CHAPTER 3
Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives

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Abstract

This chapter surveys current approaches to consciousness in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. It focuses on five approaches, to which I will refer as mysterianism, dualism, representationalism, higher-order monitoring theory, and self-representationalism. With each approach, I will present in order (i) the leading account of consciousness along its line, (ii) the case for the approach, and (iii) the case against the approach. I will not issue a final verdict on any approach, though by the end of the chapter it should be evident where my own sympathies lie.

Introduction: The Concept of Consciousness

This chapter surveys current approaches to consciousness in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. It focuses on five approaches, to which I will refer as mysterianism, dualism, representationalism, higher-order monitoring theory, and self-representationalism. With each approach, I will present in order (i) the leading account of consciousness along its line, (ii) the case for the approach, and (iii) the case against the approach. I will not issue a final verdict on any approach, though by the end of the chapter it should be evident where my own sympathies lie.

Before starting, let us draw certain distinctions that may help fix our ideas for the discussion to follow. The term "consciousness" is applied in different senses to different sorts of things. It is applied, in one sense, to biological species, as when we say something like "Gorillas are conscious, but snails are not"; in a different sense, to individual organisms or creatures, as when we say "Jim is conscious, but Jill is comatose"; and in a third sense, to particular mental states, events, and processes, as when we say "My thought about Vienna is conscious, but Jim's belief that there are birds in China is not." To distinguish these different senses, we may call the first species consciousness, the second creature consciousness, and the third state consciousness.

There appear to be certain conceptual connections among these three senses,
such that they may be analyzable in terms of one another. Plausibly, species consciousness is analyzable in terms of creature consciousness: a species S is species-conscious just in case a prototypical specimen of S is creature-conscious. Creature consciousness may in turn be analyzable in terms of state consciousness: a creature C is creature-conscious just in case C has (or is capable of having) mental states that are state-conscious. If so, state consciousness is the most fundamental notion of the three.

State consciousness is itself ambiguous as between several senses. If Jim tacitly believes that there are birds in China, but never consciously entertained this belief, whereas Jill often contemplates consciously the fact that there are birds in China, but is not doing so right now, there is a sense of “conscious” in which we may want to say that Jim’s belief is unconscious whereas Jill’s is conscious. Let us call this availability consciousness.3 By contrast, there is a sense of “conscious” in which a mental state is conscious when and only when there is something it is like for the subject – from the inside – to have it.4 Thus, when I take in a spoonful of honey, there is a very specific – sweet, smooth, honey-ish, if you will – way it is like for me to have the resulting conscious experience. Let us call this phenomenal consciousness.

Some of the leading scientific theories of consciousness – such as Baars’ (1988, 1997) Global Workspace Theory and Crick and Koch’s (1990, 2003) synchrony-based “neurobiological theory” – shed much light on availability consciousness and neighboring notions. But there is a persistent feeling that they do not do much to explain phenomenal consciousness. Moreover, there is a widespread sense that there is something principled about the way in which they fail to do so. One way to bring out this feeling is through such philosophers’ concepts as the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) or the hard problem (Chalmers, 1995). According to Chalmers, for instance, the problems of explaining the various cognitive functions of conscious experiences are the “easy problems” of consciousness; the “hard problem” is that of understanding why there should be something it is like to execute these functions.5 The sense is that an insight of a completely different order would be needed to make scientific theories, and indeed science itself, at all relevant to our understanding of phenomenal consciousness. Some sort of conceptual breakthrough, which would enable us to conceive of the problem of consciousness in new ways, is required. This is where philosophical theories of consciousness come into the picture.6,7

Mysterianism

Some philosophers hold that science cannot and will not, in fact, help us understand consciousness. So-called mysterianists hold that the problem of consciousness – the problem of how there could be something like phenomenal consciousness in a purely natural world – is not a problem we are capable (even in principle) of solving. Thus consciousness is a genuine mystery, not merely a prima facie mystery that we may one day demystify.

We may introduce a conceptual distinction between two kinds of mysterianism – an ontological one and an epistemological one. According to ontological mysterianism, consciousness cannot be demystified because it is an inherently mysterious (perhaps supernatural) phenomenon.6 According to epistemological mysterianism, consciousness is in no way inherently mysterious, and a greater mind could in principle demystify it – but it just so happens that we humans lack the cognitive capacities that would be required.

Epistemological mysterianism has actually been pursued by contemporary Western philosophers. The most comprehensive development of the view is offered in Colin McGinn’s (1989, 1995, 1999, 2004) writings. We now turn to an examination of his account.

McGinn’s Mysterianism

McGinn’s theory of consciousness has two central tenets. First, the phenomenon of consciousness is in itself perfectly natural and in no way mysterious. Second, the human mind’s conceptual capacities are too poor
to demystify consciousness. That is, McGinn is an epistemological mysterianist: he does not claim that the world contains, in and of itself, insoluble mysteries, but he does contend that we will never understand consciousness.

At the center of McGinn’s theory is the concept of cognitive closure. McGinn (1989, p. 529) defines cognitive closure as follows: “A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to a property P (or a theory T) if and only if the concept-forming procedures at M’s disposal cannot extend to a grasp of P (or an understanding of T).” To be cognitively closed to X is thus to lack the procedure for concept formation that would allow one to form the concept of X.

To illustrate the soundness and applicability of the notion of cognitive closure, McGinn adduces the case of animal minds and their constitutive limitations. As James Joyce writes in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, rats’ minds do not understand trigonometry. Likewise, snails do not understand quantum physics, and cats do not understand market economics. Why should humans be spared this predicament? As a natural, evolved mechanism, the human mind must have its own limitations. One such limitation, McGinn suggests, may be presented by the phenomenon of consciousness.

Interestingly, McGinn does not claim that we are cognitively closed to consciousness itself. Rather, his claim is that we are cognitively closed to that property of the brain responsible for the production of consciousness. As someone who does not wish to portray consciousness as inherently mysterious, McGinn is happy to admit that the brain has the capacity to somehow produce conscious awareness. But how the brain does so is something he claims we cannot understand. Our concept-forming procedures do extend to a grasp of consciousness, but they do not extend to a grasp of the causal basis of consciousness in the brain.

**The Master Argument for Mysterianism**

A natural reaction to McGinn’s view is that it may be based upon an overly pessimistic induction. From the fact that all the theories of consciousness we have come up with to date are hopelessly unsatisfactory, it should not be concluded that our future theories will be the same. It may well be that a thousand years hence we will look back with amusement at the days of our ignorance and self-doubt.

However, McGinn’s main argument for his position is not the inductive argument just sketched. Rather, it is a deductive argument based on consideration of our cognitive constitution. The argument revolves around the claim that we do not have a single mechanism, or faculty, that can access both consciousness and the brain. Our access to consciousness is through the faculty of introspection. Our access to the brain is through the use of our senses, mainly vision. But unfortunately, the senses do not give us access to consciousness proper, and introspection does not give us access to the brain proper. Thus, we cannot see with our eyes what it is like to taste chocolate. Nor can we taste with our buds what it is like to taste chocolate. We can, of course, taste chocolate. But we cannot taste the feeling of tasting chocolate. The feeling of tasting chocolate is something we encounter only through introspection. But alas, introspection fails to give us access to the brain. We cannot introspect neurons, and so could never introspect the neural correlates of consciousness.

Using the term “extrospective” to denote the access our senses give us to the world, McGinn’s argument may be formulated as follows:

1) We can have introspective access to consciousness but not to the brain;
2) We can have extrospective access to the brain but not to consciousness;
3) We have no accessing method that is both introspective and extrospective; therefore,
4) We have no method that can give us access to both consciousness and the brain.

As we can see, the argument is based on considerations that are much more principled than a simple pessimistic induction from
past theories. Dismayed as we may be by
the prospects of mysterianism, we must not
confuse McGinn’s position for sheer despair.
Instead, we must contend with the argument
just formulated.
Some materialists would contest the first
premise. Paul Churchland (1985) has repeat-
edly argued that we will one day be able
to directly introspect the neurophysiolog-
ical states of our brains. Perception and
introspection are theory-laden, according to
Churchland, and can therefore be funda-
mentally changed when the theory they are
laden with is changed. Currently, our intro-
spective practice is laden with a broadly
Cartesian theory of mind. But when we
mature enough scientifically, and when the
right neuroscientific theory of consciousness
makes its way to our classroom and living
room, this will change and we (or rather
our distant offspring) will start thinking
about ourselves in purely neurophysiological
categories.
Other materialists may deny the second
premise of the argument. As long as brain
states are considered to be merely correlates
of conscious states, the claim that the con-
scious states cannot be perceived extrospec-
tively is plausible. But according to material-
ists, conscious states will turn out to be identi-
tical with the brain states in question, rather
than merely correlated therewith. If so, per-
ceiving those brain states would just be per-
ceiving the conscious states. To assume that
we cannot perceive the conscious states is to
beg the question against the materialist.

The Case Against Mysterianism
To repeat the last point, McGinn appears
to assume that conscious states are caused
by brain states. His argument does not go
through if conscious states are simply identi-
tical to brain states. In other words, the
argument does not go through unless any
identity of conscious states with brain states
is rejected. But such rejection amounts
to dualism. McGinn is thus committed to
dualism. On the view he presupposes, the
conscious cannot be simply identified with
the physical. Rather, there are two different
kinds of states a person or organism may be
in: brain states on the one hand and con-
scious states on the other.
Recall that McGinn’s mysterianism is of
the epistemological variety. The epistemo-
logical claim now appears to be conditional
upon an ontological claim, namely dualism.
So at the end of the day, as far as the ontology
of consciousness is concerned, McGinn is a
straightforward dualist. The plausibility of
his (epistemological) mysterianism depends,
to that extent, on the plausibility of (onto-
logical) dualism. In the next section, we con-
sider the plausibility of dualism.
Before doing so, let us raise one more diffi-
culty for mysterianism, and in particular the
notion of cognitive closure. It is, of course,
deniable that rats do not understand trigo-
metric problems. But observe that trigonomet-
ic problems do not pose themselves to rats
(Dennett, 1995, pp. 381–383). Indeed, it is
precisely because rats do not understand
trigonometry that trigonometric problems
do not pose themselves to rats. For rats to
grapple with trigonometric problems, they
would have to understand quite a bit of
trigonometry. Arguably, it is a mark of gen-
uine cognitive closure that certain questions
do not even pose themselves to the cogni-
tively closed. The fact that certain questions
about consciousness do pose themselves to
humans may therefore indicate that humans
are not cognitively closed to consciousness
(or more accurately to the link between con-
sciousness and the brain).

Dualism
Traditionally, approaches to the ontology of
mind and consciousness have been divided
into two main groups: monism and dual-
ism. The former holds that there is one kind
of stuff in the world; the latter that there
are two. Within monism, there is a further
distinction between views that construe the
single existing stuff as material and views
that construe it as immaterial; the former
are materialist views, the latter idealist.
Descartes framed his dualism in terms of
two different kinds of substance (where a
substance is something that can in principle exist all by itself). One is the extended substance, or matter; the other is the thinking substance, or mind. A person, on this view, is a combination of two different objects: a body and a soul. A body and its corresponding soul “go together” for some stretch of time, but being two separate objects, their existence is independent and can therefore come apart.17

Modern dualism is usually of a more subtle sort, framed not in terms of substances (or stuffs), but rather in terms of properties. The idea is that even though there is only one kind of stuff or substance, there are two kinds of properties, mental and physical, and neither can be reduced to the other.18 This is known as property dualism. A particularly cautious version of property dualism claims that although most mental properties are reducible to physical ones, conscious or phenomenal properties are irreducible.

Chalmers’ Naturalistic Dualism

For many decades, dualistic arguments were treated mainly as a challenge to a physicalist worldview, not so much as a basis for a non-physicalist alternative. Thus dualism was not so much an explanation or account of consciousness, but rather the avoidance of one. This state of affairs has been rectified in the past decade or so, mainly through the work of David Chalmers (1995, 1996, 2002a). Chalmers’ theory of consciousness, which he calls naturalistic dualism, is stronger than ordinary dualism, in that it claims not only that phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties, but also that they fail to supervene – at least with metaphysical or logical necessity19 – on physical properties.20 We tend to think, for instance, that biological properties necessarily supervene on physical properties, in the sense that two systems cannot possibly differ in their biological properties if all their physical properties are exactly similar. But according to Chalmers, phenomenal properties are different: two systems can be exactly the same physically, but have different phenomenal properties.

At the same time, Chalmers does not take phenomenal properties to be accidental or random superpositions onto the physical world. On the contrary, he takes them to be causally grounded in physical laws. That is, instantiations of phenomenal properties are caused by instantiations of physical properties, and they are so caused in accordance with strict laws of nature.21

This means that phenomenal consciousness can be explained in physical terms. It is just that the explanation will not be a reductive explanation, but rather a causal explanation. To explain an event or phenomenon causally is to cite its cause, that is, to say what brought it about or gave rise to it.22 According to Chalmers, one could in principle explain the instantiation of phenomenal properties by citing their physical causes.

A full theory of consciousness would uncover and list all the causal laws that govern the emergence of phenomenal properties from the physical realm. And a full description of nature and its behavior would have to include these causal laws on top of the causal laws obtained by “ultimate physics.”23 Chalmers himself does not attempt to detail many of these laws. But he does propose a pair of principles to which we should expect such laws to conform. These are the “structural coherence” principle and the “organizational invariance” principle. The former concerns the sort of direct availability for global control that conscious states appear to exhibit, the latter the systematic correspondence between a system’s functional organization and its phenomenal properties.24

The Case for Dualism

The best-known arguments in favor of property dualism about consciousness are so-called epistemic arguments. The two main ones are Frank Jackson’s (1984) “Knowledge Argument” and Thomas Nagel’s (1974) “what is it like” argument. Both follow a similar pattern. After describing a situation in which all physical facts about something are known, it is shown that some knowledge is
still missing. It is then inferred that the missing knowledge must be knowledge of non-physical facts.

The Knowledge Argument proceeds as follows. Suppose a baby is kept in a black-and-white environment, so that she never has color experiences. But she grows to become an expert on color and color vision. Eventually, she knows all the physical facts about color and color vision. But when she sees red for the first time, she learns something new: she learns what it is like to see red. That is, she acquires a new piece of knowledge. Since she already knew all the physical facts, this new piece of knowledge cannot be knowledge of a physical fact. It is therefore knowledge of a non-physical fact. So, the fact thereby known (what it is like to see red) is a non-physical fact.

Nagel’s argument, although more obscure in its original presentation, can be “formatted” along similar lines. We can know all the physical facts about bats without knowing what it is like to be a bat. It follows that the knowledge we are missing is not knowledge of a physical fact. Therefore, what it is like to be a bat is not a physical fact.

These arguments have struck many materialists as suspicious. After all, they infer an ontological conclusion from epistemological premises. This move is generally suspicious, but it is also vulnerable to a response that emphasizes what philosophers call the intensionality of epistemic contexts. This has been the main response among materialists (Loar, 1990; Tye, 1986). The claim is that the Knowledge Argument’s protagonist does not learn a new fact when she learns what it is like to see red, but rather learns an old fact in a new way; and similarly for the bat student.

Consider knowledge that the evening star glows and knowledge that the morning star glows. These are clearly two different pieces of knowledge. But the fact thereby known is one and the same – the fact that Venus glows. Knowledge that this is what it is like to see red and knowledge that this is the neural assembly stimulated by the right wavelength may similarly constitute two separate pieces of knowledge that correspond to only one fact being known. So from the acquisition of a new piece of knowledge one cannot infer the existence of a new fact – and that is precisely the inference made in the above dualist arguments.

A different argument for dualism that is widely discussed today is Chalmers’ (1996) argument from the conceivability of zombies. Zombies are imaginary creatures that are physically indistinguishable from us but lack consciousness. We seem to be able to conceive of such creatures, and Chalmers wants to infer from this that materialism is false. The argument is often caricatured as follows:

1) Zombies are conceivable;
2) If As are conceivable, then As are (metaphysically) possible; therefore,
3) Zombies are possible; but,
4) Materialism entails that zombies are not possible; therefore,
5) Materialism is false.

Or, more explicitly formulated:

1) For any physical property P, it is conceivable that P is instantiated but consciousness is not;
2) For any pair of properties F and G, if it is conceivable that F is instantiated when G is not, then it is (metaphysically) possible that F is instantiated when G is not; therefore,
3) For any physical property P, it is possible that P is instantiated and consciousness is not; but,
4) If a property F can be instantiated when property G is not, then F does not supervene on G; therefore,
5) For any physical property P, consciousness does not supervene on P.

To this argument it is objected that the second premise is false, and the conceivability of something does not entail its possibility. Thus, we can conceive of water not being H₂O, but this is in fact impossible; Escher triangles are conceivable, but not possible.

The zombie argument is more subtle than this, however. One way to get at the real argument is this. Let us distinguish between the property of being water and
the property of appearing to be water, or being apparent water.\textsuperscript{33} For a certain quantity of stuff to be water, it must be H\textsubscript{2}O. But for it to appear to be water, it need only be clear, drinkable, liquid, and so on – or perhaps only strike normal subjects as clear, drinkable, liquid, etc. Now, although the unrestricted principle that conceivability entails possibility is implausible, a version of the principle restricted to what we may call appearance properties is quite plausible. Thus, if we can conceive of apparent water not being H\textsubscript{2}O, then it is indeed possible that apparent water should not be H\textsubscript{2}O.

Once the restricted principle is accepted, there are two ways a dualist may proceed. The zombie argument seems to be captured more accurately as follows:\textsuperscript{34}

1) For any physical property P, it is conceivable that P is instantiated but apparent consciousness is not;

2) For any pair of properties F and G, such that F is an appearance property, if it is conceivable that F is instantiated when G is not, then it is (metaphysically) possible that F is instantiated when G is not; therefore,

3) For any physical property P, it is possible that P is instantiated when apparent consciousness is not; but,

4) If a property F can be instantiated when property G is not, then F does not (metaphysically) supervene on G; therefore,

5) For any physical property P, apparent consciousness does not (metaphysically) supervene on P.

A materialist might want to reject this argument by denying Premise 2 (the restricted conceivability-possibility principle). Whether the restricted principle is true is something we cannot settle here. Note, however, that it is surely much more plausible than the corresponding unrestricted principle, and it is the only principle that the argument for dualism really needs.

Another way the argument could be rejected is by denying the existence of such properties as apparent water and apparent consciousness.\textsuperscript{35} More generally, perhaps, while “natural” properties such as being water or being conscious do exist, “unnatural” properties do not, and appearance properties are unnatural in the relevant sense.\textsuperscript{36}

To avoid this latter objection, a dualist may proceed to develop the argument differently, claiming that in the case of consciousness, there is no distinction between appearance and reality (Kripke, 1980). This would amount to the claim that the property of being conscious is identical to the property of appearing to be conscious. The conceivability argument then goes like this:

1) For any physical property P, it is conceivable that P is instantiated but apparent consciousness is not;

2) For any pair of properties F and G, such that F is an appearance property, if it is conceivable that F is instantiated when G is not, then it is (metaphysically) possible that F is instantiated when G is not; therefore,

3) For any physical property P, it is possible that P is instantiated when apparent consciousness is not; but,

4) If property F can be instantiated when property G is not, then F does not supervene on G; therefore,

5) For any physical property P, apparent consciousness does not supervene on P; but,

6) Consciousness = apparent consciousness; therefore,

7) For any physical property P, consciousness does not supervene on P.

Materialists may reject this argument by denying that there is no distinction between appearance and reality when it comes to consciousness (the sixth premise).

The debate over the plausibility of the various versions of the zombie argument continues. A full critical examination is impossible here. Let us move on, then, to consideration of the independent case against dualism.

\textbf{The Case against Dualism}

The main motivation to avoid dualism continues to be the one succinctly worded by Smart (1959, p. 143) almost a half-century ago: “It seems to me that science is
increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physico-chemical mechanisms: it seems that even the behavior of man himself will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms.” It would be curious if consciousness stood out in nature as the only property that defied reductive explanation in microphysical terms. More principled arguments aside, this simple observation seems to be the chief motivating force behind naturalization projects that attempt to reductively explain consciousness and other recalcitrant phenomena.

As I noted above, against traditional dualists it was common to present the more methodological argument that they do not in fact propose any positive theory of consciousness, but instead rest content with arguing against existing materialist theories, and that this could not lead to real progress in the understanding of consciousness. Yet, this charge cannot be made against Chalmers, who does propose a positive theory of consciousness.

Chalmers’ own theory is open to more substantial criticisms, however. In particular, it is arguably committed to epiphenomenalism about consciousness, the thesis that conscious states and events are causally inert. As Kim (1989a,b, 1992) has pointed out, it is difficult to find causal work for non-supervenient properties. Assuming that the physical realm is causally closed (i.e., that every instantiation of a physical property has as its cause the instantiation of another physical property), non-supervenient properties must either (i) have no causal effect on the physical realm or (ii) causally overdetermine the instantiation of certain physical properties. But because pervasive overdetermination can be ruled out as implausible, non-supervenient properties must be causally inert vis-à-vis the physical world. However, the notion that consciousness is causally inert, or epiphenomenal, is extremely counter-intuitive: we seem to ourselves to act on our conscious decisions all the time and at will.

In response to the threat of epiphenomenalism, Chalmers pursues a two-pronged approach. The first prong is to claim that epiphenomenalism is merely counter-intuitive, but does not face serious argumentative challenges. This is not particularly satisfying, however: all arguments must come to an end, and in most of philosophy, the end is bound to be a certain intuition or intuitively compelling claim. As intuitions go, the intuition that consciousness is not epiphenomenal is very strong.

The second prong is more interesting. Chalmers notes that physics characterizes the properties to which it adverts in purely relational terms – essentially, in terms of the laws of nature into which they enter. The resulting picture is a network of interrelated nodes, but the intrinsic character of the thus interrelated nodes remains opaque. It is a picture that gives us what Bertrand Russell once wittily called “the causal skeleton of the world.” Chalmers’ suggestion is that phenomenal properties may constitute the intrinsic properties of the entities whose relational properties are mapped out by physics. At least this is the case with intrinsic properties of obviously conscious entities. As for apparently inanimate entities, their intrinsic properties may be crucially similar to the phenomenal properties of conscious entities. They may be, as Chalmers puts it, “protophenomenal” properties.

Although intriguing, this suggestion has its problems. It is not clear that physics indeed gives us only the causal skeleton of the world. It is true that physics characterizes mass in terms of its causal relations to other properties. But it does not follow that the property thus characterized is nothing but a bundle of causal relations. More likely, the relational characterization of mass is what fixes the reference of the term “mass,” but the referent itself is nonetheless an intrinsic property. The bundle of causal relations is the reference-fixer, not the referent. On this view of things, although physics characterizes mass in causal terms, it construes mass not as the causing of effects E, but rather as the causer (or just the cause) of E. It construes mass as the relatum, not the relation.

Furthermore, if physics did present us with the causal skeleton of the world, then physical properties would turn out to be
epipheminal (or nearly so). As Block (1990b) argued, functional properties – properties of having certain causes and effects – are ultimately inert, because an effect is always caused by its cause, not by its causing. So if mass was the causing of E, rather than the cause of E, then E would not be caused by mass. It would be caused, rather, by the protophenomenal property that satisfies the relational characterization attached to mass in physics. The upshot is that if mass was the causing of E, rather than the cause of E, mass would not have the causal powers we normally take it to have. More generally, if physical properties were nothing but bundles of causal relations, they would be themselves causally inert.

Chalmers faces a dilemma, then: either he violates our strongly held intuitions regarding the causal efficacy of phenomenal properties, or he violates our strongly held intuitions regarding the causal efficacy of physical properties. Either way, half his world is epiphenomenal, as it were. In any event, as we saw above, the claim that physical properties are merely bundles of causal relations – which therefore call for the postulation of phenomenal and protophenomenal properties as the putative causal relata – is implausible.

Problems concerning the causal efficacy of phenomenal properties will attach to any account that portrays them as non-supervenient upon, or even as non-reducible to, physical properties. These problems are less likely to rear their heads for reductive accounts of consciousness. Let us turn, then, to an examination of the main reductive accounts discussed in the current literature.

Representationalism

According to the representational theory of consciousness – or for short, representationalism – the phenomenal properties of conscious experiences can be reductively explained in terms of the experiences’ representational properties. Thus, when I look up at the blue sky, what it is like for me to have my conscious experience of the sky is just a matter of my experience’s representation of the blue sky. The phenomenal character of my experience can be identified with (an aspect of) its representational content.

This would be a theoretically happy result, since we have a fairly good notion as to how mental representation may be itself reductively explained in terms of informational and/or teleological relations between neurophysiological states of the brain and physical states of the environment. The reductive strategy here is two-stepped, then: first reduce phenomenal properties to representational properties, then reduce representational properties to informational and/or other physical properties of the brain.

Tye’s PANIC Theory

Not every mental representation is conscious. For this reason, a representational account of consciousness must pin down more specifically the kind of representation that would make a mental state conscious. The most worked-out story in this genre is probably Michael Tye’s (1992, 1995, 2000, 2002) “PANIC Theory.”

The acronym “PANIC” stands for Poised, Abstract, Non-conceptual, Intentional Content. So for Tye, a mental representation qualifies as conscious when, and only when, its representational content is (a) intentional, (b) non-conceptual, (c) abstract, and (d) poised. What all these qualifiers mean is not particularly important, though the properties of non-conceptuality and poise are worth pausing to explicate.

The content of a conscious experience is non-conceptual in that the experience can represent properties for which the subject lacks the concept. My conscious experience of the sky represents the sky not simply as being blue, but as being a very specific shade of blue. And yet if I am presented a day later with two samples of very similar shades of blue, blue and blue, I will be unable to recognize which shade of blue was the sky’s. This suggests that I lack the concept of blue. If so, my experience’s representation of blue is non-conceptual.
The property of poise is basically a functional role property: a content is poised when it is ready and available to make a direct impact on the formation of beliefs and desires. Importantly, Tye takes this to distinguish conscious representation from, say, blindsighted representations. A square can be represented both consciously and blindsightedly. But only the conscious representation is poised to make a direct impact on the beliefs that the subject subsequently forms.

PANIC theory is supposed to cover not only conscious perceptual experiences but also all manners of phenomenal experience: somatic, emotional, and so on. Thus, a toothache experience represents tissue damage in the relevant tooth, and does so intentionally, non-conceptually, abstractly, and with poise.47

The Master Argument for Representationalism

The main motivation for representationalism may seem purely theoretical: it holds the promise of a reductive explanation of consciousness in well-understood informational and/or teleological terms. Perhaps because of this, however, the argument that has been most influential in making representationalism popular is a non-theoretical argument, one that basically rests on a phenomenological observation. This is the observation of the so-called transparency of experience. It has been articulated in a particularly influential manner by Harman (1990), but goes back at least to Moore (1903).

Suppose you have a conscious experience of the blue sky. Your attention is focused on the sky. You then decide to turn your attention away from the sky and onto your experience of the sky. Now your attention is no longer focused on the sky, but rather on the experience thereof. What are you aware of? It seems that you are still aware of the blueness of the sky. Certainly you are not aware of some second blueness, which attaches to your experience rather than to the sky. You are not aware of any intermediary blue quality interposed between yourself and the sky.

It appears, then, that when you pay attention to your experience, the only thing you become aware of is which features of the external sky your experience represents. In other words, the only introspectively accessible properties of conscious experience are its representational properties.

The transparency of experience provides a straightforward argument for representationalism. The argument may be laid out as follows:

1) The only introspectively accessible properties of conscious experience are its representational properties;
2) The phenomenal character of conscious experience is given by its introspectively accessible properties; therefore,
3) The phenomenal character of conscious experience is given by its representational properties.

The first premise is the thesis of transparency; the second one is intended as a conceptual truth (about what we mean by “phenomenal”). The conclusion is representationalism.

Another version of the argument from transparency, one that Tye employs, centers on the idea that rejecting representationalism in the face of transparency would require one to commit to an “error theory.”48 This version may be formulated as follows:

1) The phenomenal properties of conscious experience seem to be representational properties;
2) It is unlikely that the phenomenal properties of conscious experience are radically different from what they seem to be; therefore,
3) It is likely that the phenomenal properties of conscious experience are representational properties.

Here the transparency thesis is again the first premise. The second premise is the claim that convicting experience of massive error is to be avoided. And the conclusion is representationalism.
The Case against Representationalism

Most of the arguments that have been marshaled against representationalism are arguments by counter-example. Scenarios of varying degrees of fancifulness are adduced, in which allegedly (i) a conscious experience has no representational properties, or (ii) two possible experiences with different phenomenal properties have the same representational properties, or (iii) inversely, two possible experiences with the same phenomenal properties have different representational properties. For want of space, I present only one representative scenario from each category.

Block (1996) argues that phosphene experiences are non-representational. These can be obtained by rubbing one’s eyes long enough so that when one opens them again, one “sees” various light bits floating about. Such experiences do not represent any external objects or features, according to Block. In response, Tye (2000) claims that such experiences do represent – it is just that they misrepresent. They misrepresent there to be small objects with phosphorescent surfaces floating around the subject’s head.

A long-debated case in which phenomenal difference is accompanied by representational sameness is due to Peacocke (1983). Suppose you stand in the middle of a mostly empty road. All you can see in front of you are two trees. The two trees, A and B, have the same size and shape, but A is twice as far from you as B. Peacocke claims that, being aware that the two trees are the same size, you represent to yourself that they have the same properties. And yet B "takes up more of your visual field" than A, in a way that makes you experience the two trees differently. There is phenomenal difference without representational difference.

Various responses to this argument have been offered by representationalists. Perhaps the most popular is that although you represent the two trees to have the same size properties, you also represent them to have certain different properties – for example, B is represented to subtend a larger visual angle than A (DeBellis, 1991; Harman, 1990; Tye, 2000). To be sure, you do not necessarily possess the concept of subtending a visual angle. But recall that the content of experience can be construed as non-conceptual. So your experience can represent the two trees to subtend different visual angles without employing the concept of subtending a visual angle. Thus a representational difference is matched to the phenomenal difference.

Perhaps the most prominent alleged counter-example is Block’s (1990a) Inverted Earth case. Inverted Earth is an imaginary planet just like Earth, except that every object there has the color complementary to the one it has here. We are to imagine that a subject is clothed with color-inverting lenses and shipped to Inverted Earth unbeknownst to her. The color inversions due to the lenses and to the world cancel each other out, so that her phenomenal experiences remain the same. But externalism about representational contents ensures that the representational content of her experiences eventually change. Her bluish experiences now represent a yellow sky. When her sky experiences on Inverted Earth are compared to her earthly sky experience, it appears that the two groups are phenomenally the same but representationally different.

This case is still being debated in the literature, but there are two representationalist strategies for accommodating it. One is to argue that the phenomenal character also changes over time on Inverted Earth (Harman, 1990); the other is to devise accounts of representational content that make the representational content of the subject’s experiences remain the same on Inverted Earth, externalism notwithstanding (Tye, 2000).

There may be, however, a more principled difficulty for representationalism than the myriad counter-examples it faces. Representationalism seems to construe the phenomenal character of conscious experiences purely in terms of the sensuous qualities they involve. But arguably there is more to phenomenal character than sensuous quality. In particular, there seems to be a certain mine-ness, or for-me-ness, to them.
One way to put it is as follows (Kriegel, 2005a; Levine, 2001; Smith, 1986). When I have my conscious experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have my experience. A distinction can be drawn between two components of this "bluish way it is like for me": the bluish component, which we may call qualitative character, and the for-me component, which we may call subjective character. We may construe phenomenal character as the composition of qualitative and subjective character. This subjective character, or for-me-ness, is certainly an elusive phenomenon, but it is present in every conscious experience. Indeed, its presence seems to be a condition of any phenomenality: it is hard to make sense of the idea of a conscious experience that does not have this for-me-ness to it. If it did not have this for-me-ness, it would be a mere subpersonal state, a state that takes place in me but is not for me in the relevant sense. Such a subpersonal state seems not to qualify as a conscious experience.

The centrality of subjective character (as construed here) to consciousness is something that has been belabored in the phenomenological tradition (see Chapter 4; Zahavi, 1999). The concept of prereflective self-consciousness – or a form of self-awareness that does not require focused and explicit awareness of oneself and one's current experience, but is rather built into that very experience – is one that figures centrally in almost all phenomenological accounts of consciousness. But it has been somewhat neglected in analytic philosophy of mind.

The relative popularity of representationalism attests to this neglect. While a representationalist account of sensuous qualities – what we have called qualitative character – may turn out to win the day (if the alleged counter-examples can be overcome), it would not provide us with any perspective on subjective character. Therefore, even if representationalism turns out to be a satisfactory account of qualitative character, it is unlikely to be a satisfactory account of phenomenal consciousness proper.

Higher-Order Monitoring Theory

One theory of consciousness from analytic philosophy that can be interpreted as targeting subjective character is the higher-order monitoring theory (HOMT). According to HOMT, what makes a mental state conscious is the fact that the subject is aware of it in the right way. It is only when the subject is aware (in that way) of a mental state that the state becomes conscious.55

HOMT tends to anchor consciousness in the operation of a monitoring device. This device monitors and scans internal states and events and produces higher-order representations of some of them.56 When a mental state is represented by such a higher-order representation, it is conscious. So a mental state M of a subject S is conscious when, and only when, S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. The fact that M* represents M guarantees that there is something it is like for S to have M.57

Observe that, on this view, what confers conscious status on M is something outside M, namely, M*. This is HOMT’s reductive strategy. Neither M nor M* is conscious in and of itself, independently of the other state. It is their coming together in the right way that yields consciousness.58

Versions of the HOMT differ mainly in how they construe the monitoring device and/or the representations it produces. The most seriously worked out version is probably David Rosenthal’s (1986, 1990, 2002a, b). Let us take a closer look at his “higher-order thought” theory.

Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought Theory

According to Rosenthal, a mental state is conscious when its subject has a suitable higher-order thought about it.59 The higher-order state’s being a thought is supposed to rule out, primarily, its being a quasi-perceptual state.

There is a long tradition, hailing from Locke, of construing the monitoring device as analogous in essential respects to a sense
organ (hence as being a sort of “inner sense”) and accordingly as producing mental states that are crucially similar to perceptual representations and that may to that extent be called “quasi-perceptual.” This sort of “higher-order perception theory” is championed today by Armstrong (1968, 1981) and Lycan (1987, 1996). Rosenthal believes that this is a mistake and that the higher-order states that confer consciousness are not analogous to perceptual representations. Rather, they are intellectual, or cognitive, states – that is, thoughts.

Another characteristic of thoughts – in addition to being non-perceptual – is their being assertoric. An assertoric state is one that has a thetic, or mind-to-world, direction of fit. This is to be contrasted with states (such as wanting, hoping, disapproving, etc.) that have primarily a telic, or world-to-mind, direction of fit. A third characteristic of thoughts – at least the kind suitable for confering consciousness – is that they are occurrent mental states.

Crucially, a suitable higher-order thought would also have to be non-inferential, in that it could not be the result of a conscious inference from the lower-order state (or from any other state, for that matter). To be sure, the thought is formed through some process of information processing, but that process must be automatic and unconscious. This is intended to reflect the immediacy, or at least felt immediacy, of our awareness of our conscious states. The fact that my experience of the sky has for-me-ness entails that I am somehow aware of its occurrence; but not any sort of awareness would do – very mediated forms of awareness cannot confer conscious status on their objects.

One last characteristic Rosenthal ascribes to the “suitable” higher-order representation is that it represents the lower-order state as a state of oneself. Its content must be, as this is sometimes put, de se content. So the content of the higher-order representation of my conscious experience of the sky is not simply something like “this bluish experience is occurring,” but rather something like “I myself am having this bluish experience.”

It is worth noting that according to Rosenthal the second-order representation is normally an unconscious state. To be sure, it need not necessarily be: in the more introspective, or reflective, episodes of our conscious life, the second-order state becomes itself conscious. It is then accompanied by a third-order state, one that represents its occurrence in a suitable way. When I explicitly introspect and dwell on my conscious experience of the sky, there are three separate states I am in: the (first-order) experience, a (second-order) awareness of the experience, and a (third-order) representation of that awareness. When I stop introspecting and turn my attention back to the sky, however, the third-order state evaporates, and consequently the second-order state becomes unconscious again. In any event, at any one time the subject’s highest-order state, the one that confers consciousness on the chain of lower-order states “below” it, is unconscious.

In summary, Rosenthal’s central thesis is that a mental state is conscious just in case the subject has a non-perceptual, non-inferential, assertoric, de se, occurrent representation of it. This account of consciousness is not intended as an account of introspective or reflective consciousness, but of regular, everyday consciousness.

**The Master Argument for Higher-Order Monitoring Theory**

The master argument for the higher-order monitoring approach to consciousness has been succinctly stated by Lycan (2001):

1) A mental state M of subject S is conscious when, and only when, S is aware of M in the appropriate way;
2) Awareness of X requires mental representation of X; therefore,
3) M is conscious when, and only when, S has a mental state M*, such that M* represents M in the appropriate way.

Although the second premise is by no means trivial, it is the first premise that has been the bone of contention in the philosophical literature (see, e.g., Dretske, 1993).
One can defend the claim that conscious states are states we are aware of having simply as a piece of conceptual analysis – as a platitude reflecting the very meaning of the word "conscious" (Lycan, 1996). To my ear, this sounds right: a mental state of which the subject is completely unaware is a subpersonal, and therefore unconscious, state.

To some, however, this seems plainly false. When I have an experience of the sky, I am attending to the sky, they stress, not to myself and my internal goings-on. By consequence, I am aware of the sky, not of my experience of the sky. I am aware through my experience, not of my experience.

This objection seems to rely, however, on an unwarranted assimilation of awareness and attention. There is a distinction to be made between attentive awareness and inattentive awareness. If S attends to X and not to Y, it follows that S is not attentively aware of Y, but it does not follow that S is completely unaware of Y. For S may still be inattentively aware of Y.

Consider straightforward visual awareness. The distinction between foveal vision and peripheral vision means that our visual awareness at any one time has a periphery as well as a focal center. Right now, I am (visually) focally aware of my laptop, but also (visually) peripherally aware of an ashtray at the far corner of my desk. A similar distinction applies to perceptual awareness in other modalities: I am now (auditorily) focally aware of Duke Ellington's voice and (auditorily) peripherally aware of the air conditioner's hum overhead.

There is no reason to think that a similar distinction would not apply to higher-order awareness. In reflective moods I may be focally aware of my concurrent experiences and feelings, but on other occasions I am just peripherally aware of them. The former is an attentive form of second-order awareness, the latter an inattentive one. Again, from the fact that it is inattentive it would be fallacious to infer that it is no awareness at all.

When it is claimed that conscious states are states we are aware of, the claim is not that we are focally aware of every conscious state we are in. That is manifestly false: the focus of our attention is mostly on the outside world. The claim is rather that we are at least peripherally aware of every conscious state we are in. As long as M is conscious, S is aware, however dimly and inattentively, of M. Once S's awareness of M is extinguished altogether, M drops into the realm of the unconscious. This seems highly plausible on both conceptual and phenomenological grounds.

**The Case against Higher-Order Monitoring Theory**

Several problems for the monitoring theory have been continuously debated in the philosophical literature. I focus here on what I take to be the main three.

The first is the problem of animal and infant consciousness. It is intuitively plausible to suppose that cats, dogs, and human neonates are conscious, that is, they have conscious states; but it appears empirically implausible that they should have second-order representations (Lurz, 1999). The problem is particularly acute for Rosenthal's account, since it is unlikely that these creatures can have thoughts, and moreover of the complex form, "I myself am enjoying this milk."

There are two ways to respond to this objection. One is to deny that having such higher-order representations requires a level of sophistication of an order unlikely to be found in (say) cats. Thus, Rosenthal (2002b) claims that whereas adult human higher-order thoughts tend to be conceptually structured and employ a rich concept of self, these are not necessary features of such thoughts. There could be higher-order thoughts that are conceptually simple and employ a rudimentary concept of self, one that consists merely in the ability to distinguish oneself from anything that is not oneself. It may well turn out that worms, woodpeckers, or even day-old humans lack even this level of conceptual sophistication – in which case we would be required to deny them consciousness – but it is unlikely that cats, dogs, and year-old humans lack them.

The second possible line of response is to dismiss the intuition that animals, such as cats, dogs, and even monkeys, do in
fact have conscious states. Thus, Carruthers (1998, 1999) claims that there is a significant amount of projection that takes place when we ascribe conscious states to, say, our pets. In reality there is very little evidence to suggest that they have not only perceptual and cognitive states but also conscious ones.

Both lines of response offer some hope to the defender of higher-order monitoring, but also implicate the theory in certain counter-intuitive and prima facie implausible claims. Whether these could somehow be neutralized, or accepted as outweighed by the theoretical benefits of HOMT, is something that is very much under debate.

Perhaps more disturbing is the problem of so-called targetless higher-order thoughts (or more generally, representations). When someone falsely believes that the almond tree in the backyard is blooming again, there are two ways he or she may get things wrong: (i) it may be that the backyard almond tree is not blooming, or (ii) it may be that there is no almond tree in the backyard (blooming or not). Let us call a false belief of type (ii) a targetless thought. HOMT gets into trouble when a subject has a targetless higher-order thought (Byrne, 1997). Suppose at a time t subject S thinks (in the suitable way) that she has a throbbing toothache, when in reality she has no toothache at all (throbbing or not). According to HOMT, what it is like for S at t is the way it is like to have a throbbing toothache, even though S has no toothache at t. In other words, if S has an M∗ that represents M when in reality there is no M, S will be under the impression that she is in a conscious state when in reality she is not. (She is not in a conscious state because M does not exist, and it is M that is supposed to bear the property of being conscious.) Moreover, on the assumption that a person is conscious at a time t only if she has at least one conscious state at t, this would entail that when a subject harbors a targetless higher-order misrepresentation, she is not conscious, even though it feels to her as though she is. This is a highly counter-intuitive consequence: we want to say that a person cannot be under the impression that she is conscious when she is not.

There are several ways higher-order monitoring theorists may respond to this objection. Let us briefly consider three possible responses.

First, they may claim that when M∗ is targetless, the property of being conscious, although not instantiated by M, is instantiated by M∗. But as we saw above, according to their view, M∗ is normally unconscious. So to say that M∗ instantiates the property of being conscious would be to say that it is, in the normal case, both conscious and not conscious – which is incoherent.

Second, they may claim that the property of being conscious is, in reality, not a property of the discrete state M, but rather attaches itself to the compound of M and M∗. But this will not work either, because HOMT would then face the following dilemma. Either the compound state M + M∗ is a state we are aware of having, or it is not. If it is not, then HOMT is false, since it claims that conscious states are states we are aware of having. If it is, then according to the theory it must be represented by a third-order mental state, M∗∗, in which case the same problem would recur when M∗∗ is targetless.

Third, they may claim that there are no targetless higher-order representations. But even if this can be shown to be the actual case (and it is hard to imagine how this would be done), we can surely conceive of counterfactual situations in which targetless higher-order representations do occur.

A third problem for the HOMT is its treatment of the epistemology of consciousness (Goldman, 1993b; Kriegel, 2003b). Our knowledge that we are in a conscious state is first-person knowledge, knowledge that is not based on inference from experimental, or theoretical, or third-personal evidence. But if HOMT were correct, what would make our conscious states conscious is (normally) the occurrence of some unconscious state (i.e., the higher-order representation), so in order to know that we are in a conscious state we would need to know of the occurrence of that unconscious state. But knowledge of unconscious states is necessarily theoretical and third-personal, since we have
no direct acquaintance with our unconscious states.

Another way to put the argument is this. How does the defender of HOMT know that conscious states are states of which we are aware? It does not seem to be something she knows on the basis of experimentation and theorization. Rather, it seems to be intuitively compelling, something that she knows on the basis of first-person acquaintance with her conscious states. But if HOMT were correct, it would seem that that knowledge would have to be purely theoretical and third-personal. So construed, this "epistemic argument" against HOMT may be formulated as follows:

1) If HOMT were correct, our awareness of our conscious states would normally be an unconscious state; that is,
2) We do not have non-theoretical, first-person knowledge of our unconscious states; therefore,
3) If HOMT were correct, we would not have non-theoretical, first-person knowledge of the fact that we are aware of our conscious states; but,
4) We do have non-theoretical, first-person knowledge of the fact that we are aware of our conscious states; therefore,
5) HOMT is incorrect.

The upshot of the argument is that the awareness of our conscious states must in the normal case be itself a conscious state. This is something that HOMT cannot allow, however, since within its framework it would lead to infinite regress. The problem is to reconcile the claim that conscious states are states we are aware of having with the notion that we have non-theoretical knowledge of this fact.

The Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness

One approach to consciousness that has a venerable tradition behind it, but has only very recently regained a modest degree of popularity, is what we may call the "self-representational theory." According to this view, mental states are conscious when, and only when, they represent their own occurrence (in the right way). Thus, my conscious experience of the blue sky represents both the sky and itself – and it is in virtue of representing itself that it is a conscious experience.

Historically, the most thorough development and elucidation of the self-representational theory is Brentano's (1874). Through his work, the view has had a significant influence in the phenomenological tradition. But apart from a couple of exceptions – Lehrer (1996, 1997) and Smith (1986, 1989) come to mind – the view had enjoyed virtually no traction in Anglo-American philosophy. Recently, however, versions of the view, and close variations on it, have been defended by a number of philosophers.78

Rather than focus on any one particular account of consciousness along these lines, I now survey the central contributions to the understanding of consciousness in terms of self-representation.

Varieties of Self-Representational Theory

Brentano held that every conscious state is intentionally directed at two things. It is primarily directed at whatever object it is about, and it is secondarily directed at itself. My bluish sky experience is directed primarily at the sky and secondarily at itself. In more modern terminology, a conscious state has two representational contents: an other-directed (primary) content and a self-directed (secondary) content. Thus, if S consciously fears that \( p \), S's fear has two contents: the primary content is \( p \), the secondary content is itself, the fear that \( p \).

The distinction between primary intentionality and secondary intentionality is presumably intended to capture the difference (discussed above) between attentive or focal awareness and inattentive or peripheral awareness.79

Caston (2002) offers an interesting gloss on this idea in terms of the type/token distinction. For Caston, S's conscious fear that \( p \)
is a single *token* state that falls under two separate state *types*: the fear-that-*p* type and the awareness-of-fear-that-*p* type. The state has two contents, arguably, precisely in virtue of falling under two types.

Brook and Raymont (2006) stress that the self-representational content of the conscious state is not simply that the state occurs, but rather that it occurs *within oneself* – that it is one's own state. Just as Rosenthal construed the content of higher-order states as "I myself am having that state," so Brook and Raymont suggest that the full self-representational content of conscious states is something like "I myself am herewith having this very state."³⁸

For Brentano and his followers, the self-directed element in conscious states is an aspect of their intentionality, or content. In David Woodruff Smith's (1986, 2004) "modal account," by contrast, the self-directed element is construed not as an aspect of the representational content, but rather as an aspect of the representational attitude (or mode). When S consciously fears that *p*, it is not in virtue of figuring in its own secondary content that the fear is conscious. Indeed, S’s fear does not have a secondary content. Its only content is *p*. The "reflexive character" of the fear, as Smith puts it, is rather part of the *attitude* S takes toward *p*. Just as the attitudes toward *p* can vary from fear, hope, expectation, and so on, so they can vary between self-directed or "reflexive" fear and un-self-directed or "irreflexive" fear. S’s fear that *p* is conscious, on this view, because S takes the attitude of self-directed fear toward *p*.³¹,³²

One way in which the self-representational thesis can be relaxed to make a subtler claim is the following. Instead of claiming that a mental state *M* of a subject *S* is conscious just in case it represents itself, the thesis could be that *M* is conscious just in case *S* has an *M*∗ that is a representation of *M* and there is a *constitutive, non-contingent* relation between *M* and *M*∗.³³ One constitutive relation is of course identity. So one version of this view would be that *M* is conscious just in case *M* is identical with *M*∗ – this is how Hossack (2002) formulates his thesis – and this seems to amount to the claim that *M* is conscious just in case it represents itself (constitutes a representation of itself). But the point is that there are other, weaker constitutive relations that fall short of full identity.

One such relation is the part-whole relation. Accordingly, one version of the view, the one defended by Gennaro (1996, 2006), holds that *M*∗ is a *part of* *M*; another version, apparently put forth by Kobes (1995), holds that *M* is part of *M*∗; and yet another version, Van Gulick’s (2001, 2006), holds that *M* is conscious when it has two parts, one of which represents the other.

In Van Gulick’s "higher-order global states theory," S’s fear that *p* becomes conscious when the fear and S’s awareness of the fear are somehow integrated into a single, unified state. This new state supersedes its original components, though, in a way that makes it a genuine unity, rather than a sum of two parts, one of which happens to represent the other. The result is a state that, if it does not represent itself, does something very close to representing itself.³⁴

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**The Master Argument for the Self-Representational Theory**

The basic argument for the self-representational approach to consciousness is that it is the only way to accommodate the notion that conscious states are states we are aware of without falling into the pitfalls of HOMT.

The argument can be organized, then, as a disjunctive syllogism that starts from the master argument for HOMT, but then goes beyond it:

1) A mental state *M* of subject *S* is conscious when, and only when, *S* is aware of *M*;

2) Awareness of *X* requires mental representation of *X*; therefore,

3) *M* is conscious when, and only when, *S* has a mental state *M*∗, such that *M*∗ represents *M*.

4) Either *M*∗ = *M* or *M*∗ ≠ *M*;

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³¹ For Brentano and his followers, the self-directed element in conscious states is an aspect of their intentionality, or content. In David Woodruff Smith’s (1986, 2004) “modal account,” by contrast, the self-directed element is construed not as an aspect of the representational content, but rather as an aspect of the representational attitude (or mode). When S consciously fears that *p*, it is not in virtue of figuring in its own secondary content that the fear is conscious. Indeed, S’s fear does not have a secondary content. Its only content is *p*. The “reflexive character” of the fear, as Smith puts it, is rather part of the *attitude* S takes toward *p*. Just as the attitudes toward *p* can vary from fear, hope, expectation, and so on, so they can vary between self-directed or “reflexive” fear and un-self-directed or “irreflexive” fear. S’s fear that *p* is conscious, on this view, because S takes the attitude of self-directed fear toward *p*.³¹,³²

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³⁴ One such relation is the part-whole relation. Accordingly, one version of the view, the one defended by Gennaro (1996, 2006), holds that *M*∗ is a *part of* *M*; another version, apparently put forth by Kobes (1995), holds that *M* is part of *M*∗; and yet another version, Van Gulick’s (2001, 2006), holds that *M* is conscious when it has two parts, one of which represents the other.
5) There are good reasons to think that it is not the case that \( M^* \neq M \); therefore,

6) There are good reasons to think that it is the case that \( M^* = M \); therefore,

7) Plausibly, \( M \) is conscious when, and only when, \( M \) is self-representing.

The fourth premise could also be formulated as "either \( M^* \) and \( M \) do not entertain a constitutive, non-contingent relation, or they do," with appropriate modifications in Premises 5 and 6 to suit. The conclusion of the relevantly modified argument would then be the thesis that \( M \) is conscious when, and only when, \( S \) has a mental state \( M^* \), such that (i) \( M^* \) represents \( M \) and (ii) there is a constitutive, non-contingent relation between \( M \) and \( M^* \).

The fallacy in the master argument for HOMT is the supposition that if \( S \) is aware of \( M \), then \( S \) must be so aware in virtue of being in a mental state that is numerically different from \( M \). This supposition is brought to the fore and rejected in the argument just sketched.

The case for the fifth premise consists in all the reasons to be suspicious of HOMT, as elaborated in the previous section, although it must also be shown that the same problems do not bedevil the self-representational theory as well.

Consider first the epistemic argument. We noted that HOMT fails to account for the non-theoretical, first-person knowledge we have of the fact that we are aware of our conscious states. This is because it construes this awareness as (normally) an unconscious state. The self-representational theory, by contrast, construes this awareness as a conscious state, since it construes the awareness as the same state, or part of the state, of which one is thereby aware. So the self-representational theory, unlike HOMT, can provide for the right epistemology of consciousness.

Consider next the problem of targetless higher-order representations. Recall, the problem ensues from the fact that \( M^* \) could in principle misrepresent not only that \( M \) is \( F \) when in reality \( M \) is not \( F \), but also that \( M \) is \( F \) when in reality there is no \( M \). at all. The same problem does not arise for self-representing states, however: although \( M \) could in principle misrepresent itself to be \( F \) when in reality it is not \( F \), it could not possibly misrepresent itself to be \( F \) when in reality it does not exist at all. For if it did not exist it could not represent anything, itself included. Thus the problem of targetless higher-order representations has no bite against the self-representational theory.

These are already two major problems that affect gravely the plausibility of HOMT, but do not apply to the self-representational theory. They make a strong prima facie case for the fifth premise above. The fourth premise is a logical truism, and the first and second ones were defended above. So the argument appears to go through.

**Problems for the Self-Representational Theory**

One problem that does persist for the self-representational theory is the problem of animal consciousness. The ability to have self-representing states presumably requires all the conceptual sophistication that the ability to have higher-order monitoring states does (since the self-representational content of a conscious state is the same as the representational content that a higher-order state would have), and perhaps even greater sophistication.75

Another problem is the elucidation and viability of the notion of self-representation. What does it mean for a mental state to represent itself, and what sort of mechanism could subserve the production of self-representing states? There is something at least initially mysterious about the notion of a self-representing state that needs to be confronted.

In fact, one might worry that there are principled reasons why self-representation is incompatible with any known naturalist account of mental representation. These accounts construe mental representation as some sort of natural relation between brain states and world states. Natural relations, as opposed to conceptual or logical ones, are based on causality and causal processes. But
causality is an anti-reflexive relation, that is, a relation that nothing can bear to itself. Thus no state can bring about its own occurrence or give rise to itself. The argument can be formulated as follows:

1) Mental representation involves a causal relation between the representation and the represented;
2) The causal relation is anti-reflexive; therefore,
3) No mental state can cause itself; and therefore,
4) No mental state can represent itself.

The basic idea is that there is no naturalist account of mental representation that could allow for self-representing mental representations.

Even more fundamentally, one may worry whether the appeal to self-representation really explains consciousness. Perhaps self-representation is a necessary condition for consciousness, but why think it is also a sufficient condition? A sentence such as “this very sentence contains six words” is self-representing, but surely there is nothing it is like to be that sentence.86 One may respond to this last point that what is required for consciousness is intrinsic or original self-representation, not derivative self-representation.87 Sentences and linguistic expressions do not have any representational content in and of themselves, independently of being interpreted. But plausibly, mental states do.88 The same goes for self-representational content: sentences and linguistic expressions may be derivatively self-representing, but only mental states can be non-derivatively self-representing. A more accurate statement of the self-representation theory is therefore this: A mental state M of a subject S is conscious when, and only when, M is non-derivatively self-representing.

Still, self-representing zombies are readily conceivable. It is quite easy to imagine unconscious mental states in our own cognitive system – say, states formed early on in visual processing – that represent themselves without thereby being conscious.89 Furthermore, it is easy to imagine a creature with no conscious awareness whatsoever who harbors mental states that represent themselves. Thus Chalmers’ zombie argument can be run in a particularized version directed specifically against the self-representational theory.90

Conclusion: Directions for Future Research

Much of the philosophical discourse on consciousness is focused on the issue of reducibility. As we just saw, the zombie argument and other dualist arguments can be tailored to target any particular reductive account of consciousness. This debate holds great intrinsic importance, but it is important to see that progress toward a scientific explanation of consciousness can be made without attending to it.

All three reductive approaches to consciousness we considered – the representational, higher-order monitoring, and self-representational theories – can readily be refashioned as accounts not of consciousness itself, but of the emergence base (or causal basis) of consciousness. Instead of claiming that consciousness is (or is reducible to) physical structure P, the claim would be that consciousness emerges from (or is brought about by) P. To make progress toward the scientific explanation of consciousness, we should focus mainly on what the right physical structure is – what P is. Whether P is consciousness itself or only the emergence base of consciousness is something we can set aside for the purposes of scientific explanation. If it turns out that P is consciousness itself (as the reductivist holds), then we will have obtained a reductive explanation of consciousness; if it turns out that P is only the emergence base of consciousness (as the dualist holds), then we will have obtained a causal explanation of consciousness. But both kinds of explanation are bona fide scientific explanations.

In other words, philosophers could usefully reorganize their work on consciousness around a distinction between two separate issues or tasks. The first task is to
devise a positive account of the physical (or more broadly, natural) correlate of consciousness, without prejudging whether it will constitute a reduction base or merely an emergence base. Work along these lines will involve modifying and refining the representational, higher-order monitoring, and self-representational theories and/or devising altogether novel positive accounts. The second task is to examine the a priori and a posteriori cases for reducibility. Work here will probably focus on the issue of how much can be read off of conceivability claims, as well as periodic reconsideration of the intuitive plausibility of such claims in light of newer and subtler positive accounts of consciousness.

Another front along which progress can certainly be made is tightening the connection between the theoretical and experimental perspectives on consciousness. Ultimately, one hopes that experiments could be designed that would test well-defined empirical consequences of philosophical (or more generally, purely theoretical) models of consciousness. This would require philosophers to be willing to put forth certain empirical speculations, as wild as these may seem, based on their theories of consciousness, and experimental scientists to take interest in the intricacies of philosophical theories in an attempt to think up possible ways to test them.

All in all, progress in our understanding of consciousness and the outstanding methodological and substantive challenges it presents has been quite impressive over the past two decades. The central philosophical issues are today framed with a clarity and precision that allow a corresponding level of clarity and precision in our thinking about consciousness. Even more happily, there is no reason to suppose that this progress will come to a halt or slow down in the near future.

Notes
1. More accurately, I present central aspects of the main account, the case in favor, and the case against. Obviously, space and other limitations do not allow me to present the full story on each of these approaches.
2. The distinction between creature consciousness and state consciousness is due to Rosenthal (1986).
3. Availability consciousness as construed here is very similar to the notion of access consciousness as defined by Block (1995). There are certain differences, however. Block defines access consciousness as the property a mental state has when it is poised for free use by the subject in her reasoning and action control. It may well be that a mental state is availability-conscious if and only if it is access-conscious. For a detailed discussion of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, see Kriegel (2006b).
4. It is debatable whether thoughts, beliefs, desires, and other cognitive states can at all be conscious in this sense. I remain silent on this issue here. For arguments that they can be conscious, see Goldman (1993a), Horgan and Tienson (2002), and Stewert (1998).
5. The terms "easy problems" and "hard problem" are intended as mere labels, not as descriptive. Thus it is not suggested here that understanding any of the functions of consciousness is at all easy in any significant sense. Any scientist who has devoted time to the study of consciousness knows how outstanding the problems in this field are. These terms are just a terminological device designed to bring out the fact that the problem of why there is something it feels like to undergo a conscious experience appears to be of a different order than the problems of mapping out the cognitive functions of consciousness.
6. This is so even if phenomenal consciousness does not turn out to have much of a functional significance in the ordinary cognitive life of a normal subject — as some (Libet, 1985; Velmans, 1992; Wegner, 2002) have indeed argued.
7. In the course of the discussion I avail myself of philosophical terminology that may not be familiar to the non-philosophically trained reader. However, I have tried to recognize all the relevant instances and such and include an endnote that provides a standard explication of the terminology in question.
8. No major philosopher holds this view, to my knowledge.
9. Many of the key texts discussed in this chapter are conveniently collected in Block et al. (1977). Here, and in the rest of the chapter, I refer to the reprint in that volume.

10. This is what Churchland often discusses under the heading of the “plasticity of mind” (see especially Churchland, 1979).

11. It may not be perceiving those brain states as brain states. But it will nonetheless be a matter of perceiving the brain states.

12. The view – sometimes referred to as emergentism – that consciousness is caused by the brain, or causally emerges from brain activity, is often taken by scientists to be materialist enough. But philosophers, being interested in the ontology rather than genealogy of consciousness, commonly take it to be a form of dualism. If consciousness cannot be shown to be its own material, but only caused by matter, then consciousness is itself immaterial, as the dualist claims. At the same time, the position implicit in scientists’ work is often that what is caused by physical causes in accordance with already known physical laws should be immediately considered physical. This position, which I have called elsewhere inclusive materialism (Kriegel, 2005b), is not unreasonable. But the present chapter is dedicated to philosophers’ theories of consciousness, so I set it aside.

13. It should be noted that McGinn himself has repeatedly claimed that his position is not dualist. Nonetheless others have accused him of being committed to dualism (e.g., Brueckner and Berukhim, 2003). There is no doubt that McGinn does not intend to commit to dualism. In a way, his position is precisely that, because of our cognitive closure we cannot even know whether materialism or dualism is true. Yet it is a fair criticism to suggest that McGinn is committed to dualism despite himself because his argument for mysterianism would not go through unless dualism was true.

14. More generally, it is curious to hold, as McGinn does, that an organism’s concept-forming procedures are powerful enough to frame a problem, without being powerful enough to frame the solution. To be sure, the wrong solution may be framed, but this would suggest not that the conceptual capabilities of the organism are at fault, but rather that the organism made the wrong turn somewhere in its reasoning. The natural thought is that if a conceptual scheme is powerful enough to frame a problem it should be powerful enough to frame the solution. Whether the correct solution will actually be framed is of course anyone’s guess. But the problem cannot be a constitutive limitation on concept formation mechanisms. (For a more detailed development of this line of critique, see Kriegel, 2004a.) There is a counterexample of this sort of claim, however. Certain problems that can be framed within the theory of rational numbers cannot be solved within it; the conceptual machinery of irrational numbers must be brought in to solve these problems. It might be claimed, however, that this sort of exception is limited to formal systems and does not apply to theories of the natural world. Whether this claim is plausible is something I do not adjudicate here.

15. Monism divides into two subgroups: materialist monism, according to which the only kind of stuff there is matter, and idealist monism, according to which the stuff in question is some sort of mindstuff.

16. Idealism is not really considered a live option in current philosophical discussions, although it is defended by Foster (1982). I do not discuss it here.

17. Such coming-apart happens, for Descartes, upon death of the physical body. We should note that Cartesian substance dualism drew much of its motivation from religious considerations, partly because it provided for the survival of the soul. The main difficulty historically associated with it is whether it can account for the causal interaction between the mind and the body.

18. So property dualism is compatible with substance monism. Unlike Descartes and other old-school dualists, modern dualists for the most part hold that there is only one kind of stuff, or substance, in the world – matter. But matter has two different kinds of properties – material and immaterial.

19. A kind of property F supervenes on a kind of property G with logical necessity – or for short logically supervenes on them – just in case two objects differing with respect to their F properties without differing with respect to their G properties would be in contravention of the laws of logic. A kind of property F supervenes on a kind of property G with metaphysical necessity – or for short
metaphysically supervenes on them – just in case it is impossible for two objects to differ with respect to their F properties without differing with respect to their G properties. Philosophers debate whether there is a difference between the two (logical and metaphysical supervenience). That debate does not concern us here.

20. This stronger claim will require a stronger argument. The claim that phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties could be established through the now familiar argument from multiple realizability (Putnam, 1967). But multiple realizability does not entail failure of supervenience. To obtain the latter, Chalmers will have to appeal to a different argument, as we will see in the next subsection.

21. As a consequence, phenomenal properties do supervene on physical properties with nomological necessity, even though they do not supervene with metaphysical or logical necessity. A kind of property F supervenes on a kind of property G with nomological (or natural) necessity – or for short nomologically supervenes on them – just in case two objects differing with respect to their F properties without differing with respect to their G properties would be in contravention of laws of nature.

22. So causal explanation is the sort of explanation one obtains by citing the cause of the explanandum. For discussions of the nature of causal explanation, see (e.g., Lewis, 1993).

23. The latter will govern only the causal interaction among physical events. They will not cover causal interaction between physical and phenomenal, non-physical events. These will have to be covered by a special and new set of laws.

24. In Baars’ (1988, 1997) Global Workspace Theory, consciousness is reductively explained in terms of global availability. In a functionalist theory such as Dennett’s (1981, 1991), consciousness is reductively explained in terms of functional organization. Chalmers’ position is that neither theory can explain consciousness reductively, though both may figure as part of the causal explanation of it. These theories are not discussed in the present chapter, because they are fundamentally psychological (rather than philosophical) theories of consciousness.

25. A linguistic context is intensional if it allows certain inferences, in particular existen-
tial generalization (the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘there is an x, such that x is F’) and substitution of co-referential terms salva veritate (the inference from “a is F” and “a = b” to “b is F”). Epistemic contexts – contexts involving the ascription of knowledge – are intensional in this sense.

26. Another popular materialist response to these arguments is that what is being gained is not new knowledge, but rather new abilities (Lewis, 1990; Nemirow, 1992). Upon being released from her room, the Knowledge Argument’s protagonist does not acquire new knowledge, but rather a new set of abilities. And likewise what we lack with respect to what it is like to be a bat is not any particular knowledge, but a certain ability – the ability to imagine what it is like to be a bat. But from the acquisition of a new ability one can surely not infer the existence of a new fact.

27. Materialists reason that because what it is like to see red is identical to a neurophysiological fact about the brain, and ex hypothesi the Knowledge Argument’s protagonist knows the latter fact, she already knows the former. So she knows the fact of what it is like to see red, but not as a fact about what it is like to see red. Instead, she knows the fact of what it is like to see red as a fact about the neurophysiology of the brain. What happens when she comes out of her room is that she comes to know the fact of what it is like to see red as a fact about what it is like to see red. That is, she learns in a new way a fact she already knew in another way. The same applies to knowledge of what it is like to be a bat: we may know all the facts about what it is like to see a bat, and still gain new knowledge about bats, but this new knowledge will present to us a fact we already know in a way we do not know it yet.

28. It could be responded by the dualist that some pieces of knowledge are so different that the fact known thereby could not possibly turn out to be the same. Knowledge that the evening star is glowing and knowledge that the morning star is glowing are not such. But consider knowledge that justice is good and knowledge that banana is good. The dualist could argue that these are such different pieces of knowledge that it is impossible that the facts thereby known should turn out to be one and the same. The concepts of evening star and morning star are not different enough to exclude the possibility that they pick out
the same thing, but the concepts of justice and banana are such that it cannot possibly be the case that justice should turn out to be the same thing as bananas.

29. The kind of possibility we are concerned with here, and in the following presentation of variations on this argument, is not practical possibility, or even a matter of consistency with the laws of nature. Rather it is possibility in the widest possible sense— that of consistency with the laws of logic and the very essence of things. This is what philosophers refer to as metaphysical possibility.

30. The modal force of this supervenience claim is concordant with that of the claim in Premise 2; that is, that of metaphysical necessity.

31. The reason it is impossible is that there is no such thing as contingent identity, according to the official doctrine hailing from Kripke. Since all identity is necessary, and necessity is cashed out as truth in all possible worlds, it follows that when a = b in the actual world, a = b in all possible worlds, that is, a is necessarily identical to b.

32. The interpretation I provide is based on certain key passages in Chalmers (1996, pp. 131–134), but I cast the argument in terms that are mine, not Chalmers’.

33. I mean the property of apparent water to be more or less the same as the property philosophers often refer to as “watery stuff” (i.e., the property of being superficially (or to the naked eye) the same as water—clear, drinkable, liquid, etc.).

34. Chalmers (1996, 132) writes, “...the primary intension [of "consciousness"] determines a perfectly good property of objects in possible worlds. The property of being watery stuff [or apparent water] is a perfectly reasonable property, even though it is not the same as the property of being H, O. If we can show that there are possible worlds that are physically identical to ours but in which the property is introduced by the primary intension is lacking, then dualism will follow [italics added].”

35. Our discussion so far has presupposed a “latitudinous” approach to properties, according to which there is a property that corresponds to every predicate we can come up with. (Thus, if we can come up with the predicate, “is a six-headed space lizard or a flying cow,” then there is the property of being a six-headed space lizard or a flying cow. This does not mean, however, that the property is actually instantiated by any actual object.) But on a sparse conception of property—one that rejects the latitudinous assumption—there may not be appearance properties at all.

36. The notion of a natural property is hard to pin down and is the subject of philosophical debate. The most straightforward way of understanding natural properties is as properties that figure in the ultimate laws of nature (Armstrong, 1978; Fodor, 1974).

37. That is, they would have their causal efficacy restricted to bringing about physical events and property-instantiations that already have independent sufficient causes (and that would therefore take place anyway, regardless of the non-supervenient properties. (This is the second option of the dilemma.)

38. This is the strategy in Chalmers (1996). Later on, Chalmers (2001a) embraces a three-pronged approach, the third prong consisting in accepting causal overdetermination.

39. When a cause C causes an effect E, C’s causing of E may have its own (mostly accidental) effects (e.g., it may surprise an observer who did not expect the causing to take place), but E is not one of them. This is because E is caused by C, not by C’s causing of E. Dretske (1988) distinguished between triggering causes and structuring causes, the latter being causes of certain causal relations (such as C’s causing of E), and offers an account of structuring causes. But this is an account of the causes of causal relations, not of their effects. To my knowledge, there is no account of the effects of causal relations, mainly because these seem to be chiefly accidental.

40. Or at least they would be nearly epiphenomenal, having no causal powers except perhaps to bring about some accidental effects of the sort pointed out in the previous endnote.

41. By “representational properties” it is meant properties that the experience has in virtue of what it represents—not, it is important to stress, properties the experience has in virtue of what does the representing. In terms of the distinction between vehicle and content, representational properties are to be understood as content properties rather than vehicular properties. We can also make a distinction between two kinds of vehicular properties: those that are essential to the vehicling of
the content and those that are not. (Block's (1996) distinction between mental paint and mental latex (later, "mental oil") is supposed to capture this distinction.) There is a sense in which a view according to which phenomenal properties are reductively accountable for in terms of vehicular properties essential to the vehicling is representational, but the way the term "representationalism" is used in current discussions of consciousness, it does not qualify as representationalism. A view of this sort is defended, for instance, by Maloney (1989), but otherwise lacks a vast following. I do not discuss it here.

By the "phenomenal character" of a mental state at a time t I mean the set of all phenomenal properties the state in question instantiates at t. By "representational content" I mean whatever the experience represents. (Experiences represent things, in that they have certain accuracy or veridicality conditions: conditions under which an experience would be said to get things right.)

See Dretske (1981, 1988) for the most thoroughly worked out reductive account of mental representation in informational and teleological terms. According to Dretske (1981), every event in the world generates a certain amount of information (in virtue of excluding the possibility that an incompatible event can take place). Some events also take place only when other events take place as well, and this is sometimes dictated by the laws of nature. Thus it may be a law of nature that dictates that an event type E₁ is betokened only when event type E₁ is betokened. When this is the case, E₁ is said to be nomically dependent upon E₁, and the tokening of E₁ carries the information that E₁ has been betokened. Or more accurately, the tokening of E₁ carries the information generated by the tokening of E₁. Some brain states bear this sort of relation to world states: the former come into being, as a matter of law, only when the latter do (i.e., the former are nomically dependent upon the latter). Thus, a certain type of brain state may be tokened only when it rains. This brain state type would thus carry the information that it rains. An informational account of mental representation is based on this idea: that a brain state can represent the fact that it rains by carrying information about it, which it does in virtue of nomically depending on it.

Other representational theories can be found in Byrne (2001), Dretske (1995), Lurz (2003), Shoemaker (1994a, b, 1996, 2002) and Thau (2002). Some of these versions are importantly different from Tye's, not only in detail but also in spirit. This is particularly so with regard to Shoemaker's view (as well as Lurz's). For a limited defense and elaboration of Shoemaker’s view, see Kriegel (2002a, b). In what way this defense is limited will become evident at the end of this section.

The properties of intentionality and abstractness are fairly straightforward. The former is a matter of intentionality; that is, the disallowing of existential generalizations and truth-preserving substitutions of co-referential terms. The second is a matter of the features represented by experience not being concrete entities (this is intended to make sense of misrepresentation of the same features, in which case no concrete entity is being represented).

This line of thought can be resisted on a number of scores. First, it could be argued that I do have a short-lived concept of blue, which I possess more or less for the duration of my experience. Second, it could be claimed that although I do not possess the descriptive concept "blue," I do possess the indexical concept "this shade of blue," and that it is the latter concept that is deployed in my experience’s representational content. But that as it may, the fact that conscious experiences can represent properties that the subject cannot recognize across relatively short stretches of time is significant enough. Even if we do not wish to treat them as non-conceptual, we must treat them at least as "sub-recognitional." Tye’s modified claim would be that the representational content of experience is poised, abstract, sub-recognitional, intentional content.

To be sure, it does not represent the tissue damage as tissue damage, but it does represent the tissue damage. Since the representation is non-conceptual, it certainly cannot employ the concept of "tissue damage."

An error theory is a theory that ascribes a widespread error in commonsense beliefs. The term was coined by J. L. Mackie (1977). Mackie argued that values and value judgment are subjective. Oversimplifying the dialectic, a problem for this view is that such a judgment as “murder is wrong” appears to be, and is commonly taken to be, objectively true.
In response Mackie embraced what he termed an error theory: that the common view of moral and value judgments is simply one huge mistake.

49. Externalism about representational content, or "content externalism" for short, is the thesis that the representational content of experiences, thoughts, and even spoken statements is partially determined by objects outside the subject's head. Thus, if a person's interactions with watery stuff happen to be interactions with H₂O, and another person's interactions with watery stuff happen to be interactions with a superficially similar stuff that is not composed of H₂O, then even if the two persons cannot tell apart H₂O and the other stuff and are unaware of the differences in the molecular composition of the watery stuff in their environment, the representational contents of their respective water thoughts (as well as water pronouncements and water experiences) are different (Putnam, 1975). Or so externalists claim.

50. Another option is to go internalist with respect to the representational content that determines the phenomenal properties of conscious experiences. With the recent advent of credible account of narrow content (Chalmers, 2002b, Segal, 2000), it is now a real option to claim that the phenomenal properties of experience are determined by experience's narrow content (Kriegel, 2002a; Rey, 1998). However, it may turn out that this version of representationalism will not be as well supported by the transparency of experience.

51. For one such line of criticism, on which I do not elaborate here, see Kriegel (2002c).

52. Elsewhere, I construe this form of pre-reflective self-consciousness as what I call intransitive self-consciousness. Intransitive self-consciousness is to be contrasted with transitive self-consciousness. The latter is ascribed in reports of the form "I am self-conscious of my thinking that p," whereas the former is ascribed in reports of the form "I am self-consciously thinking that p." For details see Kriegel (2003b, 2004b).

53. Part of this neglect is justified by the thesis that the for-me-ness of conscious experiences is an illusory phenomenon. For an argument for the psychological reality of it, see Kriegel (2004b).

54. There are versions of representationalism that may be better equipped to deal with the subjective character of experience. Thus, according to Shoemaker’s (2002) version, a mental state is conscious when it represents a subject-relative feature, such as the disposition to bring about certain internal states in the subject. It is possible that some kind of for-me-ness can be accounted for in this manner. It should be noted, however, that this is not one of the considerations that motivate Shoemaker to develop his theory the way he does.

55. Rosenthal prefers to put this idea as follows: conscious states are states we are conscious of. He then draws a distinction between consciousness and consciousness of – intransitive and transitive consciousness (Rosenthal, 1986, 1990). To avoid unnecessary confusion, I state the same idea in terms of awareness of, rather than consciousness of. But the idea is the same. It is what Rosenthal calls sometimes the "transitivity principle" (e.g., Rosenthal, 2000): a mental state is intransitively conscious only if we are transitively conscious of it.

56. The representation is "higher-order" in the sense that it is a representation of a representation. In this sense, a first-order representation is a representation of something that is not itself a representation. Any other representation is higher-order.

57. More than that, according to Rosenthal (1990), for instance, the particular way it is like for S to have M is determined by the particular way M represents S. Suppose S tastes an identical wine in 1980 and in 1990. During the 1980s, however, S had become a wine connoisseur. Consequently, wines she could not distinguish at all in 1980 strike her in 1990 as worlds apart. That is, during the eighties she acquired a myriad of concepts for very specific and subtle wine tastes. It is plausible to claim that what it is like for S to taste the wine in 1990 is different from what it was like for her to taste it in 1980 – even though the wines' own flavors are identical. Arguably, the reason for the difference in what it is like to taste the wine is that the two wine-tasting experiences are accompanied by radically different higher-order representations of them. This suggests, then, that the higher-order representation not only determines that there is something it is like for S to have M, but also what it is like for S to have M.
58. I do not mean the term “yield” in a causal sense here. The higher-order monitoring theory does not claim that M’s representing of M somehow produces, or gives rise to, M’s being conscious. Rather, the claim is conceptual: M’s being conscious consists in, or is constituted by, M’s representing of M.

59. Other versions of the higher-order thought view can be found in Carruthers (1989, 1996), Dennett (1969, 1991), and Mellor (1978).

60. Rosenthal (1990, pp. 739–40) claims that it is essential to a perceptual state that it has a sensory quality, but the second-order representations do not have sensory qualities and are therefore non-perceptual. Van Gulick (2001) details a longer and more thorough list of features that are characteristic of perceptual states and considers which of them is likely to be shared by the higher-order representations. His conclusion is that some are and some are not.

61. The notion of direction of fit has its origins in the work of Anscombe (1957), but has been developed in some detail and put to extensive work mainly by Searle (1983). The idea is that mental states divide into two main groups, the cognitive ones (paradigmatically, belief) and the conative ones (paradigmatically, desire). The former are such that they are supposed to make the mind fit the way the world is (thus “getting the facts right”), whereas the latter are such that they are supposed to make the world fit the way the mind is (a change in the world is what would satisfy them).

62. Kobes (1995) suggests a version of higher-order monitoring theory in which the higher-order representation has essentially a telic direction of fit. But Rosenthal construes it as having only a thetic one.

63. Carruthers (1989, 1996, 2000), and probably also Dennett (1969, 1991), attempt to account for consciousness in terms of merely tact or dispositional higher-order representations. But these would not do, according to Rosenthal. The reason for this is that a merely dispositional representation would not make the subject aware of her conscious state, but only disposed to being aware of it, whereas the central motivation behind the higher-order monitoring view is the fact that conscious states are states we are aware of having (Rosenthal 1990, p. 742).

64. Earlier on, Rosenthal (1990) required that the higher-order thought be not only non-inferential but also non-observational. This latter requirement was later dropped (Rosenthal, 1993).

65. A person may come to believe that she is ashamed about something on the strength of her therapist’s evidence. And yet the shame state is not conscious. In terms of the terminology introduced in the introduction, the state may become availability-conscious, but not phenomenally conscious. This is why the immediacy of awareness is so crucial. Although the person’s second-order belief constitutes an awareness of the shame state, it is not a non-inferential awareness, and therefore not immediate awareness.

66. De se content is content that is of oneself, or more precisely, of oneself as oneself. Castañeda (1966), who introduced this term, also claimed that de se content is irreducible to any other kind of content. This latter claim is debatable and is not part of the official higher-order thought theory.

67. Rosenthal’s (1990, p. 742) argument for this requirement is the following. My awareness of my blushing experience is an awareness of that particular experience, not of the general type of experience it is. But it is impossible to represent a mental state as particular without representing in which subject it occurs. Therefore, the only way the higher-order thought could represent my experience in its particularity is if it represented it as occurring in me.

68. This is necessary to avert infinite regress. If the higher-order state was itself conscious, it would have to be itself represented by a yet higher-order state (according to the theory) and so the hierarchy of states would go to infinity. This is problematic on two scores. Firstly, it is empirically implausible, and perhaps impossible, that a subject should entertain an infinity of mental states whenever conscious. Secondly, if a mental state’s being conscious is explained in terms of another conscious state, the explanation is “empty,” inasmuch as it does not explain consciousness in terms of something other than consciousness.

69. This claim can be made on phenomenological grounds, instead of on the basis of conceptual analysis. For details, see Kriegel (2004b).

70. To repeat, the conceptual grounds are the fact that it seems to be a conceptual truth that
conscious states are states we are aware of having. This seems to be somehow inherent in the very concept of consciousness.

71. There are other arguments that have been leveled against the higher-order monitoring theory, or specific versions thereof, which I do not have the space to examine. For arguments not discussed here, see Block (1995), Caston (2002), Dretske (1995), Guzeldere (1995), Kriegel (2000a), Levine (2001), Na-tsoulas (1995), Rey (1988), Seager (1999), and Zahavi and Parnas (1998).

72. The argument has also been made by Caston (2002), Levine (2001), and Seager (1999). For a version of the argument directed at higher-order perception theory (and appealing to higher-order misperceptions), see Neander (1998).

73. Note that M* does not merely misrepresent M to be F when in reality M is not F, but misrepresents M to be F when in reality there is no M at all.

74. This would be a particular version of the supposition we made at the very beginning of this chapter, by way of analyzing creature consciousness in terms of state consciousness.

75. Furthermore, if M* were normally conscious, the same problem would arise with the third-order representation of it (and if the third-order representation were normally conscious, the problem would arise with the fourth-order state). To avert infinite regress, the higher-order monitoring theorist must somewhere posit an unconscious state, and when she does, she will be unable to claim that that state instantiates the property of being conscious when it misrepresents.

76. This appears to be Rosenthal’s latest stance on the issue (in conversation).

77. There are surely other ways the higher-order monitoring theorist may try to handle the problem of targetless higher-order representations. But many of them are implausible, and all of them complicate the theory considerably. One of the initial attractions of the theory is its clarity and relative simplicity. Once it is modified along any of the lines sketched above, it becomes significantly less clear and simple. To that extent, it is considerably less attractive than it initially appears.


80. So the self-representational content of conscious states is de se content. There are places where Brentano seems to hold something like this as well. See also Kriegel (2003a).

81. For more on the distinction between content and attitude (or mode), see Searle (1983). For a critique of Smith’s view, see Kriegel (2005a).

82. A similar account would be that conscious states are not conscious in virtue of standing in a certain relation to themselves, but this is because their secondary intentionality should be given an adverbial analysis. This is not to say that all intentionality must be treated adverbially. It may well be that the primary intentionality of conscious states is a matter of their standing in a certain informational or teleological relation to their primary objects. Thus, it need not be the case that S’s conscious fear that p involves S’s fearing p-ly rather than S’s standing in a fear relation to the fact that p. But it is the case that S’s awareness of her fear that p involves being aware-fear-that-p-ly rather than standing in an awareness relation to the fear that p. To my knowledge, nobody holds this view.

83. A constitutive, non-contingent relation is a relation that two things do not just happen to entertain, but rather they would not be the things they are if they did not entertain those relations. Thus A’s relation to B is constitutive if bearing it to B is part of what constitutes A’s being what it is. Such a relation is necessary rather than contingent, since there is no possible world in which A does not bear it to B – for in such a world it would no longer be A.

84. Elsewhere, I have defended a view similar in key respects to Van Gulick’s – see Kriegel (2003a, 2005, 2006a).

85. Indeed, the problem may be even more pressing for a view such as the higher-order global states theory. For the latter requires not only the ability to generate higher-order contents, but also the ability to integrate those with the right lower-order contents.

86. For a more elaborate argument that self-representation may not be a sufficient condition for consciousness, one that could provide...
a reductive explanation of it, see Levine (2001, Ch. 6).

87. I am appealing here to a distinction defended, e.g., by Cummins (1979), Dretske (1988), and Searle (1992). Grice noted that some things that exhibit aboutness of meaningfulness, such as words, traffic signs, and arrows, do so only on the assumption that someone interprets them to have the sort of meaning they have. But these acts of interpretation are themselves contentful, or meaningful. So their own meaning must be either derived by further interpretative acts or be intrinsic to them and non-derivative. Grice’s claim was that thoughts and other mental states have an aboutness all their own, independently of any interpretation.

88. This is denied by Dennett (1987), who claims that all intentionality is derivative.

89. One might claim that such states are less clearly conceivable when their self-representational content is fully specified. Thus, if the content is of the form, “I myself am herewith having this very bluish experience,” it is less clearly the case that one can conceive of an unconscious state having this content.

90. The conceivable of unconscious self-representing states may not be proof of their possibility, but it is evidence of their possibility. It is therefore evidence against the self-representational theory.

91. The reductivist may claim that zombies with the same physical properties we have are conceivable only because we are not yet in a position to focus our mind on the right physical structure. As progress is made toward identification of the right physical structure, it will become harder and harder to conceive of a zombie exhibiting this structure but lacking all consciousness.

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References


