often described as leading and original reformer of Arab thought, renovator of the Islamic cultural heritage (itwāth) and advocate of political freedom. But these categorizations are based on insufficient analyses of his writings on both the Islamic and the Western intellectual heritage as well as his statements on current political issues. A critical reading of the first unveils that Hanafi misrepresents religious and philosophical doctrines and that he systematically passes over the fact that the relations between intellectual currents which he claims as role models for the “Islamic left” were marked by deep enmity. His writings on Marxism reveal that he merely condemns capitalism on moral terms without deeper analysis of the way it works. He himself proposes the idea of historical cycles determining the course of Eastern and Western civilization. This allows him to predict the imminent decline of the latter. The contradicting elements in Hanafi’s thought do, however, gain coherence when analyzed in the context of his writings on the modern history of Egypt and the Middle East at large. Here he juxtaposes activist and progressive Nasserism to the religious quietism used by Sadat to legitimize his

¹ This article is based on an M.A. thesis at the “Orientalisches Seminar” of the Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen in 1996. A note on reference to Hanafi’s writings: In the following, lower case Roman ciphers (i, v, x etc.) refer to the volumes of Al-Dīn wa-l-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, whereas those in upper case (I, V, X etc.) indicate the volumes of Min al-‘Aqīda ilā l-Thawra. See also the list of his writings at the end of this article.


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rule. From 1978 onwards he became an advocate of the Islamic revolution in Iran which he saw as rebirth of Nasserim and Tiermondism in general.

In 1981, Hasan Hanafi, professor of philosophy at Cairo University, published the first and only issue of the magazine *al-Yasār al-Islāmī*. The title was also intended to serve as the label of a new ideological movement. Profiting from the quest for a “Muslim Luther”3 Hanafi is a frequent guest at major international conferences4 and he served as program adviser at the International University in Tokyo. He is one of only 7 living authors to whom an article in “The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World” has been dedicated. This attention notwithstanding there is no comprehensive analysis of the major aspects of his thought in Western languages.5 Although Hanafi himself explicitly aims at bringing about political changes by his ideological activity, most of the western presentations of his thought deal with his project of *istighrāb* (“occidentalism”) or his reformulation of *turāth* without trying to assess their position in the context of Egyptian politics.6 The majority of authors dealing with Hanafi praises him as original rationalist thinker who presents Islam as enlightenment.7 Here, I will try to assess whether Hanafi is likely to come up to such expectations. A closer look at the actual intentions and concrete proposals of Islamic ideologists is most necessary in times when discussions in current Islamic studies increasingly center on the problem of how someone defines an “identity” on the most abstract possible level of “discourse”.

I will try to close this gap with an examination of the following works by Hanafi: 1. *al-Dīn wa-l-Thawra fī Miṣr*, an eight-volume collection of articles, interviews and speeches intended to have a direct political impact. They were written in the late seventies and early eighties, when Hanafi decided to favour political action over theoretical reflection

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3 Kramer pp. 52ff.
5 Esposito & Voll pp. 68-90 focus on Hanafi’s biography.
6 The exceptions are Matthee and Yadlin pp. 41-62.
after being removed from his teaching-post in 1977. 8 2. The booklet al-Tarāth wa-l-Tajdid in which Ḥanafī explains the methodological premises and the objectives of his project to revolutionize culture and politics of the Islamic World in accordance with its “heritage”; 3. Min al-Aqīda Ḱila l-Thawra, a “reinterpretation” of kalām in the context of the aforementioned project; 4. al-Muqaddima fī ‘Ibn al-Iṣtiqrāḥ, another part of this project, combining a conventional handbook account of Western philosophy with the most extensive presentation of Ḥanafī’s views on the development of Western civilization; 5. Huwār al-Mashriq wa-l-Maghrib, the public correspondence with the Moroccan professor of philosophy al-Jābiri in the Paris based weekly al-Tāwārīḥ al-Sāḥibī. Ḥanafī’s recent writings dedicated to the issue of “globalization” will occasionally be touched upon.

Furthermore I will refer to writings on Ḥanafī by major critics in the Arab world. The three most important examples are refutations from different ideological points of view. But while his former student Abū Zayd concentrates on criticizing Ḥanafī’s methodological premises in Naqd al-Khiṣab al-Dinī, the Jordanian Communist Nāḥīdat Ḥattar and Jurj Ṭarābīshī, the exponent of psychoanalytical literary criticism in the Arab World, indulge in malicious polemics. 9

An analysis of Ḥanafī’s writings poses several problems. The most severe one has been singled out by Ṭarābīshī: “When one reads Ḥanafī’s writings, what catches the eye first is the author’s almost infinite ability to contradict himself.” 10 This article attempts to explain this

8 i.5 Muqaddimat al-taḥa al-Ṭila.
9 Ṭarābīshī’s theses would deserve a study of its own, but I will not deal with his arguments based on psychoanalysis, because of my lacking competence to evaluate this method and my doubts concerning its scientific value. His study on Ḥanafī is preceded by a theoretical outline and a demonstration of his theses with reference to a large number of intellectuals from different political camps (pp. 17–101): By paralleling individual and collective psychic development, Ṭarābīshī denounces the entire ṭarāth-discourse as regressive (muṣlah) reaction to the traumatic shock (andaima, radda) caused by the confrontation of the omnipotent overfather “West”, depicted with phallic symbols (khanjar Isrā’il, with its air-force in 1967). This, he says, led to a neurotic flight towards collectives depicted with female, maternal images (such as umma, jamāḥīrat). These collectives allow the individual to merge with them and thus spare it the confrontation with reality. The manifestation of this flight reflex is a narcissistic compensation (tarmīm naskhat) marked by an idealization of collective identity and a regression towards pre-logical (qabman iqā) and magical thought, which renders a realist approach towards reality impossible.
inconsistency instead of searching for a coherent ideology where there is none. Another problem is Ḥanafi’s tendency rather to evoke than to explain. He reduces complex systems of thought to one or two catchwords, or he even confines himself to name-dropping. To imagine what the actualized _turāth_ should look like is left to the reader. On the other hand, where Ḥanafi deals with the Islamic heritage, he often cites doctrines by referring to “the elders”, “the ‘ulamā’”, “the Islamic thinkers”, thus suggesting that certain doctrines represent Islam as such. Moreover, he takes theological and philosophical terms (especially _taṣwīd_12) out of context and gives them a suggestive meaning.

**Ḥanafi’s understanding of the Terms “Ideology” and “Left”**

In the editorial of his magazine _al-Yasīr al-Islāmi_, Ḥanafi declares that the project of an “Islamic Left” continues al-Afghānī’s and ‘Abduh’s efforts to unite the _ummā_ in resistance to imperialism and to modernize the Islamic creed by taking into consideration the political and social needs of the Muslim masses.13 But Ḥanafi’s objectives are more far-reaching: he aims, as a ‘ālim multazim (= engaged), at designing a new ideology. For him this term implies a positive notion. He stresses this by equating it with “science” in a Third World context. Due to his intention of founding an ideology on the basis of _turāth_ instead of a “museum of thoughts” he refutes methods that would question the relevance of theological, legal and philosophical concepts for the present.14 He underlines the main intention of his ideological activities

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11 Hildebrandt p. 46.
12 i.143ff. _muqawwim_ _t_ al-shakhßiyya al-`arabīyya, speech in Tripoli, 1984 (henceforth _muqawwim_); in an interview by Navid Kermani following the German edition of his _Naqd al-khiyāb al-dīn_, Abū Zayd (1996) p. 206 does not explicitly refer to Ḥanafi, but it is obvious at whom his criticism of the associative and anachronistic use of religious terminology is directed.
13 viii.3, 75, _mādīhā yānī al-yasīr al-Islāmī_, 1981 (henceforth _yasīr_ the name of the magazine project was intended to be al-‘_Urwa-l-wuthqā al-jadīda_ or al-Manār al-jadīd first; vii.5 _al-yasīr wa-l-yāmīn ðī l-fikr al-dīnī_, 1976 (henceforth _yāmīn_, the article is a talkhīṣ of _Muṣnad_ ‘alā Thawrāl_).  
14 Ḥanafi, _Turāth_ pp. 23f, 24n12, against historist, analytical and projective (ıṣqṣā‘) methods and the search for influences (anggal al-ṭahr wa l-ta’alākh) p. 82ff; against a “matḥaf li l-ṣafār” (p. 89); the description of ideology as “neutral and objective” science also: Ḥanafi, _Muqaddima_ pp. 71-3ff; Scheffold pp. 87, 92 wants to see “Historisierungsambitionen” but
by reformulating Feuerbach’s statement that all theology is anthropology and he deplores:

...the lacking ability to develop theology (ilāhīyyāt) into theoretical thought and further into an economic and political ideology with clear characteristics, which can only be brought forth in a rational and practical way. ... Therefore the desire to attempt to confront ideologies of today with an Islamic ideology is still alive in our thought. 15

In the introduction to Min al-Aqīda ilā l-Thawra, he alludes to Marx by stating that it is not his aim to improve the understanding of the World but to change it. In al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdid, he describes revolutionary change as the result of ideological activity 16, and with a sideswipe at al-Ghazālī he calls for an ilḥām al-durūyā. The use of the term “Left” is justified by Ḥanāfī as a terminological convention with reference to the “Hegelian” and the “Freudian Left”. He considers all those political or philosophical currents as leftist that side with the oppressed masses against the status quo, thus disassociating the term from the exclusive association with Marxism. 18

The Umma’s Seven Challenges and the four National Currents

According to Ḥanāfī the Islamic umma is currently facing seven major challenges (taḥaddiyāt al-‘aṣr) to which a new revolutionary ideology is supposed to develop adequate responses 19:

some peripheral remarks cannot neutralize the practice of several volumes; according to Campanini p. 117n28, Ḥanāfī’s anti-historism is due to the influence of Husserl. But this philosopher’s anti-historism is one aspect of his anti-relativist epistemology: Husserl pp. 323-341. As will be shown, Ḥanāfī can in no way be considered an anti-relativist; for a critical assessment of Ḥanāfī’s reception of Husserl cf. Junm’a pp. 139ff.

15 Ḥanāfī, Turāth p. 38, also vi.264f. mhūkamāh hawla sīra dhāhiyya, (ṣīra); Ḥanāfī, “Buhūth” p. 26; II.556ff. ‘ilam al-kalām ‘ilam ma‘ālīk; Ḥanāfī’s use of the pronoun “we” is not the pluralis modestatis of traditional Arab authors. It reflects his ambition to act as the spokesman of the umma.

16 I.32, 6f; Ḥanāfī, Turāth p. 58.

17 vii.254 ahbādīth fi l-yasir al-islāmi, 1984; cf. also the frequent quotation of the following verse by Mahmūd Darwīs: “wa hlamū ahbāa bi-l-nu‘ī bi jī‘a l-fa‘ir” e.g. Ḥanāfī, Turāth p. 118n60.

18 viii.7 yasir.

1. Taḥrīr al-arḍ: all occupied Muslim territories, particularly Palestine, are to be liberated from non-Muslim rule. He explicitly counters “Erets Israel” as the central topos of Zionist ideology.\(^{20}\)

2. The liberties: Hanafī draws a bleak picture of an Arab world suffering from tyranny and the absence of freedom.

3. Social justice: Hanafī calls for the abolition of the blatant inequality inside the Islamic societies and of the gaps between the rich and the poor Islamic states.

4. Unity instead of fragmentation: A united umma ought to replace the present assembly of small artificial Arab states. These are proud of their flags and anthems but their borders are artificial, and their existence is not justified by any national identity. Therefore he rejects rivaling ideologies like tribalism (qabīlīyya), confessionalism (šī‘īyya) and particularism (quṣūrīyya).

5. Identity instead of Westernization: he calls for the creation of a real synthesis between modernity and tradition, instead of the Western model of a “total break with the past”, or the eclecticism prevailing in the contemporary Muslim world.

6. Material progress for the masses.

7. Mobilization of the masses against passivity.

The second main objective of the “Islamic Left” is a united front of action composed of Egypt’s “four national currents” (al-tayyārīt al-wataniyya al-arba‘a): Liberalism, Marxism, Nasserism and the “Islamic movement”. Liberalism, which Hanafī equates with the bourgeois nationalist movement, receives the least attention. He praises its role in the development of modern educational institutions in Egypt as well as its leading role in the formation of a national consciousness. Earlier generations of liberals, like al-Ṭahṭāwī, generally receive a more favourable treatment, because they did not yet question Egypt’s Islamic identity, whereas Hanafī criticizes later representatives, like Ṭāhā Husayn or the neo-Wafd for propagating Westernization and reconciliation with imperialism.\(^{21}\)

**Revolutionary and Reactionary Religion**

“Religion is the opium of the people and the cry of the wretched creature”
This quotation from Marx’s *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* is the major leitmotif of Ḥanafī’s writings. Ḥanafī slightly rearranges the sentence to make it appear more antithetic, and he also interprets it in a way that distorts its original context but supports Ḥanafī’s own thesis: religion is not reactionary as such but may also harbour revolutionary interpretations and traditions that can bring about political change.

In the editorial in *al-Yasār al-İslāmī* Ḥanafī sets out to discover the revolutionary potential of religion. First he states that religion as such means revolution. Muḥammad and the prophets before him were revolutionaries: ʿĪbrāhīm revolted against *shirk* in the name of *tawḥīd*, ʿĪsā revolted against matter and materialism in the name of spirit, Muḥammad led the revolt of the downtrodden in Mecca against the Quraysh nobility in the name of “liberty, equality and fraternity”. Therefore they had to suffer persecution and death at the behest of the worldly rulers, whose vested interests they attacked. But the prophets were not only revolutionaries, they were also the “teachers (murābbūn) of mankind”, a hint at Ḥanafī’s understanding of Islam as the true Enlightenment. He alludes to Lessing’s treatise *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* which he has translated and commented upon. Ḥanafī interprets Lessing’s triadic concept of religious history from Judaism via Christianity towards the religion of reason in the light of Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s superficially similar concept in *Risālat al-Tawḥīd*. According to Ḥanafī, the final revelation of Islam corresponds to the natural religion of the Enlightenment philosophers because it provides mankind with an amount of rationality that renders any further revelation superfluous.

Ḥanafī discovers revolutionary tendencies not only in the Islamic heritage but also in other religions. He cites the rebellion of Bar Kochba against Roman oppression, Thomas Müntzer as the leader of the sixteenth century’s peasants’ war in Germany, the “revolutionary priests” in Latin America, but also Mao and Ho Chi Minh as revolutionary

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23 Note the deviation from traditional Islamic prophetology.

Confucians and Buddhists! In addition he invokes a variety of political movements from the history of Islam like the Qarmatians, the Sudanese Mahdi and the zanj. But for him the main source for a revolutionary interpretation of Islam is to be found in its theological, philosophical and juridical doctrines.

In his attempt to reinterpret **turāth**, Hanafi divides it into different branches, in each of which he singles out “leftist” and “rightist” schools of thought. He pays most attention to the field of theology, where he strictly opposes “rightist” Ash’arism “fiqat al-sulṭān” to “leftist” Mu’tazilism, “the open opposition from the inside”. The “Islamic Left” ought to be a “radical Mu’tazilite movement”. Hanafi criticizes Ash’arism, above all al-Ghazālī—allegedly its foremost representative—for defending the belief in miracles, which according to Hanafi wrought havoc on science and rationality and thus initiated the decline of the Islamic world. Furthermore, he holds the doctrine of khalq al-afāl responsible for the passivity prevailing in the Muslim societies. In reverse, he praises Mu’tazilism for promoting activism by defending free will, and for stimulating rationalism and scientific inquiry by stressing causality of natural processes. Hanafi equates ‘adāla, one of the five principles of Mu’tazilism to social justice. Al-khayr wa-l-sharr al-‘aqliyyān, allegedly also standing for one of five principles (sic, actually replacing the manzila bayn al-manzilatayn), appear as antidote to scripturalism. Hanafi interprets the Mu’tazilite doctrine of al-aslah in a way that clears God of any responsibility for evil. The present deplorable state of affairs is to be considered manmade and hence removable by political action. In other places he reformulates the doctrine of al-aslah as a duty to improve the world through a revolution for the poor. He praises the physical theories

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25 viii.60f. yasār.
26 viii.18ff. yasār; on the three types of opposition and the fiqat al-sulṭān: V.328n279, V.429-461.; The reappraisal of Mu’tazilism can be traced back to Muḥammad ʿAbdul Abī al-Ghafir ibn Abī al-ʿAbd. The most important “neo-Mu’tazilī” was Ahmad Amin. In our context it is noteworthy that he presented his reappraisal in a cyclical concept of the historical development of the Islamic World, Caspar pp. 178ff. and passim.
27 vii.1 ḳamān; Campanini pp. 100ff.
of the early Mu’tazilite *aṣbāb al-tacwīḥ* like al-Naẓārām, Mu’ammar b. ‘Abbād, Thumāmā b. Ashras and al-Jāhiz for denying the existence of independent accidents. He often invokes their concepts in the defense of Marxist materialism, or he proposes their “naturalism” as an authentic alternative to Western materialist concepts, for example in the refutation of *al-Nazārāt al-Maddīyya fī l-Falsafa al-‘Arabiyya al-Islāmiyya* by the Communist Party of Lebanon central-committee member Ḥusayn Muruwwa.

Ḥanāfī awards political relevance to the struggle against anthropomorphism which he equates with Ash’arism. He condemns the equation of God and worldly rulers as a justification for exploitation and for authoritarian political systems. Ḥanāfī describes the behavior of worldly rulers by alluding to the *ḥusnā* of the ruler: the ruler is rich (Ghanī) and donates generously (*Mu’tī, Wahhāb*). Ordinary men appear as humble petitioners towards both God and the rulers, although they should claim their rights from the capitalist system with self-confidence. Therefore Ḥanāfī rejects the “hierarchical worldview” of traditional religion by denouncing the idea of God as supreme mover beyond this world as a product of capitalism, designed to inculcate the opinion that worldly affairs are beyond control and unchangeable.

Ḥanāfī recommends Khārijism, the “opposition from outside”, and Shi’ism, “the undercover opposition from inside” as further alternatives to Ash’arism without delving into details. The appraisal of Shiism is a reflex of the “Great Islamic Revolution in Iran”, whereas the Khārijīs are described as exponents of revolutionary egalitarianism.

Contrary to what might be expected from an Islamic reformer, Ḥanāfī does not consider medieval Islamic philosophy as such as progressive. He praises a rationalist current beginning with al-Kindī and reaching its zenith with Ibn Rushd. But he rejects the illuminationist concepts of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā. Ḥanāfī attacks the neo-Platonic concept of a hierarchical state governed by a *ra’īs mulham* and he disapproves of any

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30 This designation is false cf. Van Ess (1991) vol. ii pp. 39ff., vol. iii p. 239.
33 In this context it is worthwhile to note that in official Egyptian religious discourse the militant Islamist groups (*jama’āt*) are denounced as Khārijīs: Jansen (1997) p. 33.
dualism of matter and form, body and soul. Combined with a preference for speculation over action, he holds these concepts responsible for the passivity and the neglect of the real world prevailing among contemporary Muslims. His siding with Ibn Rushd in philosophy is due to the latter’s criticism of al-Ghazālī. Ibn Rushd’s physical theory is described as another equivalent of materialism and is therefore used in the defense of Marxism. By rejecting Ibn Sīnā in favour of Ibn Rushd Hanafi diverts markedly from a Marxist school of thought (Engels, Bloch, Ley, Tizinī, Muruwwa) which considers both as precursors of European rationalism and materialism. On the other hand Hanafi does not fall prey to the dilemma of other neo-Averroists who simultaneously stress Ibn Rushd’s relevance for Western science and rationalism and his accordance with orthodoxy by referring to those theological writings that do not openly contradict widely accepted Islamic doctrines but were irrelevant for the intellectual development of Europe. Another idea of Ibn Rushd that plays a major role in Hanafi’s specialist writings is the denial of an individual afterlife, to which he opposes worldly salvation. But in his articles for dailies and magazines he refers to this aspect only once. There he declares that the only possible form of afterlife consists of the effects of one’s actions and the memory one leaves in the collective mind of fellow men. The closest parallel in the Islamic heritage is the doctrine discussed in Ibn Rushd’s major commentary on de anima, according to which the individual soul merges with the active intellect after death.

34 viii.21f.; against dualism: IV.463ff.
37 On afterlife and salvation: vii. 29f yamūr; explicit: IV.339,5f. “al-khulād ‘analqya sāhima fihā kall afīrād, kall yamūl l-aikhār hattī yakhluq hāl dhīh al-basharī al-shahīq al-muḥdi ‘in hawwa mā sammūhū b-hakama” khalūd al-aql al-ja‘īl wa inna b-khulād al-fardī la-yajidu kamālahu illā fī khalūd al-jamā‘a fi l-baḥth wa-l-ta‘īkī”; concepts of an afterworld as sawar fanniyya IV.331ff.; human beings create their eternal existence by activism: IV.338,-11f.; other extensive refutations of beliefs on death and resurrection: IV.384,4f; worldly reformulations e.g.: “fā-ḥuwa (al-baḥīth) wa-l-ta‘īkī ta‘īrīqa fanniyya l-farḍī la-yajidu l-manāwir wa-l-yaqūn” IV.450,5f., 467,-3ff.; Hanafi, “Buhārī” pp. 31, 34ff; see also Von Kügelgen pp. 232f and Campanini p. 112; the influence of Rudolf Bultmann’s demythologizing Christian theology, cannot be...
In the field of legal theory, Ḥanafi does not contrast “right” and “left” with equal strictness but he expresses his preference for Mālikism. Ḥanafi states that this school is based on the principle of masūla (mursala), which was formulated by al-Shāṭibī but which can be traced back to ʿUmar (i.e. his “nationalization” of the Sassanid domains). Moreover Ḥanafi defines tasḥīl as human activity and al-Shāṭibī was the only classical jurist to express a similar opinion. Apart from his proposal to base legislation on masūla, he joins in the reformist demand for the reopening of ijtihād. The qualifications he demands for a mujtahid are low: a thorough knowledge of Arabic, a knowledge of the asbāb al-nuzūl and the needs of the umma. The latter may again be a reflex of the thoughts of al-Shāṭibī, who declares the knowledge of the maqāsid al-sharīʿ to be the main prerequisite for a mujtahid. Ḥanafi’s dynamic concept of ijtihād is completed by a dynamic concept of ijmāʿ which ought to change with every generation.

Ḥanafi also pays his tribute to the scientific achievements of medieval Islam and advocates a fresh spirit of scientific inquiry. In other contexts, he judges cosmological theories not in respect of their scientific tenability but their ideological utility: “Which of the ancient theories is the most useful in order to claim back al-ʿarḍ? Creation, emunation or pre-existence of matter (qīlām)?” In the field of humanities Ḥanafi compares himself to Ibn Khaldūn, “who recorded the first cycle of Islamic civilization”.


vi, 14, 20f. ḍaṣīr (instead of madhābih Ḥanafi writes madātiṣ ḍaṣīrīyya); Jābir/Hanafi, Husār p. 195; Ḥanafi, “Buhūtih” p. 53f.; I.40: “wa la fāqir min faqīh b al-mashāhiyyu qudādā lahu dīnāhum wa urdī masūlah l-nūr”; III.473f., III.484 pu l.; the reference to Ἱμᾶρ is a Nasserist propaganda formula quoted v.117 tammiyya, see p. 95, and Kassian pp. 194ff., 262ff.


But he pays more attention to a renewal of the Islamic sciences like tafsîr and hadîth than to a renewal of secular sciences.\footnote{8} In the field of tafsîr Hanafî rejects the “historical” tafsîr of the past, according to which the Qur’ân only deals with bygone events. He favours a “thematical” tafsîr, in which the teachings of the Qur’ân on certain subjects are demonstrated by collecting the respective verses instead. This method of exegesis is to be the preparatory stage of a “tafsîr of consciousness” containing a comprehensive, revolutionary Qur’ânic weltanschauung.\footnote{44} He argues with reference to the asbâb al-nuzûl that the message of the Qur’ân deals with social reality but that it has to be reinterpreted\footnote{45} because of changed circumstances. Hadîth is not rated very high by Hanafî. He only accepts mutawâwîr traditions. Moreover, the judgment on the tawâdîr al-hadîth has to be based on their accordance with reason, experience and the Qur’ân, and not only on the reliability of their isnâd:\footnote{46} This might be a reflex of al-Shâtî’s theory that all juridically relevant hadîth have a foundation in the Qur’ân.\footnote{17} Notably similar opinions were discussed passionately among the Ikhwân al-musîlimûn in the fifties.\footnote{48} In Hanafî’s eyes, a new kind of biography of the Prophet is also in demand, because the messenger’s message has been submerged in the veneration of his person. This threatens to lead Muslims astray like the ahl al-kitâb, who adore the messengers instead of following the message. Therefore Hanafî praises Wahhâbîsm (al-laṣf i lâ l-Hijâz!) for its struggle against the veneration of Muḥammad.\footnote{49} Hanafî

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\begin{enumerate}
\item[vi.121-45 al-mâl fi l-Qur’ân (mâl), 1979; English version: The Method of Thematic Interpretation of the Koran; on the evil character of Jews see pp. 84ff. Concerning tafsîr Hanafî does not name specific role models, but it is obvious that Seyyid Qu’est’s Fî Zîlîl al-Qur’ân is the model for a revolutionary tafsîr, whereas the method of thematic interpretation has been formulated by al-Khâlî (pp. 304ff.) and Mâhûd Shâlûtû, shaykh al-Azhar under Nasser: Zebîrî pp. 150ff.
\item Hanafî, “Buhûtî” p. 59; IV.14.6ff., IV.144.7ff., IV.212ff.
\item Mitchell p. 238, reporting private conversation; on hadîth-criticism in modern Islam, mainly in the South Asian context: Brown.
\end{enumerate}
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even goes as far as considering Muḥammad fallible in religious matters, for example with regard to invention of the “Satanic verses” in order to reach a temporary compromise with pagan tribes. Therefore Ḥanafī defends Salman Rushdie’s right to deal critically with this issue.\(^{50}\)

In the field of applied law Ḥanafī gives priority to social matters and jihād instead of rituals and purity, which he underlines by quoting Khumaynī’s statement that “we are not the fuqaha’ of menses and childbed”. Ḥanafī does not elaborate a theory of jihād but considers warfare legitimate and calls jihād the “forgotten duty”. In line with his general preference for the muʿāmalāt over the ‘ibādāt, Ḥanafī redefines the pillars of Islam with an activist meaning: ḥajj ought to be an annual international Islamic conference, fasting teaches the satiated compassion with the hungry, zakāt does not mean almsgiving but collective ownership (iṣṭīrāk al-māʾ), prayer teaches a sense of the time, and shahāda does not mean to murmur a formula, but being aware of reality and the willingness to sacrifice oneself in the struggle against the idols (javāghīt) of a materialist, egotistical attitude towards life like money, social status and lust.\(^{51}\)

In al-Yāsīr al-Islāmī and other writings dedicated to a wider public, Ḥanafī condemns mysticism because it teaches patience, passivity and withdrawal from the world at a time when activism is most necessary. In his attacks on mysticism he advocates Iqbāl’s understanding of the Islamic message as an activist program of continual change against the attitude of leaving the world unchanged. As an antidote to the practical consequences of mysticism, especially the doctrine of the intercession of the shaykh, he recommends neo-Ḥanbalī puritanism. Therefore he praises Wahhābīsm as revolution against saint worship.\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, Ḥanafī partly exculpates mysticism as an understandable overreaction of the pious to the failure of the Alīd revolution against

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\(^{50}\) In the discussion following his speech: al-wahl wa-l-wāqiʿ in Adīmās et al.: al-ʿĪslām wa-l-hadīthā, pp. 234ff.

\(^{51}\) vii.27ff. yaṣār; on jihād as farāda ghālība: I.30,-6f.; viii.295 sulṭa; on the shahāda vii.151f. māṣūḥa tāʾa asshadhu lā sīḥa lā ‘ādha; vii.54 yamīn; IV.380f.; Campanini p. 105; for the interpretation of the shahāda cf. Ibn Taymiyya pp. 42, 59.

the luxury of the Umayyad empire. The inability to save the world led to the egotistical attempt to save oneself/one’s soul (nafs). In writings not aiming at immediate political impact, Hanafi admits that mysticism may be a useful device to build a personal relationship with God. As such it might find its deserved place in a world that has changed for the better. Finally he uses the concept of *wahdat al-wujūd* in the defense of Marxist materialism.

Because Hanafi considers the message of Islam as thoroughly belonging to this world, he strictly opposes any speculation on supernatural and invisible phenomena. Instead, he favours “struggling for the people”, which he legitimizes by almost identifying them with God. He accuses the capitalist system of reifying what is beyond perception in the material forms of *mawālīd* and sufi orders in order to let religion appear as self-sufficient set of ceremonies apart from social reality. Hanafi brands all forms of outward, ritualistic (ṣhi‘ā‘īrī, mazharī) religion as “capitalist religion”. With this he attacks phenomena that characterized the boom of popular devotion during the Sadat era, like mosque-building and religious festivals. According to him they are used by politicians and the upper-class to present themselves as pious Muslims and to divert attention from malpractice and the exploitation of the world’s resources. But not only the rich are accused of exploiting religion for their purposes: The Egyptian state abuses the ordinary believer’s blind reverence for the *rijāl al-dīn*, although Islam disapproves of a clergy. Hanafi insinuates that both have struck a political bargain: the government protects vested interests of the *ulamā‘* whereas they legitimize its policy with *fatwās*, peace with Israel included. Furthermore, the religious scholars play a major role in the defense of private property and the propaganda for a pro-Western alignment by preaching that

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53 On Alid revolution also Hanafi, *Tawīl* pp. 14, 185; vi.222 *ṣūr;* for origin of this argument among the *Ikhwān*: Mitchell p. 214; on “Western” materialism: viii.41 *ṣa‘īr;* positive evaluation of mysticism: Hanafi, *Tawīl* p. 187f., cf. also Von Kügelgen p. 211; to which extent Hanafi’s concepts concerning “Sufi hermeneutics” can only be discussed when Akhavi (1997) p. 378 explains what that is supposed to mean in this context.


the imperialist West may be rapacious and oppressive, but unlike the atheist East, at least respects religion.57

**Anachronisms and Contradictions in Ḥanafi’s Invented Tradition**

Anybody slightly acquainted with the political and intellectual history of Islam will be stunned at how easily Ḥanafi projects several currents, the actual relations of which were marked by deep enmity, back into the past as one “Islamic Left”. The most striking example is the simultaneous appreciation of Muʿtazilism and Ḥanbalism.58 This does not result from a lack of knowledge of Ibn Ḥanbal’s fate. Ḥanafi prays his steadfastness towards oppression, but suppresses the fact that this occurred during the *miḥna*.59 Although no leading Muʿtazilite theologian took part in the persecution of opponents,60 the fact that Muʿtazilite doctrines were used for repression would hardly fit the democratic, freedom-loving image of Muʿtazilism which is designed by Ḥanafi.

In the case of al-Ghazālī, Ḥanafi grossly exaggerates his occasionalism by taking the arguments from the 17th chapter of *Tahāfut al-falāṣifa* out of context and accusing him of teaching that the world is totally incalculable at any time.61 Furthermore he withholds the fact that al-Ghazālī’s arguments belong to a tradition that started with the Muʿtazilī Abū Hudhayl.62 Nor does he mention al-Ghazālī’s opinion that anyone who sets out to

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58 Most Western authors neglect the Ḥanbalite influence on Ḥanafi whereas for his secularist critics in the Arab world it is a major bone of contention cf. Khulayf quoted in Hildebrandt p. 119; Zakariyyāʾ pp. 51ff.

59 viii.14 yasār.


61 A detailed reappraisal of al-Ghazālī’s theories of miracles that dissects the traditional clichés is presented by Rudolph pp. 57ff. Moreover he and his collaborator Perler conclude that in the West occasionalism has played a decisive role in overcoming Aristotelian hyle-morphism and thus paved the way for Hume’s empiricism with its theory of causality as empirical regularities, *ibid.* pp. 257ff.

defend cosmological doctrines that contradict mathematical proofs does a disservice to Islam. Occasionally Hanafi even pretends that there was a miḥna against Muʿtazilism, and that al-Ghazālī refuted logics. The doctrines of the “leftist” Ibn Taymiyya on miracles, cosmology, the attributes of God as well as his attacks on logics ought to be considered even further “to the right” according to Hanafi’s own criteria. In his writings, the relationship between Wahhābism and the Saudi monarchy is conspicuous by absence. He considers the latter completely illegitimate and even writes ‘Ḥijāz’ where he lists contemporary states.

Three factors account for Hanafi’s selection from the Islamic heritage and thus for his anachronisms and ahistorical presentations:

First of all, the choice of the currents which Hanafi discovers as the “Islamic Left” in the past is due to superficial parallels to those Western religious movements, philosophical doctrines and ideologies which he himself considers progressive. Muʿtazilism is frequently equated to European Enlightenment, in particular to the teachings of Spinoza, in spite of obvious differences like an immanentist versus a transcendentalist concept of God, or the Muʿtazilite concept of al-aṣl al-sharṭ (as understood by Hanafi) versus Spinoza’s clockwork-like deus sive natura, the perfection of which may affect mankind quite negatively. In this context Hanafi makes use of widespread anachronistic clichés in apologetical writing which let the Islamic past appear as an idealized anticipation of modernity. In spite of his outspoken elitism he describes Ibn Rushd as a popular orator who directed his enlightening messages to “the masses” of Cordoba: If Ibn Rushd ever preached to the masses it is likely that it


64 viii.318 wa-da, correct on his attitude towards logic: Hanafi, “Buḥūth” p. 52.

65 A spot check at some Hanbali essentials shows that this observation also applies to Min al-Aqīda ilā l-θawra with its extensive references as well: II.226ff. (istiqāʿ<7:54 et al.>), IV.140ff. (shagg al-qamaʿa), IV.411ff. (ndib al-qabr). At one place (V.550n363), he turns Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qaysyim into Ashʿarites. In I.368-7ff. he admits that there is a conflict between his own position on ḥudūd and the position of the salafīyya.

66 iv.151 harama.

67 Hanafi’s translation of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus was not available to me.
would have been that kind of corporealism and scripturalism that Ḥanafī rejects.68

The second factor is the influence of Latin-American liberation theology, with which Ḥanafī is thoroughly acquainted. In 1967, he wrote a biographical article on the Colombian priest Camilo Torres, who was killed after joining a guerrilla movement. He dedicated his edition of Khumaynī’s al-Hukūma al-islāmīyya not only to ‘Alī Sharī’ī and the victims of the Shah, but also to the martyrs of the “religious revolution” in Latin America. The parallels are not restricted to the transformation of religious formulas into political slogans. Both Ḥanafī and the exponents of liberation theology advocate a this-worldly reinterpretation of religion to promote revolutionary change. Both attack the hierarchical clergy for forging the initially revolutionary message of the Scriptures into a conservative tool of repression. Both explicitly reject (“Platonic”) body-soul dualism, advocate a unitarian vision of man instead and replace eschatological concepts by this-worldly salvation. The preference of orthopraxy over orthodoxy is a common cliche, but Ḥanafī’s equation of the latter with social activism again betrays the influence of Latin American concepts. In accordance with them he replaces the concept of sin with that of social evils. For Ḥanafī as well as for liberation theologians, the interpretation of the Scriptures has to begin with an analysis of the social situation and the demands of “the masses”. It therefore comes as no surprise that both are accused by their respective opponents of practicing eisegisis instead of exegesis.69

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68 iii.18 al-judhūr al-ta’īliniya bil-ghazzat as-sahhāt fi lturūth al-islāmī (ghazwa), speech in Tunis 1984. This anachronism appears in an article where Ḥanafī sets out to prove that under Islamic rule Jews and Christians were treated as equal citizens. Thus Maimonides, expelled from his home town as a boy, appears as the second popular orator of the Andalusian metropolis; on the “Andalusian model” of coexistence of Muslims Jews and Christians also: jahārī/ Ḥanafī, Husār pp. 99ff. Nobody seems to have informed Ḥanafī about the biography of Maimonides in the meantime: “Die Globalisierung”, part 2; on the neglect of Ibn Rushd’s elitism: Von Kügelgen p. 214. For Ibn Rushd’s opinion on the kind of exegesis suitable for the masses: Fasl, pp. 28ff.

Western and Latin American concepts are important in another respect. In his articles Ḥanāfī never explains what God actually is. But in *Min al-ʿAqidat ilā l-Thawra* he expresses a variety of opinions which betray the influence of various Western philosophical or modernist Christian theological doctrines: A *deus sive natura* like Spinoza’s, 70 a Hegelian God as consciousness of humanity in history, 71 a Marxian alienated human self-consciousness thrown beyond this world 72 or a purely cognitive principle that ought to be realized by revolutionary practice.73 This impersonal God does however communicate with mankind via revelation.74 Ḥanāfī frequently describes revelation as merger of consciousness and reality, a product of reality and as a mission to fulfill,75 as a discourse and a work of art (*khāliq fann*)76 and he stresses that it is identical with reason,77 but he never bothers to explain how the revealed text has come into existence. Most likely this is not due to the fear of hostile reaction alone, but reflects the dilemma which most modernists are facing in a monotheist tradition: On the one hand he almost abolishes God, on the other hand the normative foundation of his project is “revelation” i.e. a text that, unlike the intellectual products of fallible humans, is beyond criticism.

Thirdly, with reference to the antagonism between Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism, Ṭarābīshī has pointed to the fact that Ḥanāfī promotes religious currents that play no role in modern Islam, or at least in contemporary Egypt. Therefore they appear as “magical crowbar” able to open the deadlock of a bleak reality.78 This also explains why al-Ghazālī, the most influential theologian of Sunni Islam, appears as personalized evil. This point, with which Ṭarābīshī deals only briefly,

interpretation of scriptures according to the needs of the “masses”: *ibid*. pp. 8ff., criticism of “eisegesis”: *ibid*. pp. 22ff. and Abū Zayd (1994) pp. 155, 179ff., respectively.

70 I.423ff.
71 I.343,1ff.
72 II.609,5f.: “Allâh!” huwa waʾa al-insân bi-dhâth madfâʾ an khârj al-ʿâlam baʿda’ an al-insân manfasalan ʾanhu mutahajjirin jâmiʿan”.
73 I.82,10ff., I.343,1ff., II.557,2ff.
74 II.558,9ff.
75 II.463,2ff., 476,8ff.; V.325,6ff.
76 II.466,1ff.
77 IV. 55,2ff.
will be discussed more extensively in the context of Ḥanafi’s writings on the recent history of Egypt.

Ḥanafi and Marxism

Ḥanafi’s “Islamic Left” is not a simple blend of Marxist and Islamic elements. He justifies his opposition to capitalism in a completely different way. Compared to Marx, Ḥanafi’s notion of capitalism is ahistorical, non-economic and undialectic. It never appears as a progressive and necessary stage in the course of history. He excuses Marx’s positive evaluation of the role of capitalist imperialism in the destruction of the “Asiatic mode of production” as a youthful fault resulting from lack of knowledge. He does not blame the logic of the system for the evils of capitalism. Instead he holds the neglect of timeless moral values responsible for these evils. His criticism of capitalism is, on the rhetorical level, directed against ṭūbū, usually usury, the “sphere of circulation”, and not against the “sphere of production”. Thus his arguments correspond formally to a criticism of capitalism that is widespread among Islamists as well as Western fascists. But when the content of the slogans is scrutinized more closely, differences become apparent. In Ḥanafi’s texts the Qur’ānic term ṭūbū is not used to combat honest “productive” capitalism with “unproductive” financial operations. He defines ṭūbū as “profit without work” and thus explicitly includes the profits resulting from the exploitation of labor into that notion. In his rejection of private ownership of the means of production, Ḥanafi also agrees with Marxism and differs from the majority of Islamists. He proves its illegitimacy by the means of ʿaṣṣ al-mā‘mūn with reference to verses which mention God, not men, as ʿālīk al-samawāt wa-l-ārd. According to Ḥanafi, the Qur’ān describes māl as that which belongs to God: He puts it at man’s disposal in order to encourage production and to fulfill vital needs collectively (shuyū‘ al-amwāl), but not for

79 Cf. also Mughīth ṭūsiyya.
81 ii.63 Banū Isrā‘īl.
82 vii.138 māl, 1979; against “Islamic banking”: viii.305 kāfyu yufakkir... .
accumulation.83 Another argument put forward for collective ownership is derived from the hadith according to which fire (industry), water (energy), salt (mining) and fodder (agriculture) are common goods.84

Another point in which Ḥanāfi differs markedly from Marxism is his purely idealist view of history. In his accounts of Western history, Ḥanāfi hardly ever discusses events and developments beyond the realm of mere thought.85 When he deals with the history of Islam, he explicitly rejects any consideration of social and economic factors relevant to the development of thought. Ḥanāfi justifies this neglect with the assertion that Islamic civilization is determined by revelation.86 Whereas Ḥanāfi strictly opposes the separation of substrate and accident in metaphysics, Islamic thinkers appear as mere substrates to which the accident “thought” merely subsists.87 According to him, Islamic history is the result of the attempt of Islamic thinkers to direct society according to revelation. Thus, the Islamic world of the past appears as socialist utopia where revelation made Islamic scholars and rulers aware of social justice and the demands of the poor. They passed rulings and took decisions in their favour, like the confiscation of excessive riches or the ʿabdāl al-ṣūq.88 His refusal to look into social history allows Ḥanāfi to project anachronistic political concepts into Islamic history: Salāḥ al-Dīn does not appear as the commander of an efficient professional

83 vii.123ff., 135ff., 141, 145 müḥ; nowadays he uses the same verses to legitimize environmentalism: On the Thematical Interpretation of the Koran, p. 209.
84 i.157 maqāwaḥm. Ḥanāfi, Muqaddima p. 77, 15ff.
85 Ḥanāfi, Turāth pp. 95ff.; see also Hattar pp. 124ff. and Jum’a pp. 137f., 143ff.
86 Ḥanāfi, Turāth p. 89: ill-fār maṭuṭih fi l-ʿaṣādh, wa mā l-ʿafād illah hasāmil lahu; vii.248 al-dīn wa-l-turāth wa-l-thawra, 1985; criticized by Abū Zayd p.162f., 185f.; ironically his attitude is exactly the one his admirer Schulze expects to have been overcome by him (1992, pp. 74f.): “Ein letzter Punkt, der mich bedrückt, ... die Feststellung, dass wenn vom Islam gesprochen wird, der Islam zum Subjekt gemacht wird, und die Menschen die eigentlich Muslime sind, als Objekte des Islam gesehen werden.” In the case of Schulze it is a further proof for the paucity of reading on which his far-reaching conclusions are based. However with regard to their relentless reinterpretation of terms until they fit their own purposes (Radtke 2000), Schulze and Ḥanāfi show a striking similarity that produces even more striking dissimilarities en détail.
87 On muṣāḥahāt: vii.225 ṣiswahī; vii.197-202 ʿabdāl al-ṣūq, 1978, III.334,3ff.; when Western Orientalists like Bernard Lewis dare to challenge such an opinion by writing on slavery and racial prejudice in the Islamic World, this is an obvious part of the Zionist conspiracy against Islam: iii.28 ghazw.
army but as modern nationalist leader, mobilizing “the masses” against the Crusaders and their Fatimid collaborators.89

The rejection of the materialist and “Darwinist” Marxism of the 19th century leads Hanafi to a high esteem of European intellectual Marxisms, which restored the realm of ideas to its well-deserved place. Furthermore he appreciates the theoretical adaptation of Marxism to the conditions of non-industrialized countries by Lenin and Mao.90 In Hanafi’s eyes, revolutionary change in the pre-industrial Islamic world with its uneducated masses cannot be brought about by the working class, but only by intellectuals and officers.91 Although no influence of Maoist theory is apparent in his thought, he refers in some writings to the “east wind” concept of his friend Anwār ‘Abd al-Malik, according to whom revolutionary China will lead the revolt of the whole non-Western World against both “Western” political systems, capitalism and Soviet communism.92

Hanafi explains away Marxist atheism in the same way as Western criticism of religion in general and, as already mentioned, he defends Marxist materialism with reference to various “materialist” concepts in the Islamic heritage. In this context Hanafi insists on the differentiation between the terminological and the colloquial understanding of materialism, of which he himself makes use in his criticism of the “West”.93

Hanafi counts Marxism as one of the four “national currents” in Egypt. He praises the Egyptian communists for their achievements in organizing workers and students and for their courageous struggle against the British.94 Nevertheless, Hanafi considers the implementation of Marxist-Leninist politics in Islamic countries disastrous. His opinion is based on personal experiences in Afghanistan, where he had observed

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92 viii.12 yasīr; Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 41, 101f., p. 531, 1 ff.; For the ideas of this Coptic writer and former Marxist critic of Nasser, who currently advocates an eclectic mix of Maoism, Third Worldism, Nasserism and Islamic revivalism, see his article “Rih al-sharq” or Boullata [1992] pp. 92ff.
93 vii.217f. tasawwur, viii.178 al-tanwīr al-dinī wa-l-tanẓīm al-siyāsī, a reference to Engels’s positive judgements on various religious traditions; materialism as egotism and hedonism opposed to Islamic idealist collectivism e.g.: viii.41f. yasīr.
94 viii.66 yasīr.
a tiny, culturally alienated minority imposing an agenda that the traditionally minded population of a pre-industrial society was not prepared to accept. Their resistance led to the Soviet invasion, which was even more devastating than the crusades of Western imperialism. In *Min al-‘Aqida ilā l-Thawra*, however, he himself proposes a revolutionary avant-garde party as the appropriate reformulation of *imāna* in classical Islamic political theory for the present.95

**Ḥanafi’s Writings on the Jews and Judaism**

The analysis of Ḥanafi’s writings on capitalism has already shown that he makes use of the rhetorical repertory of conservative anti-capitalism. In Islam, as well as in the Western world, this kind of anti-capitalism is almost always accompanied by the negative stereotyping of Jews as the ruthless force behind this system. This is also the case with Ḥanafi. With the exception of Yadlin, all Western authors pass over this disturbing aspect of Ḥanafi’s œuvre! Furthermore his attacks urge to question the alleged progressive character of his supposedly new hermeneutics of the Qur’ān: His article “Ḥal yajāzu shar‘ān al-ṣulḥ ma‘a Banī Isrā’īl” in which he lashes out at Jews in general is one of the examples for *tafsīr al-madūn*.

The article is conceived as a *fatwā*. Ḥanafi states that he just wants to address the problem from a legal point of view. Moreover, it is exclusively based on the Qur’ānic statements on Jews.96 His intention is to counter the propaganda of the state-controlled media who depict Israel in a favourable light, as well as the opinions of “some of us” (authors and movie directors) who depict Jews as ordinary human beings, and not as “hooked nosed Shylock-like figures”.97

Ḥanafi singles out all negative statements of the Qur’ān on Jews. He particularly dwells on the accusation that they always rejected the

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96 Ḥ.33 Banī Isrā’īl.
97 Ḥ.38 Banī Isrā’īl, maybe with “some of us” Ḥanafi aims at intellectuals and artists. One might think of Yousef Chahine’s autobiographical movie *Iskandaryya laykh*? the protagonist of which, a young Christian cinéphile in World War II Alexandria, falls in love with a Jewish girl.
revealed truth and even attacked those who conveyed it to mankind.\textsuperscript{99} This forces him to take an affirmative stance on aspects that he himself denounces as “conservative religion” in other contexts: The mental orientation of the Jews is exclusively this-worldly, they even “cling to this world with their molars” and they do not believe in the angels of death.\textsuperscript{99} Another of their foremost features is their egotism and greed. It is derived from their role models, the rabbis (9:34). Therefore it is no accident that the Jews trade in gold or work as goldsmiths, moneylenders and bankers. Unsurprisingly they do not show any reluctance to take interest (5:161).\textsuperscript{100}

Hanafī deals with Jews and Judaism also in another text, a speech held in Tunis in 1984 at a congress dedicated to the “Zionist Crusade against the Islamic Heritage”. He begins with the observation that two tendencies are to be observed in Judaism, a universalist and a particularist one. The universalist tendencies may be seen in the teachings of the prophets and the Jewish philosophers. These tendencies have been preserved in Islam.\textsuperscript{101} During the centuries however, the other tendency has been more forceful. It found its expressions in two phenomena: the exploitation of other peoples’ intellectual heritage, and the infiltration of their teachings with Jewish superstitions. The first example can already be observed in the Ancient Near East where the Israelites constructed their religion with elements stolen from the Ancient Babylonian mythology. This notwithstanding, they developed the concept that they were elected and hence deserve superiority.\textsuperscript{102} They rejected the teaching of the prophets who had come to admonish them, but afterwards they took every opportunity to distort these teachings. St. Paul infiltrated Christianity with this intention.\textsuperscript{103} Later, they tried to undermine Islam, initially by creating Shiism, then by introducing isrāʾīlīyāt into the science of tafsīr.\textsuperscript{104}

In recent history they continued this policy: the main examples are Freemasonry and internationalist socialism. Freemasonry came into

\textsuperscript{98} iii.40ff Banū Isrāʾīl.

\textsuperscript{99} iii. 61f. Banū Isrāʾīl, with reference to Qurʾān 2.86, 44: 34ff., 23.33ff.; and iii.79 ibid.

\textsuperscript{100} iii.63 Banū Isrāʾīl.

\textsuperscript{101} iii.4 ghazw.

\textsuperscript{102} iii.7ff. ghazw.

\textsuperscript{103} iii.11 ghazw.

\textsuperscript{104} iii.14ff. ghazw.
being as a movement to promote the equality of mankind regardless of their national background. Then it was hijacked by the Jews as a tool for destroying national identities by propagating cosmopolitanism and thus to further their own particularist agenda. Then they propagated socialism. By calling for universal brotherhood they could promote their own capitalist objectives even more effectively. In the Middle East Hanafi discovers a similar attempt in Bahaism “which discourages the Muslims from jihād”. Obviously Hanafi’s scenario is far from original. Our “enlightened” Islamic thinker shows no reluctance to name his source: *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.105 As the most evil device in the Zionist Crusade against the Islamic heritage he names the alleged key-position of Jews in Orientalism. They control the major research institutes and use this opportunity to spread lies about Islam and to deny its originality.106

However, in the context of contemporary Arab discourse his ideas may be regarded as relatively moderate. In other writings the “Andalusian model” has been proposed as a solution to the Palestine conflict. The main objective should be to regain Palestine for the Palestinians. After that the Jews could live there as citizens with equal rights and a fertile cultural synthesis could come into being again.107 Ironically, he received scathing criticism for such a proposal in a tone closely resembling his own invectives presented above.108

“East” and “West” in Hanafi’s Writings

According to Hanafi, Western civilization derives from four sources: Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, Ancient Eastern and the “barbarian milieu”. Whereas Western scholars acknowledge the first two sources, a conspiracy of silence led to a denial of the latter two. This insinuation does not keep Hanafi from proving the influence of the Ancient

106 iii.23f.
108 al-Dāghshī pp. 159ff.
East on Europe with extensive references to the works of Western scholars. Whereas the Ancient Eastern influence entailed purely positive consequences (including Eastern polytheist cults in Rome), the Judeo-Christian and the Greco-Roman heritage are to be considered ambivalent, whereas the effects of the “barbarian milieu”, i.e. Celtic and Germanic tribalism combined with the negative effects of Europe’s bad climate, are condemned. Roman imperialism, combined with the Jewish concept of the chosen people and racism originating from Germano-Celtic tribalism laid the foundations of Europe’s aggressive expansionism. He sees in barbarian tribalism, which imbued every European nation with a spirit of superiority, the cause of the cruelty that marks the history of Europe.\footnote{Hanafi, \textit{Muqaddima} pp. 81-111, esp. p. 104, l. 6ff.; conspiracy of silence: p. 109, l. 10ff.; Judeo-Barbarian merger: p. 107; in the elder version viii.32f. \textit{yasâr}, the Ancient East does not yet play any role; iii.8ff \textit{ghazaw} on Ancient Eastern influence on the Old Testament; if Western scholars trace back Qur’ânic stories to the Bible it is \textit{inkâr al-tawhîd}; iii. 24 \textit{ghazaw}; furthermore Hanafi sympathizes with Afrocentrists like Martin Bernal who names Hanafi’s friend ‘Abd al-Malik as a supporter of his project (p. xxiii). Hanafi refers to his “Black Athena” in Hanafi, \textit{Muqaddima} p. 483; on Bernal see Lefkowitz, Roth.} Besides racism and materialism, individualism and egotism distinguish the West from the idealist and collectivist East.\footnote{Hanafi, \textit{Muqaddima} pp. 102, -4ff, 551, 4ff.; \textit{Tarâbûshî (1991)} pp. 193f; ‘Ali Ḥarb quoted by Hildebrandt pp. 56f.}

Hanafi holds Western imperialism responsible for an insurmountable enmity between the peoples of the “East” and those of the “West”. This conflict predates the advent of Islam. Its origins are to be seen in the conquest of Palestine by the Israelites, Alexander’s conquests and Roman imperialism: Hanafi calls Augustine an agent of Roman imperialism fighting Donatism, an African liberation movement. With reference to Hanafi’s labelling of Greek antiquity as “Western”, \textit{Tarâbûshî} rightfully dismisses this projection of the opposition between “East” and “West” back into the past as pseudo-revisionist, because Hanafi simply re-evaluates what Westerners have used to construct their identity, instead of scrutinizing its historical tenability.\footnote{Hanafi, \textit{Muqaddima} pp. 102, -4ff, 551, 4ff.; \textit{Tarâbûshî (1991)} pp. 193f; ‘Ali Ḥarb quoted by Hildebrandt pp. 56f.}

Although Hanafi justifies his negative judgment of the West by referring to its conquering nature, a closer look at his writings shows that this is not based on a condemnation of conquests as such, but on the fact that the wrong conquerors were more successful: Of course he
generally approves of Islamic conquests. The best example is an article about Islam in South Asia, where he replaces the white man’s by the Muslim’s burden: The Muslims rightfully conquered and united the subcontinent in the name of *taṣḥīd* and began to convert the Buddhists, Brahmns (*sic*) and Hindus who evidently lack the right to cultural authenticity. Movements of any non-Muslim population directed against Islamic rule are therefore generally considered illegitimate. When he condemns British imperialism in the South-Asian context, he does not charge it of exploiting India and suppressing its people, but merely of depriving Islam of the opportunity to complete the conversion of its population to Islam. By inciting the Sikhs against the Muslims (*sic*), appeasing the Hindus with the partition of the subcontinent (*sic*) and through the integration of Kashmir and the “independent Islamic state of Hyderabad” into India, in which the Muslims had become a minority (*sic*), the British completed the defeat of Islam. 112

Nevertheless, Hanafi’s condemnation of the “West” is neither absolute nor does he deal with the “West” as a homogenous block. He distinguishes markedly between various countries. Apart from Israel the Anglosphere is treated with the least favour. Hanafi does not only reject British imperialism and American support for Israel, Sadat and the Shah, he also disapproves of the thought of the anglophone world because of its tendency towards sensualism and empiricism. 113 He judges France and especially Germany more favourably. He praises German idealism and nationalism as models for the Islamic world. In the tradition of Arab nationalists like al-Ḥuṣrī, he declares himself indebted to Fichte “*fiyālasif al-arḍ al-muhtallā*” whose *Reden an die deutsche Nation* he frequently refers to. The parallels of thought are unmistakable: both deplore the fragmentation of their respective communities and accuse the elites of their societies of abandoning their authentic culture for fashionable foreign values and modes of behaviour. Both plead for economic autarchy and denounce universalist ideologies. 114 But in his admiration for German

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112 iv. 65ff. *Aṣṣār*. Whereas the fact that the partition of British India was a Muslim demand can be considered as generally known, it seems necessary to note for the sake of historical accuracy that the defeat of the Sikhs by the British in 1846 enabled the Muslim population of the Punjab to practice its religion properly. The Muslim dynasty in the princely state of Hyderabad ruled over a Hindu majority of 88%.

113 vi. 260 sūra.

114 Hanafi, *Muqaddima* p. 243f.; i.142 *muqawwim*, vi.211 sūra, on the German model
nationalism Hanafi never goes as far as showing sympathy for Nazism or Arab movements with fascist tendencies like Mīr al-fatāt.\textsuperscript{115} Hanafi’s negative judgment of the contemporary West, and particularly the Anglophobe, cannot be traced back to negative personal experiences. In this respect, the Western countries are judged much more favourably than the Islamic societies. Sometimes he even becomes euphoric, for example, in his account of the achievements of a free press and its courageous representatives in the Watergate affair, or in his description of the BBC as “the pulpit of the people”.\textsuperscript{116}

When Hanafi deals with the relationship between the “East” and the “West”, he follows two different concepts: an “ex oriente lux” theory and a historicist\textsuperscript{117}, morphological concept of “East” and “West” developing in opposing cycles. Both concepts are, however, not clearly kept apart. Sometimes both of them appear in the same article or even intermingle from sentence to sentence.\textsuperscript{118}

In an obvious response to the tendency to find non-Islamic roots for all aspects of Islamic civilization, the ex oriente lux theory traces every positive phenomenon of Western civilization back to Eastern roots: in the Middle Ages Islamic philosophy was taught in universities which were designed after Islamic models the West had come to know during the Crusades. The influence of Islamic rationalism paved the way for

\textsuperscript{115} Hanafi distances himself from his sympathies for the Axis as a small boy: I.46f.; on Mīr al-fatāt: 120 ff l-thaqīfa l-watanīyya, 1900.

\textsuperscript{116} vi. 261 ātu.

\textsuperscript{117} In the sense of Popper’s The Poverty of Historicism, where the epistemological fallacies and political dangers of this kind of ideologies are treated in full. The persistent popularity of morphological concepts in the Islamic world deserves attention, see Yazbeck Haddad pp. 81, 124ff. Western political philosophy with a strong anti-totalitarian tendency has not received much attention. Only in 1992 al-Sa‘īd, London, has published translations of Popper’s essay as Bu‘l al-tiyāliyya, Nāqal Muḥammad al-Anwārī fi l-Tawāwul wa l-Ta’dālī, Hannah Arendt’s On Violence as “Fi l-‘Unf” and Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” as “Ḥudūd al-Ḥuṣriyya”.

\textsuperscript{118} The most striking example: viii.36ff. yasār.
Reformation. The deep impact of Islam on Protestantism cannot be overlooked: both refute saint-worship, intercession and the clerical monopoly to interpret the scriptures. Above all Luther (wrongly alleged to be versed in Arabic) promoted the Islamic principle *sola scriptura* (he passes over the latter’s rather “Ash’arite” *sola gratia* and *sola fide*).119 Enlightenment appears as a transfer of basically Islamic rationalist principles: Hanafi compares the historical-critical study of the Bible to ‘ilm al-hadith and he labels the philosophy of religion since Spinoza a belated offshoot of Mu’tazilism.120

In this context, Hanafi uses ‘Abd al-Malik’s term “civilizational surplus value”. In the light of this theory the achievements of Western civilization are to be considered as results of the accumulation of profits from an imperialist exploitation that was not restricted to the field of economy.121 By ascribing inventions and scientific discoveries collectively to “East” or “West” and not to individuals, Hanafi stresses the right of Easterners to reclaim the scientific achievements of the “West”: “Now as we physically exist among the applied inventions of the West, we are harvesting the fruits of a tree in the planting of which we have taken part”.122 In the case of Islamic civilization Hanafi denies any external influence. He admits that the terminology of Islamic philosophy has been borrowed from the Greek tradition, but he considers this a “*pseudo-morphologie*” (tashakkul kādhibī, correct would be “*pseudo-morphose*”), because the terms are supposed to mean something completely different.123

121 Boullata (1992) p. 95f.
122 ii.257 al-ma‘āyil al-arabī waḥdiha l-qidrīr ala man al-ma‘ājizā; Hanafi, “Berlin” p. 106; With his thoroughly essentialist description of the West and Islam and, on the other hand his appraisal for Said’s attacks on Orientalism, Hanafi provides a good example for the selective reception of the latter in the Arab world cf. E. Said: p. 331 (new afterword to “Orientalism”); Hanafi, *Muqaddima* p. 41n. (on Said) p. 77,-4f. (justification of essentialist *māḥasīb* approach); severe criticism of his essentialism by pp. 31f, 91, 143f., 154f (reply without reference Hanafi, *Muqaddima* p. 76ff.); Salvatore’s (1995) p. 213 “escape from an essentialist attitude” which he attributes to Hanafi results from wishful thinking combined with insufficient reading. Such a superficial understanding of the progress of science since the late Middle Ages and its role in Western society is not uncommon in contemporary Arab discourse: Radtke (1989) pp. 75ff.
123 Hanafi, *Tarīḵ* 194f. esp. n108; He pretends that although he borrows Spengler’s ter-
The impact of Hanafi's identification of Islam with rationality has political consequences. Hanafi dismisses European criticism of religion for Islam: The denial of God's existence is an understandable overreaction towards clericalism and irrational anthropomorphism in Christianity. But that the Bible is not to be held true was not discovered by Spinoza, Voltaire and Strauss first, but can already be read in the Qur'an and the works of Ibn Hazm, al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya. Because of the rational and secularist character of Islam, the political model of laicism/secularism (alm-niyya) is superfluous: Where there is no church with priesthood, it cannot be separated from the state. Apart from this, the rational revelation of Islam allows Islamic civilization to remain centripetal (markaz), contrary to the centrifugal (tardi) Western civilization. Anyhow, religions in other parts of the World are rather counterparts of ideologies in the West.

Hanafi accuses Levantine Christian intellectuals lacking firm roots in Islam as a religion and civilization of spreading the idea of a separation of politics and religion in Egypt. His arguments from the apologetical tradition fail to convince secularist critics who consider them a contradiction to his objective of constructing a religious ideology or consider them illogical and ahistorical nonsense resulting from a “thought-strike” (idrāb ‘an al-tafkīr). The cyclical model, reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun, as understood by Hanafi and Spengler (“Decline of the West”, insinuataneous analogies) presents the development of the “West” and the “East” as adverse

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124 vi.244f., ibid., criticism of his epistemological relativism: p. 149.
125 viii.32 jurār, Hanafi, Ḥudūd pp. 177f.
126 Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 109f.
127 Ḥudūd p. 43.
128 According to Hattar p. 131n, Hanafi distinguishes between good (Islamic) and bad (Christian) theocracy, whereas Tarabishi states a lack of formal logic, because the whole “religion” is subordinated to the particular “church” Jābir/Hanafi, Ḥudūd pp. 137f., 142f.

minology, he means something completely different; cf. Spengler pp. 784ff.; On the denial of external cultural influences (takhabīrijyya thaqāfīyya) also Tarabishi (1991) pp. 189ff., 199ff. It is noteworthy that the “Islamic leftist” is inspired by several concepts of the extreme right in the West. For example he pays respect to Fouillé’s “peoples psychology” Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 108ff.
sine curves. The climax of one civilization coincides with the other’s awakening from its nadir. In this concept, the “West”, identified with Christianity, is the model prefiguring the development of the East. Its development starts with an upward movement from AD 1 until about AD 400, when decline set in with the establishment of Christianity as a state religion. The curve crosses the x-line with the coronation of Charlemagne and reaches its low-point at about 1200, when scholasticism marked the beginning of a period of revival with the study of Islamic rationalism (the second era of translations). The x-line is surmounted again at about 1600, when the Reformation laid the foundations for the Renaissance. After the Renaissance, Enlightenment paved the way for a new climax of Western civilization with German idealism. The contemporary Western world is described as being in a state of decline, comparable to the Mamluk age, because it has lost its rational foundations. This is reflected in the contemporary arts and in post-modern thought: music has become atonal and painting abstract, the nouveau roman and the movies of the nouvelle vague have given up the Kantian categories of time and space, deconstructivism proclaims the “death of the author” and replaces him by impersonal discourses, Foucault is preoccupied with folly instead of reason. The development of Islamic civilization is described in a strictly analogous way. It began with a heyday during which the sciences flourished after the translation of the knowledge of Antiquity into Arabic (the “first era of translations”). But then the Islamic world took the fatal

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130 Hanafi, Muqaddima pp. 496ff.; Hildebrandt pp. 29ff.; Campanini pp. 118ff.; according to Chartier p. 610, Hanafi has been propagating this concept in his lectures since the early 1970s.

131 Hanafi states that he insisted on this periodization even in his Ph.D.-exam: Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 171n261. In the historical part of the “Muqaddima fi ḫīn al-īṣṭighāb” Hanafi notably places Renaissance in the 15th and Reformation in the 16th century, according to the convention.


133 Hanafi, Muqaddima pp. 429-ff., 506ff., 62-ff.; Campanini p. 118f; criticism of the reception of cultural pessimism: Hattar p. 161.; it is not devoid of irony that Hanafi’s admirers among Western orientalists are outspoken post-modernists and consider him a kindred spirit: e.g. Martin & Woodward p. 211, also Schulze, Salvatore.
decision to follow al-Ghazālī instead of Ibn Rushd, thus initiating its own decline. The period between the decline of Islamic civilization and its second rise is described as being dominated by a combination of Ash‘arism and Sufism which, in his account, resemble Catholicism. The Wahhābī struggle against saint worship is described as the Islamic religious reformation that will lay the basis for a renaissance. A third era of translations, which began with al-Ṭahṭāwī, al-Afghānī and Shibli Shumayyil has laid the foundation for a renaissance of the East. His hope for a cultural and political renewal of the Islamic World, resulting from a religious reformation, accounts for the deliberate false dating of Renaissance and Reformation in the West and the doubtful causal connection. Hanaīfī admits that he borrowed this comparative vision of the development of Islam and the Western world with the stress on the need for an Islamic reformation from his role-model al-Afghānī.

Preliminary Conclusion

Up to now, Hanaīfī’s project has presented itself as an inconsistent assemblage of heterogeneous ideological elements which he never tries to systematize. Ṭarābilshī has pointed out that Hanaīfī’s writings are characterized by two different aspects: a critical or compensatory (ta‘āzīmi) view of Islamic culture and history, and a megalomaniac (ta‘āzīmi) or twaddle (hidhā’i) discourse, an uncritical and unreflected affirmation of Islamic identity. When Hanaīfī deals with the development of Islamic thought, he deplores that Ash‘arism in the service of “the power” has suppressed rational thought in Islam. But men of power like Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Maḥmūd Ghaznawī are praised for their heroic conquests, notwithstanding their support for “conservative religion”.

Nevertheless, one cannot explain the inconsistencies in Hanaīfī’s “heritage” discourse out of itself alone. It is essentially intertwined with
his political intentions. This becomes obvious if one studies his writings on Egypt’s contemporary history and on the “Great Islamic Revolution in Iran”, where many of the discussed elements will reappear.

**Revolution: Nasser**

Hanafi’s writings about the contemporary history of Egypt deal with three major subjects: the presidents Nasser and Sadat, and with the “Islamic movement” with which both were at odds. In his account of Nasser’s policies, Hanafi stresses the roots of the Free Officers in the “nationalist currents”. Among those with inclinations towards the Ikhwān he mentions Mun‘im ‘Abd al-Ra‘ūf and Kamāl al-Dīn Husayn, but not Sadat. According to him, the supporters of the revolution among the population were mobilized by the Ikhwān for mass rallies in the streets of Cairo.139

Hanafi praises Nasser’s policies for two major achievements: the fight against imperialism, Zionism in particular, and the struggle for social justice. He enthusiastically refers to Nasser’s liquidation of British rule and his relentless resistance to Zionism and Western block-building, which he countered by promoting Arab unity. He approvingly relates Nasser’s posing as a new Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, uniting the Asian and the African wing of the Arab nation.140 But when Hanafi praises Nasser’s pan-Islamic activities, one looks in vain for the man in charge: Sadat.141 Nasser is not only exalted as an Arab and Islamic leader but as an outstanding Third World figure, with reference to his performance at the Bandoeng conference and his leading role in the non-alignment movement. When Hanafi himself pleads for non-alignment, he uses an argument Nasser had already used: the equidistance to the Eastern and the Western block corresponds to the struggle of the early Islamic umma against the Eastern and the Western super-powers of its time.142 Hanafi’s own wavering between pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism and Third-

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139 iv.10ff. tanmiyya.
141 iv.24f tanmiyya.
142 Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 502.
Worldism, always based on Egyptocentrism, is an obvious reflection of Nasser’s theory of the three circles (Arabic, Islamic and Afro-Asian) centered around Egypt.\(^{143}\)

Hanafi also praises Nasser’s struggle for social justice, the abolition of “feudalism” and the “Egyptianization” of enterprises. He quotes Nasser’s justifications for these policies, which resemble his own economic ideas:
1. The hadith according to which salt, water and fodder are common goods, and the reference to the “nationalizations” of `Umar. 2. Islam teaches the abolition of the differences between the classes. 3. No ribā, in the sense of profit without work. 4. Inequality is atheism. 5. Islam is a program for social revolution, not a solace for afterlife.\(^{144}\) Hanafi’s reinterpretation of the hajj as an annual convention of Muslims from all over the world is a concept Nasser had already propagated in his Falsafat al-Thawra.\(^{145}\) Nasser’s acolytes justified his socialist policies by praising him as a follower of the prophets, who were revolutionaries\(^{146}\), and above all the term “Islamic Left” is already to be found in Nasserist propaganda.\(^{147}\)

Nevertheless, Hanafi mercilessly criticizes the failures and deficiencies of the Nasserist system. As the first major shortcoming he singles out the lack of democratic legitimacy. This point can be divided into two sub-points: dictatorial political practice, including the suppression of every opposition, and lack of an autonomous mass support: the “Free Officers” took decisions for the welfare of the masses, who in return appreciated them, but because they received those favours by decree, they were not prepared to defend them when Sadat abolished them in the same way.

The second major point is connected with the lacking mass support: the lack of an authentic ideology able to motivate the people. Although

\(^{143}\) v.3 Ḥanafī, Muqaddima p. 529,1ff.  
\(^{144}\) iv.226-30; 218 al-`umal al-din; 231n; similar iv.115ff., 120 kwammāra.  
\(^{145}\) `Abd al-Nāṣir (1962) pp. 72ff.  
\(^{146}\) Kassian pp. 259ff., 270ff; Yazbeck Haddad p. 32.  
\(^{147}\) Sāliḥ. In the introduction to his al-Tamīm wa-l-Yasir fi l-Īslām concepts similar to Hanafi’s can be found: Ibn Rushd as a source of inspiration for Western enlightenment and al-Ghazālī as the nemesis of Islamic rationalism (pp. 11ff.). However, the largest part of the book consists of a vulgar materialist analysis of Meccan society and the conflicts in the first decades of Islam. See also: Kassian pp. 263ff. The Nasserists were not the first to apply the right-left dichotomy to categorize intellectual currents in Islam. As far as I could fathom it was Goldziher p. 100.
Hanafi cites Nasser’s Islamic justifications for his socialist measures with approval, he doubts their honesty and credibility and describes them as merely tactical and inconsistent. According to him, Nasser first took decisions by trial and error. His personal charisma alone was sufficient to gain mass approval. But when Saudi Arabia and Syria indulged in polemics against his “atheist communism” by appealing to conservative religious sentiments, Nasser had to refer to Islam in order to legitimize his regime with religious slogans. Moreover these arguments were not used consistently by Nasser: After the Communist-backed Qāsim had gained power in Iraq, Nasser indulged in polemics against him with the very same arguments which the reactionary forces had previously used against him.148

Religion: Hanafi on the Ikhwān and Sayyid Qūṭb

For Hanafi the way out of this dilemma would have been closer cooperation with the Ikhwān, whom he himself had joined in 1952,149 and with Sayyid Qūṭb in particular. Therefore he considers the reconciliation of Nasserism and the Ikhwān, or of din and thawra, his main objective.150 He praises the Ikhwān for a number of achievements: In their version of Islam, cleansed of the accretions of bygone centuries, he sees the signs of an ideology able to confront the contemporary Western ideologies on equal terms. Moreover, he describes the Ikhwān as the first authentic mass movement in the history of Egypt. He praises the efficacy of their “hierarchical family system” in organizing mass resistance to imperialism. The combination of these two factors facilitated the emergence of a new kind of intellectual committed to turāth, caring for the needs of the masses and speaking to them in a language they can understand. By attracting Islamic thinkers and activists from other parts of the Islamic world, like Abū l-Hasan Nadwī, ‘Allāl al-Fāsī, Nawwāb Ṣafāwī, Muṣṭafā al-Sībā‘ī, Arafat and Boumedienne, they also made Egypt the core of

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148 iv.222 al-‘imāl al-din; similar vii.68f, yasūr.
149 vi.217f suna, before he was a Sa’dist in the tradition of his family, vi.214.
150 viii.64f, yasūr; vi.200f. harakat, Abū Zayd (1994) pp. 150ff.: tawfīqyya.
the Islamic world. It is of course no coincidence that this list, with the latter two, comprises later allies of Nasser.

This generally positive assessment notwithstanding, Hanafi severely disapproves of other aspects of their ideology and their political methods. He condemns their anti-modernism and their “sexual worldview”, which expressed themselves in the resistance to the emancipation of women promoted by Nasser in the Act of 1955, and their disdain for theatre, cinema and music. Hanafi blames these aspects of their ideology—in combination with the striving for power of the conservative wing of the Ikhuwān led by Hasan al-Huṣaynī an ally of General Najib—for the final rift with Nasser. Hanafi praises Nasser’s refusal to become kāmin bi-amr Allāh by succumbing to narrow-minded demands like enforcing the veil or closing down theatres and music-halls. When Hanafi relates his youth, he mentions his participation in actions in support of imprisoned Ikhuwān but no hatred for Nasser, which suggests that Nasser’s break with the Ikhuwān must have been a most serious disappointment for him. When writing about his studies in Paris, he states that his thoughts were with the Revolution. But this did not keep him from publicly questioning a delegation of Egyptian officials at the Sorbonne about the fate of the Ikhuwān and about the names of those who withheld information on such acts of injustice from the rāsūl. When Hanafi praises the formulation of a coherent ideology by the Ikhuwān he is referring to the writings of Sayyid Quṭb. His study of Quṭb is a contribution to the Markaz al-qawm lil-buṭr al-ijtimā’iyya wa-al-’iyniyya. Although less a biography than an analysis of the development of Quṭb’s thought, Hanafi stresses the importance of the personal and historical background for the development of ideas in this particular

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151 viii.105ff. Ḥābīr/Hanafi, Ḥusn, similars vi.300ff. mādhūb ḥakayat Muḥammad zanā‘at al-ikhuwān al-muslihīn, 1976; Zakariyyāʾ pp. 38ff. criticizes Hanafi for two historical inaccuracies in this context: He exaggerates the following of the Ikhuwān among students before 1952 and conceals their temporary alliance with the monarchy.


153 vi.229ff. ibn. in I.46n he states that he was a follower of Najīb first, but sided with Nasser after 1956.
context. Hanaﬁ divides Qutb’s thought into four phases: literary (1930-51), social activist (1951-54), philosophical (1954-62) and political (1962-66). Hanaﬁ does not neglect the ﬁrst phase. On the contrary, he stresses the importance of the young Qutb’s aesthetic approach to the Qur’an in al-Taṣawwuf al-Fannī fi l-Qur’ān. By praising Qutb’s early love lyrics, Hanaﬁ implicitly criticizes the concentration of contemporary Islamists on the regulation of sexuality and gender relations. He also stresses the nationalist commitment of the young Qutb and the fact that he was in contact with almost all political movements and intellectual currents in Egypt, which distinguishes him from his own position later and the intolerant exclusivism of the recent terrorist groups (jamaʿātī)...

In the description of the second phase Hanaﬁ portrays Qutb as thinker devoted to the improvement of the fate of the poor. This led him to formulate an Islamic concept of social justice in al-ʿAdāla al-Rišādīyya fi l-Islām and Maʾrakat al-Islām wa-l-Raʾsmānīyya. Surprisingly, Hanaﬁ refers only briefly to the relation between the Qutb’s economic thought and Nasser’s justiﬁcations for his socialist policies: Qutb legitimized the nationalization of basic industries with reference to the Mālikite theory that maslahat in case of darūra urges exceptional interferences into property rights. But Hanaﬁ disapproves of Qutb’s defense of private property in general. The young Qutb’s interpretation of tawḥīd, shahāda and ḥākimiyya are regarded by Hanaﬁ as foundation for the “liberation of conscience” and the struggle against tyranny. He claims that Qutb’s deﬁnition of ḥākimiyya contains no positive notion in the sense of “divine government” but only the rejection of tyrannical...

156 v.188 Qutb. In this context it is worthy to note that even in Fi Ṣīḥ al-Qur’ān Qutb begins the analysis of some sûras with a praise of their rhythmical beauty: Qutb (1903) pp. 340ff (sūra 53); 390ff (sūra 89); for a general account of aesthetic approaches to the Qurʾān: Kermani. However, his juxtaposition of fundamentalist legalists and those torn towards the Qurʾān by its beauty is a misleading simpliﬁcation as Qutb’s remarks demonstrate.
157 vi.44 harakat; v.181f. Qutb: support for Saʿid Zaghbūl, quotation from ʿifī min al-qur’ān.
160 v.221 Qutb.
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powers.\(^\text{161}\) Therefore, Ḥanāfī labels Qūṭb the first “Islamic leftist” and describes his own project as the continuation of Qūṭb’s theoretical efforts during the late forties and early fifties.\(^\text{162}\)

Nevertheless, Ḥanāfī does not overlook the fact that many aspects of the later Qūṭb’s dualistic worldview and intolerance are already to be found in this phase. Ḥanāfī condemns his attacks on secularist intellectuals of Christian origin\(^\text{163}\) and his refutation of “the West” which led Qūṭb to a rejection of all currents of Islamic civilization influenced by non-Islamic sources. By rejecting the heritage of Islamic philosophy and Mu’tazilism, Qūṭb deprived himself of the opportunity to bolster his own thought with a more solid foundation. The total rejection of Western culture caused him to refute achievements like enlightenment and freedom of thought.\(^\text{164}\)

Ḥanāfī explains Qūṭb’s development from his “social” to his “philosophical” phase as a consequence of his incarceration after the break between Nasser and the Ikhwān. This forced him to divert his attention from direct political action towards theory. Instead of paying attention to urgent social problems he decided to fight Westernization.\(^\text{165}\) This led him to the study of the works of Mawdūdī, whose isolationism was to dominate his thought later.\(^\text{166}\)

Ḥanāfī completely rejects Qūṭb’s thought in the “political” phase. But the refutation of his thought is mitigated by an exculpation of the person. He describes the negative development as the product of the “thought of the tortured” and accuses the political leadership:\(^\text{167}\) “The Egyptian Revolution is responsible for the development from the struggle between Islam and capitalism into the struggle between Islam and jāhiliyya.”\(^\text{168}\) This argument fails to convince Ḥanāfī’s former student Abū Zayd. According to him Ḥanāfī underestimates the internal logic of Qūṭb’s

\(^{161}\) v.195f, 200, 209 Qūṭb: bāḥa‘iyya wa ash’āb ‘alāṭ al-bashar; not yet influenced by Mawdūdī: v.205.


\(^{163}\) v.202 Qūṭb.

\(^{164}\) v.195f Qūṭb.

\(^{165}\) v.251 Qūṭb.

\(^{166}\) v.238ff., 252 Qūṭb.

\(^{167}\) v.295 Qūṭb.

\(^{168}\) v.255 Qūṭb.
thought, and moreover he fails to explain why similar ideologies were 
promoted or adopted by people not exposed to torture.\textsuperscript{169}

Hanafi traces the later Qutb’s hākimiyā theory back to Mawdūdi, 
whose concepts he refutes, not only because of his preoccupation with 
formalities, his reactionary stance concerning women and his defense of 
private property.\textsuperscript{170} Above all, he rejects the “theocentrism” 
underlying Mawdūdi’s political thought because it contradicts his own pretension 
to transform theology into anthropology, according to which vox dei 
ought to be vox populi. Mawdūdi’s positive understanding of hākimiyā 
as the rule of God is therefore directed against any other form of 
government, tyrannical or not.\textsuperscript{171} Influenced by this conception, Qutb 
began to denounce every form of government which does not conform 
to his own concept of an Islamic order as jāhilīyya.\textsuperscript{172} In the footsteps 
of Mawdūdi, it was logical to give up every notion of Islam that went 
formalism and a static understanding of the sharīa. Qutb’s struggle became a struggle of belief devoid of any social content.\textsuperscript{173}

Hanafi considers this isolationist tendency of the later Qutb the main 
source of inspiration for the violent jamā‘at of the seventies.\textsuperscript{174}

**Treason and Punishment: Sadat and the jamā‘at**

Whereas Nasser’s regime appears in Hanafi’s writings as a failure, 
although the honorable intentions of the leader may not be questioned, 
the reign of Sadat (thawra mu‘adda, or even ridda) appears as a humiliating 
sell-out of Egypt and the darkest phase in the country’s history.\textsuperscript{175} In

\textsuperscript{169} Abū Zayd (1994) pp. 107f.

\textsuperscript{170} v.154ff. Athar Abū l-Alā‘ Mawdūdi’s al-\textipa{ jamā‘at al-diniyya al-mu‘āṣira, 1979, (Mawdūdi), an-} 
other contribution to the “Markaz al-qarnî lil-buhāth al-\textipa{ijtimā‘iyya wa-l-jinā‘iyya”; preface 
to Khumaynî p. xxviii.

\textsuperscript{171} v.12b-31 Mawdūdi; similar against the preponderance of the nasr over the maslah \textipa{v.132f., v.160, and v.154ff. against Mawdūdi’s stress on seclusion of women. Hanafi’s argu-} 
ments as well as Qutb’s reception of Mawdūdi are most likely due to the wrong translation 

\textsuperscript{172} v.264f. Qutb.

\textsuperscript{173} v.272f. Qutb.

\textsuperscript{174} v.253, 288ff. Qutb.

\textsuperscript{175} ridda: Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 67, 7; viii.312 kayfa yufakkiru l-yasīr al-islāmī, 1982, in 
al-Ahīā‘. 
most of Hanafi’s writings Sadat enters the stage as diabolus ex machina, as he has already been shown with reference to those passages where he has been eliminated from the picture of Nasser’s regime. Hanafi’s criticism of Sadat’s reign can be divided into the criticism of concrete political actions and a deeper-lying aspect: the misuse of religion to justify them. An extensive discussion of the first aspect is unnecessary. Obviously infīṭāḥ and the pro-Western foreign policy culminating in the peace treaty with Israel could only be abhorred by Hanafi. On the other hand, the way in which Sadat exploited religion is the clue to Hanafi’s heritage discourse which has to be considered an implicit criticism of that era: when Hanafi bashes al-Ghazālī he aims at Sadat. Hanafi rarely mentions the use made of these ideological elements by the regime, but for contemporary observers the allusions must have been obvious.

In comparison with Nasser’s “charismatic” leadership, Hanafi describes Sadat’s leadership as “traditional”. He accuses him of exploiting the patriarchal and authoritarian aspects of the Egyptian popular heritage by praising the akhlāq al-qarya and by styling himself as a traditional rural leader, “thus the ruler began to appear as tribal chief or ancient Hebrew patriarch”. This orientation towards rural conservatism implied, according to Hanafi, the rejection of everything young and innovative. 176

Hanafi’s rejection of “conservative religion” refers to phenomena typical for the Sadat era. It is not difficult to see his refusal of illuminationist political concepts with a ra‘īṣ mulhm on top in connection with a president who used to justify his decisions with the formula: “ulhima li”. 177 Hanafi’s struggle against Ash‘arism in favour of doctrines teaching the causality of natural processes has a point of reference in the propaganda of the regime. The president used to trace his success at the beginning of his tenure back to miraculous interventions of God. Legends witnessing the support of angels were woven after the Egyptian army had crossed the Suez Canal in 1973. 178 The struggle against social evils was discouraged by the promotion of a fatalist world-view

176 viii.158 maaṣuqaḥ al-Misr.
178 iv.276 al-‘umāl al-din; other examples: iv.188 tanmiya; vi.63ff hanika.
ascribing them to the will of God. Hanafi’s agitation against the preoccupation with supernatural phenomena, diverting the attention from worldly affairs, aims at the TV sermons of Shaykh Sharawi. Even his polemics against the import of scientific knowledge belong to this context. Sadat claimed for his government to be founded on “ilm wa ‘inna.” Hanafi rejects this slogan, because it implies a contradiction between science and religion. Moreover the respective propaganda associated knowledge with the “West” and belief with the “East”, thus holding the Egyptian people back from being creative.

The part of Islamic tradition of which the Sadat regime made the most extensive use was Sufism. The upsurge of splendid mawlid is not the only indicator for this. Sadat founded al-Majlis al-dīl li-shu‘ān at-tarīqāt and thus rendered the Sufi orders a tool of the regime. On the ideological level, Hanafi’s opposition against the promotion of Sufism has to be seen in connection with the regime’s obvious intention to keep people from revolting against economic hardship by propagating the quietist values of ṣabr and tawakkul. Moreover he claims that Sadat, who abused Islam for manipulating the Egyptian public, in his propaganda for the West gave up Islam for syncretism. He reports with disgust on the inter-religious center Sadat planned to set up in the Sinai, because this would mean propagating the reconciliation between Arabs and Jews and between “the peoples (ṣu‘āb) and imperialism”. In his articles written in defense of Marxism Hanafi denies the intention of promoting a foreign ideology, but he insinuates that the attacks on Marxism by the regime were directed against the idea of social justice as such.

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179 iv.269 al-‘umal al-dīl; iv.172ff. tanmiya.
180 Jansen (1986) pp. 121ff; Hanafi only criticizes his political function viii.303f kayfa yuṣallī; Hildebrandt (p. 43n173) reports that in a private conversation Hanafi declared al-Sharawi his main enemy.
181 iv.184ff. tanmiya; Jāburi/Hanafi, Hvisit p. 73.
182 iv.33ff. tanmiya; this is not correct, the institution was already founded at the beginning of the 20th century and continued to exist under Nasser cf. Johansen pp. 37f., but the Sadat regime passed to acts in 1976 and 1978 which lead to a extension of state control over the institution. Translations of both Ordinances: ibid. pp. 256-292.
184 vi.76 karaḍa.
185 vii.225 tashwīḥ.
Hanaﬁ does not accuse Sadat of the misinterpretation of Islam alone. He stresses that during the first phase of his reign, Sadat left religious propaganda to members of the conservative wing of the Ikhwān, whom he had released from jail or allowed to return from exile. After their return they focused on Nasser-bashing. Above all, they propagated the opinion that the defeat of 1967 was the well-deserved punishment for the atrocities of Nasser’s godless regime.\footnote{vi.61f. \textit{harraka}.} In his criticism Hanaﬁ does not explicitly refer to the economic ideology of the Ikhwān, but for the contemporary observer their growing bourgeois outlook and the conservatism nurtured by their leaders during exile in Saudi Arabia could not be overlooked.\footnote{Kepel p. 105ff.}

In his writings Hanaﬁ dedicates considerable space to the terrorist jamā‘at, in particular al-Jihād al-Islāmī, out of which the assassins of Sadat emerged. His judgment of them varied considerably. The fact that they are considered primarily disastrous in his studies on Quṭb and Mawdūdī, and in \textit{al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdid} but praised heavily in articles published two years later in his series for the Kuwaiti daily \textit{al-Watan} can easily be explained by the political context: in 1980 \textit{al-Jihād al-Islāmī} had not yet assassinated Sadat.\footnote{A similar conclusion by Zakariyyā’ pp. 78ff.}

Hanaﬁ regards the jamā‘at a product of the isolationist thought of Mawdūdī and of Quṭb in the last phase of his life.\footnote{v.140-54. \textit{Mawdūdī}.} In his account of the \textit{fitna tâ’ifiyya} which marred Egypt’s communal relations during the seventies, Hanaﬁ condemns their intolerance and their violent methods. He contrasts their atrocities against the Christian minority with the national unity between Christians and Muslims during the Nasser era. Nevertheless, Hanaﬁ holds two parties responsible for the \textit{fitna}: On the one hand, he charges the jamā‘at with trying to enhance their popularity among the backward Muslim population of Upper Egypt by attacking wealthy Christians. Therefore he condemns the \textit{fatwā} of ‘Umar Abd al-Raḥmān, which legitimizes the expropriation of Christians. On the other hand, he accuses Sadat of exploiting the situation by presenting himself to the West as the savior of the Christians from Muslim
fanatism, and to the Egyptian public as a strong leader preventing a Lebanon-like civil war.190

This condemnation of the jamā‘at is replaced by approval when Hānāfī refers to the assassination of Sadat. In this context he praises them as the executors of the people’s will. He seems, however, not to be quite sure about the degree of popular acceptance. On the one hand, he stresses that they were inspired by the Islamic heritage and that they expressed themselves in fatwās, a literary form the masses were acquainted with. On the other hand, he considers their doctrines extremist, preventing them from moving among the people “like a fish in water”.191 Hānāfī criticizes their preference for action in small elitist and hierarchical groups over mass mobilization, which made them fall prey to the “dialectic of all or nothing”.192 Their legitimization of the murder with reference to Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwā against the Mongols appears to him as insufficient qiyyās based on the analysis of contemporary events in the light of the past.193 But whatever his objections to their theoretical justification may be, he welcomes the deed. In Hānāfī’s description Sadat’s funeral appears as final verdict on the traitor:

Only the West and Israel attended (the funeral), represented by three former American presidents and Begin, who insisted on coming on the Sabbath in order to fulfill his duty towards a friend who had granted Israel its birth certificate and endowed it with a guaranty of survival. But (the funeral took place) in the desert of Egypt, without people, apart from the security forces. In this moment Egypt remembered the funeral of Nasser, five millions in Cairo, carrying the bier on their shoulders, tearing it out of each other’s hands; and they laid him to rest in the presence of two comrades, a brother from Sudan and a son from Libya.194

According to Hānāfī, the opposition against Sadat was not restricted to the jamā‘at, referred to as the legitimate heirs of the “Free Officers”, but was shared by all “national currents”.195 Nevertheless, only al-jihād al-‘Islāmi was able to execute the people’s will, because its adherents

190 vi.83f. haraka.
191 vi.201 haraka.
194 vi.94ff. (quot. p. 96) haraka; also vi.201 haraka; “dīlā‘ Mīr ft Ülūkūn 1981”; repeated in Hānāfī/Ḫādir, Ḥawārī p. 35 and 1.47n.; cf. Esposito & Voll p. 79: "Although he did not condone the murder of Sadat in 1981, ...".
195 vi.193f. haraka.
alone had the chance to infiltrate the army—unlike the Nasserists who were purged at the beginning of Sadat’s reign. Thus, in the aftermath of Sadat’s assassination Hanafi saw the jamāʿat as the avant-garde of a united front of the “national currents”.¹⁹⁶

The Way to Bandoeng leads through Tehran: Khumaynī as a New Nasser

Hanafi hailed the “Great Islamic Revolution in Iran” with enthusiasm. Unlike other intellectuals in the West and the Islamic world, he did not disassociate himself from this euphoria later.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless his accounts of the revolution, which he partially witnessed, are not completely uncritical.

First, he considers the revolution the foremost sign of a general awakening (jahwa) of Islam and a severe blow to Western imperialism:
The Great Islamic Revolution in Iran was the authentic indicator for the awakening of the Muslims and the appearance of Islam.... It broke out totally unexpected, when Iran was an oasis of security for the West in the region.... And it occurred after the largest experiment in Westernization in the region, according to which Iran was to become a part of Europe, in the way khedive Isma’il had tried to deal with Egypt in the last century.... (The revolution) has developed into the greatest challenge to the West and into the strongest pillar of Islamic identity as national identity and into the strongest affirmation of national independence against a Western policy of block-building and expansionism.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ vi.92f. Hanawa, Zakariyyā‘ considers this description of al-Jihād al-islāmi dangerously naive because Hanafi does not consider their antidemocratic objectives exposed in al-Faraj al-ghāiba (pp. 81ff.). For Zakariyyā‘ the assassination of Sadat was an attempt to assassinate modernity as such, including “Hasan Hanafi as he expresses himself in other articles” (p. 94).

¹⁹⁷ Those who come forward with this assertion give no reference from Hanafi’s writings: Von Kügelgen p. 207; Hildebrandt p. 12; cf. the continuing positive evaluation Hanafi, Maqālāt pp. 528-548 (on waṣl ṣulṭat al-faqīḥ), 548, 12ff.; with some good will a dissociation could be seen in a statement in “intervista” p. 78, but the interview addresses a European audience, and Hanafi criticizes the Ayatollāh’s old fashioned beards, not the persecution, torture and murder of political opponents and religious minorities. Other Egyptian leftists did not sympathize with the Iranian Revolution longer than until October 1979; see a quotation from “Roz al-Yasif” in Akhavi (1990) p. 149.

¹⁹⁸ v.9f. Ājīl. The reference to Ismā‘īl seems to be an allusion to the common equation of Nasser and Sadat to Muhammad ‘Āli and Ismā‘īl respectively, Schölch p. 368.
The anti-Western rage of the revolution is described as a new impetus for the struggle against Zionism, which has come to a standstill. Therefore: “The road to al-Quds leads through Tehran”. In his accounts, Hanafi stresses the similarities between Nasser and Khumaynī, one time even calling the imām a “new Nasser”. In this respect his position differs markedly from the Ikhwān, who equated Khumaynī’s struggle against the Shah with Q̲ūb’s struggle against Nasser. Hanafi justifies this equation by describing Khumaynī as Muṣaddiq’s heir. He even goes one step further by presenting the Iranian revolution as a superior alternative, devoid of the crucial deficiency of the Nasserist system: the non-existent mass basis. In his account the Islamic revolution is characterized by a complete merger of leadership and masses.

Hanafi is less euphoric about the ideological aspect of the revolution. He mentions the efforts of Sharīf ʿalī and Banī Sadr to formulate a revolutionary ideology but does not delve into details. Sometimes he considers Shiism as such a revolutionary movement. But hardly anywhere is Hanafi’s “almost infinite ability to contradict himself” more apparent than in his foreword to the Arabic translation of Khumaynī’s al-Hukūma al-islāmiyya. He first praises the concept of effective leadership by alluding to al-Fārābī’s virtuous city. Later on, he criticizes Khumaynī for a concept conceived from top to bottom and thus resembling the authoritarian models of early modern political thought in the West and the reality of the Arab military regimes. He first praises Khumaynī for refraining from an explicitly Shiite argumentation and for appealing to the common Islamic heritage instead. Then he criticizes the obvious influence of Shiite metaphysics on his concepts, like the idea of the Twelve Imams and Fatima as pre-existing lights revolving around the Throne of God.

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199 v.15 Jānjī; iii.331f.  thawra itnīyya; for a similar slogan concerning Cairo among the Free Officers: Jansen (1997) p. 125.; the Ikhwān did praise the anti-imperialist aspect of the revolution in a similar fashion Akhāvi (1990) p. 146.
201 v.12 Jānjī.
202 iii.331f. thawra itnīyya; Hanafi does not know Farsi: viii.296 al-yasīir as-islāmī lā yubu l-sūtih  ... 
203 preface to Khumaynī p. xii.
204 preface to Khumaynī p. xxvii (on Machiavelli and Hobbes n14).
205 preface to Khumaynī p. xxv ff.
Hanafi’s ambivalent attitude towards the specifically Shiite elements in the Islamic revolution corresponds to the attitude of the Ikhwān. Both were surprised that it took place in Iran, whose Shiism both had previously considered the product of a Judeo-Persian conspiracy against Islam. On the other hand it is worth mentioning that the issue of taqrīb between Sunnism and Shiism was supported by the Nasserist regime. Hanafi defends the revolution against the attacks in the Egyptian media, which exploited the lack of knowledge about the different branches of Shiism by ascribing ghulāt views like hulūl to Iran’s Imāms. But instead of demonstrating that the accusations are wrong, he stresses that the Iranian ‘ulamā’ are just about to return to common Islam by wiping out innovations. Nevertheless, Shiite popular devotion had obviously shocked him:

... and in Qumm the poor-, men, women and children- are crowded around the ra‘ula mutamama, the grave of Fatima the daughter of Musa b. Ja’far, and they ask the people: “What is more honorable, all the gold, silver and crystal in the dome and the donations on the holy grave, or feeding, clothing and sheltering the poor?” Underdevelopment does not consist of poverty alone but of all the mental and psychological structures causing it and other evils. But the men and women cry and beg for baraka by striking its brass and its iron fence.... Then they leave as if their problems were solved. It seems as if the revolution cannot succeed without repeating the revolution of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb against the graves and the living places of the awliyā’.

While he severely criticizes Shiite devotion, the repression of women, political opponents and religious minorities did not upset Hanafi. He even hails the persecution of the Bahai minority as eradication of a crypto-Zionist movement that wants to abolish jihād. He compares severe punishment, not only of representatives of the old system but also of ordinary criminals, favourably to the Western juridical systems, which he describes as too mild as well as corrupt and inefficient. This stance is slightly softened by the expectation that the revolution will

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206 iii. 17 ghazw; Matthee p. 259ff.; initially the Ikhwān too were supporters of taqrīb, Brunner pp. 135ff., pp. 196f.; Akhavi (1990) pp. 139f.
207 Brunner pp. 208—232.; Ende passim, and id. in EI s.v. “Takrīb” and s.n. “al-Shaltīn”.
208 v. 22 $siy; preface to Khumayn p. 25.
209 iii.333f. thawra  $niyya.  

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declare a general amnesty after its final victory.\textsuperscript{210} Although Hanafi strictly opposes demands for Islamic clothing with respect to Egypt, he praises the imposition of the veil in Iran as a powerful affirmation of Islamic identity.\textsuperscript{211}

**The “Islamic Left” and “Peoples’ Nasserism”**

Generally, Hanafi’s thought is discussed in relation to Western thought, \textit{turāth} and Islamism. But as has been shown his main concern is obviously the revitalization of Nasserism,\textsuperscript{212} which he intends to reinvigorate by creating an ideology capable of mobilizing the masses for its support, thus rendering a second implosion like the one in 1970 impossible. Therefore Nasser’s tactical attempt to legitimize the revolution with religious slogans ought to be overcome by systematic ideological activity.\textsuperscript{213} In several writings he articulates his desire for a \textit{Nāṣirīyya shāh biyya}, cleansed of the deficiencies of the “bureaucratic” precursor; and the “Islamic Left” is identical with “peoples’ Nasserism”.\textsuperscript{214} In the seventies, Hanafi associated with the Nasserist Tajammū‘ Party and not with the \textit{Ikhwān}. He wrote a large number of his articles for its daily \textit{al-Ålā}.

\textsuperscript{210} iii.335f. \textit{thawrār niyya}; v.18 \textit{sīyās}; on Bahais also iii.27 \textit{ghazw}; the \textit{Ikhwān} took a similar stance: Matthee: p. 258.

\textsuperscript{211} iii.335 \textit{thawrār niyya}; modernist attitudes exposed in vii.314-22 \textit{al-ma‘r’a al-`arabiyya muṭurūna min huqūqat al-muṣlima}, 1985; V.246,7ff. (on inšāmah of women) and V.288,8f.

\textsuperscript{212} This is supported by his former pupil Aḥzāb: p. 146 ff.: “\textit{al-yāsir al-islāmī} interes ‘alā ‘a‘marā li ‘a‘marā l-ma‘ṣūmak n‘a‘marā al-arāka allatī wajada fī niqām al-Walīyā” also Hattar p. 18f.; Boullata s.n. “Hanafi” in EMiW; Campanini suppose a certain influence of Nasserism, pp. 112n19, 119.

\textsuperscript{213} This is shown in \textit{Turāth} p. 59; the programmatic title of an article: \textit{al-Dubbī‘ al-`abrūr am al-maṣāfikīrūn al-`abrūr} ii.79, 1979.; L.36,7ff.


\textsuperscript{215} Because of tactical differences the cooperation was problematic, Hanafi preferred education of the masses to immediate political action: vii.175 \textit{al-tanwīr al-dinī wa-l-tanẓīm al-siyāsī}, 1976; while lecturing in Morocco he was close to the \textit{Istiqlāl party}, vi.275 \textit{sīrā}, in Tunisia the group around the “Majallat 15-21” is influenced by him see n162 and Hildebrandt p. 82n313. Currently he seems to have attracted a number of Indonesian intellectuals: Martin & Woodward pp. 130 and 156n32; Together with Shonhaji Sholeh he has published the volume: \textit{Agama, Ideologi dan Pembangunan} (Religion, Ideology and Development), Jakarta 1991.
a unification of the four national currents: Nasser’s propagandists had already presented Nasserism as synthesis of socialism without materialism and atheism, Islam without backwardness, and modernism without bourgeois dominance.216

The desire for a more “democratic” variant of Nasserism is not at all to be understood as a demand for a Western-style multi-party system, which Hanafi rejects with contradictory arguments: on the one hand, parliamentary democracy is said to prevent any real change in favour of the majority, on the other hand it is accused of causing suppression of the minority by the majority.217 In this respect Hanafi’s position differs from the party-line of Tajammu’, which has given up Nasserist resentment against parliamentarianism and parties.218 Hanafi suggests a “pluralist one-party system” representing the different national currents in one single organization as the superior alternative. His concept of pluralism, too, must not be confused with the liberal idea of pluralism, because it does not imply the legitimacy of different interests or objectives. Not unlike the block-party system in pre-1989 Central Europe it rather means justifying one objective with different slogans: tahrir al-ard bismillah, bism al-hurriyya, bism al-tabqa al-’ammila, bism al-watan al-‘arabi.219 Hanafi’s rejection of the hadith about the firqa nājiya is usually interpreted as a plea for religious tolerance. This, too, should be scrutinized more closely:220 It is not valid for Ahmadis, Ismailis and especially Bahais whom he wants to see exterminated.
He does not deal with their teaching extensively because his condemnation is a *talât fir sîyâsî*: their cardinal sin is their pro-Westernism.\(^{221}\)

Hanafî’s attempt to revitalize Nasserism has to be considered in a larger context: it is the specific Egyptian formulation of his demand to endow Third-World ideologies with a more solid theoretical foundation:

It is the task of our generation, to bring forth a multitude of theoretical judgments, so that the civilizational development of the “self” (masâb al-anâ) comes close to the civilizational development of the “other” in respect of theoretical judgments, so that we read Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl with the intellect while in our hearts we are sympathizing with Nasser, Nkrumah, Senghor, Guevara, Kaunda, Kenyatta and Nyerere. Those are the experiences of our generation, which we did not reflect upon (*taraknâhâ bîdîn tanzîb*), and we moved toward ready-made theories without living their reality or undergoing their experiences (*dînâ an ma’dîsh wâqi’îhâ au wâmul bâs-tajribatihâ*). We are challenged to elevate these writings (of the Third-World leaders) from the level of mere rhetoric to the level of theory and to elevate them out of the field of lived experiences (*tajîrb mala’dish*).\(^{223}\)

The choice of words already shows that the longing for an upswing of theoretical thought in the Third World is derived from his morphological concept of history. But although Hanafî, when he deals with the past, only contrasts Islam as “East” in opposition to the “West”, he suddenly speaks of the whole Third World as “East” when he deals with the present: in the index of his *Muqaddima*... even Tito and Latin Americans are listed among the Easterners!\(^{224}\)

\(^{221}\) v.71. *Âjîb*: in the same context Hanafî ironically also condemns Sayyîd Ahmad Khân although he was the first to sing the tunes that Hanafî continues when he pleads for a re-appreciation of rationalist trends in early Islam, a reconsideration of the accord between *hâdîth* and Qur’ân and above all for an understanding of revelation that eliminates the contradiction between the “Word of God” and the laws of nature, the “Work of God”. Cf. Troll pp. 13f., 172f., 216f., 226f.; Brown pp. 33f.

\(^{222}\) This awkward construct (Fr. *expérience vécue*) is generally used by non-German phenomenologists to render the associative aspect of “Erlebnis” cf. Gail Soffer s.v. “Relativism” in “Encyclopedia of Phenomenology”, p. 595a.

\(^{223}\) Hanafî, *Muqaddima* p. 529,10ff.; similar I.75,9ff.

\(^{224}\) Notably in Arabic letters only. On the other hand Japanese and all Jews, including those from Arab countries, appear as Westerners. This inconsistency has also been singled out by Qanswawa, p. 220, who concludes that Hanafî fails to present objective criteria for the “self” and the “other”. Recently, in an interview for a German online-magazine (“Die Globalisierung”, part 1) and his debate with al-‘Azm (1999), Hanafî (p. 41) seems to have become quite pessimistic with regard to the anti-Western identity of Latin America: “Lî-
will be the seven thousand years of consciousness to which the Third World can look back, whereas the consciousness of the West dates back only two thousand or two and a half thousand years.221 His “Occidentalism” is also to be considered in this context: it is supposed to show that the “West is in no way superior to other world-cultures and that its history can never serve as role-model for their development, a theory which is hidden behind the legend of world-civilization”.226 Moreover, his historicist concept contains a serious warning for all Arab secularists: their attempt to stem the tide of Islamic awakening is doomed to fail because it contradicts the laws of history.227

The short, adverse comments by secularist intellectuals show that they share more or less the view of Ṭarābīḥī and Ḥattar, who both stress his affinity to Islamism.228 Most critics disapprove of Ḥanaffi’s instrumentalist eclecticism: Abū Zayd accuses him of borrowing relentlessly from rightist as well as from leftist schools.229 Ḥanaffi’s concept of authenticity is questioned by Ḥattar from the Marxist point of view. Notwithstanding his dogmatic convictions, he convincingly demonstrates that Ḥanaffi never pays attention to the fact that heritage is something men pass on and accept or reject. This leads him to the polemical assertion that Ḥanaffi’s concept is mere biologism, because turāth seems to be inherent to genes.230 In al-Tarāth wa-l-Tajdid Ḥanaffi himself frankly admits that he considers the potential for mobilization of ideological concepts their most important aspect by denying that they are true or false as such.

beration theology has weakened and the youth has Americanized (ṣī), its civilizations have become blurred, it is neither African nor Indian, neither Spanish nor Portuguese, nor North American”.  

221 Hanaffi, Muqaddima p. 549f.

222 Hanaffi, Muqaddima p. 30f., pp. 33f., p. 39f., 40f.

223 vi.320ff. al-Turāth wa-l-Tajdīd, 1989 in “al-Khalīj”


226 Ḥattar pp. 91ff.
With this argument he explicitly justifies the usage of anti-Semitic stereotypes and his appeals to the yearning for a leader.\textsuperscript{231}

Whereas Marxists and other secularists express their refusal by restricting themselves to scorn and sarcasm, the long-lingering conflict with the “religious right” took a dramatic turn in spring 1997, when “jabhat al-takfîr”, a faction of Azhar-scholars led by Mûsâ Ismâ‘îl, accused Hanafi of apostasy, with reference to a denial of the miracles and a statement that God is a mere projection. Hanafi defended himself by pointing to the fact that the accusations were based on quotations taken out of context, especially from passages where he quotes opinions of firaq and does not express his own point of view. But unlike Abû Zayd, Hanafi seems to have found more support from Azhar scholars and State authorities, in which the fact that the attack on him was considered an attack on the “modernist faction” around Hanafi’s friend Zainqu and Shaykh Ṭāntâwî, and hence the state, may have played a considerable role.\textsuperscript{232}

Unlike his Arab critics, Western scholars, with the exception of Von Kügelgen and Hildebrandt, have paid astonishingly little attention to Hanafi’s logical flaws, the distortions of the doctrines which he refers to and the plethora of blatant historical mistakes, which they would—hopefully—mark red in their students’ papers. The less euphoric researchers express their disappointment about the discrepancy between Hanafi’s high pretensions and the lack of concrete analyses and proposals.\textsuperscript{233} Hanafi’s apparent hypocrisy with regard to the Western public i.e. preaching dialogue abroad, and declaring the clash of civilizations at

\textsuperscript{231} Hanafi, Tawîlîth p. 66: “lasya lil-`aqqî`id sidq fi dhâti`ah, bal `isdqah huwa madâ ta`rikhi fi l-hayyât al-`ama`ayya wa taghyirahu lil-wâqi` ... wa layya lahā` ayy maqâlîh muddât fi l-`ålîm al-khâřîjī ka haushûtîth ta`rikhiyya aw asâkhîs aw ma`asâwîth, illā miu al-a`aqî` al-`a`th al`iddîhu huwa hâmîl al-`umî`în wa maydîn al-`fi`l”; Salvatore (1999) p. 237: considers similar statements „a rejection of the reification of knowledge“; viii.312 hayfa yâfikkee, ii.37f., 40 bal yajiyya dar`an al-sulh ma`a Bani Isrâ‘îl, 1981; in the assessment of the intentions of Hanafi’s anti-Jewish polemics Yadlin is absolutely right: pp. 61f, on the popular admiration for leaders: ii.218f. qadîyya al-dimmî`rî`yya; a similar conclusion by Hildebrandt pp. 36f.


home, has recently been singled out by Hamzawy. Most astonishingly, nobody in the Arab world or the West raises the questions in how far Hanafi’s Wahhabite Averro-Mu’tazilism is likely to be accepted by ordinary Egyptians as more “authentic” than any Western ideology. Actually Hanafi’s intention to bring about a unification of secularist Left, Liberals and Islamists has not yet met with any success on the political level. Notwithstanding the lack of influence in the realm of day-to-day politics, the impact of Hanafi’s writings on educated people in Egypt and the Maghrib should not be underestimated.

In conclusion, the main problem with Hanafi is his diffuseness, which cannot be attributed to his eclecticism alone. Rather, it is due to a relentless instrumentalization of ideological elements for an objective which itself has not been sufficiently thought through. He calls for resistance against a despised West. But simultaneously he implicitly admits that he considers the latter superior by choosing it as the yardstick against which to measure the Islamic heritage. In this respect Hanafi has a well-known predecessor: his role-model al-Afghāni. So if one replaces the word technology by ideology, Keddie’s statement on the teacher, equally suits the disciple: “The conflict between the urgent need to adopt Western techniques and the equal need to combat dumb admiration of the West accounts for many of al-Afghanis contradictions”.

234 Hamzawy p. 359.
235 A certain exception is Hanafi himself who occasionally admits that the reception of Western culture has become an integral element of Egypt’s heritage during the last century and a half: Hanafi, Muqaddima p. 57.
236 The evidence for this is rather impressionistic: Tibi (1992) p. 120 relates that his arguments are often repeated by Egyptian students in discussions.
237 Keddie p. 96; similar conclusions by Hattar p. 161; and Hildebrandt p. 99ff. (on the difficulties of original production in the Arab “intellectual field”, following Bourdieu).
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