1- The Concept of African Philosophy

Contemporary African Philosophy can be viewed as an outcome of two roots: the traditional African worldview and the modern Western philosophical thought. Just like other non-Western traditional thought, controversy around its depiction as ‘philosophy’ takes place.

A-Controversy around the concept of African philosophy

Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya presents discuss the ‘legitimacy’ of describing African thought as ‘philosophy’ as follows,
In many African countries, the discipline of African philosophy is relatively young and often studied as a sub-set of African Studies. It is different from philosophy in Africa which entails the participation of Africa in the universal enterprise of philosophy. In fact, while African philosophy presupposes pluriversality in so far as it implies the existence of a distinct philosophy in Africa with a distinct approach – a philosophy with a distinct way of doing philosophy – philosophy in Africa implies that there is participation of the continent as a whole in the enterprise of philosophy. While through professional African philosophy, African philosophy as a discipline is fast gaining place in academia either replacing or taught alongside Western philosophy in African universities where the latter was normally taught since the introduction of formal education on the continent. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to describe African philosophy in terms of its nature and scope. Mesembe (2013) acknowledging the same notes that: “African philosophy as a component of academic global philosophy has become very respectable in its contributions to shaping the history and experiences of the African people and that work on African Philosophy must be persistent and sustained.” An attempt to understand the nature and scope of African philosophy begs an understanding of two things: what it means to do philosophy and; the prefixing “African” of African philosophy we highlighted above. Doing philosophy entails a process. It is a process of rational and critical reflection or a reflective examination of things in the realm of existence. Ezeani (2005) puts this
aptly when he notes:
To philosophise is to think, and to think is to question. To philosophise is to ask questions and question the answer to the question and continue the process until one arrives at the ultimate answer – the truth […] through the process of critical questioning and reflection the philosopher attempts to confront his or her existence, assumptions and also contribute to the development of thoughts (p. 11 & 7).
From the above, one notes that all humans have the capacity and right to think rationally: they have the capacity and right to philosophise or to do philosophy. In fact any tradition or lore that raises people’s nadir of curiosity widens people’s knowledge base, and presents food for thought to the present and future generations marks the beginning of philosophy. The enterprise of critical reflection in Africa, therefore, qualifies as philosophy. It is what it means to do philosophy in Africa. It is also what we mean when we talk of Western philosophy or when we talk of American philosophy – how they do philosophy in the West and in the Americas. It is from this understanding that it becomes absurd to ask whether there is philosophy in Africa, in Europe, or in Asia. For as long as there are people who can engage in critical investigation of things, there is philosophy. Yet when this or that thing is tagged “African,” it means the thing is related to Africa in some special way. This may be in terms of origin, place of existence, or some other forms of attachment; hence we can talk of African philosophy as a philosophy that belongs to Africa. The same understanding alludes to the question on the content/nature of philosophy in Africa, by which we mean the study, writing, teaching, and practice of philosophy in Africa. It is on the basis of such understanding that scholars like Anyanwu (2010), has come to understand African philosophy as that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and present make sense of their destiny and the world they live. For Janz (2009), African philosophy is philosophy produced by African people. Asukwo (2009: 30) understands African philosophy as “a subjective world-view packaged and anchored with the mind-frame in order to ask and answer questions that can solve the immediate problem at hand within a given socio-economic and political environment.” Bodunrin summarises African philosophy as “the philosophy done by African philosophers whether it be in the area of logic, ethics or history of philosophy” (Sogolo 1993: 2). We should, however, note that to discuss philosophy in Africa is necessarily to discuss African philosophy. By African philosophy we mean the contextualised critical thinking, articulation of ideas, and attempts to seek solutions to problematic situations by Africans. This is because tagging a philosophy “African” or “American” or “European” is contextualising it. It is showing that the philosophising exercise is being executed in the specific context in question. In the case of African philosophy, it means that philosophy tools and techniques are being utilised to explore reality of things from the view point of Africa. We, thus, concur with Ezeani (2005: 7) who understands African philosophy as “contextualised critical thinking of or a philosophical product by an African […] it is (or part of it is) an articulation by an African philosopher of his or her ideas or thoughts in a coded format meant to provide an answer to a mind boggling question or a solution to a contextualised social or political problem” (p. 9). On this basis, African philosophers should not be criticised for being linked to the kind of philosophy they study, teach, or practice simply because it is reflects on the existential experiences of the African people or is different from Western philosophy. Makinde (2000), thus, is right when he warns and encourages African philosophers “to do [philosophy] in the way they think it should be done including of course, the writing and teaching of it” (p.125). So is Sodipo, in his assertion that “when you say African philosophy you are drawing attention to that aspect of philosophy which arises from a special problem and the unique experience of African people” (Uduigwomen 2009: 6). In fact, African philosophers must hold onto their position as long as they maintain the main function of philosophy, that of searching for truth in its entirety (Nze 1990). This way African philosophy can maintain its uniqueness as an equal philosophy and grow its influence beyond Africa as Western philosophy has done over the years. Otherwise, African philosophy, as has been done to the African people during trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, will be devalued and subjected to lower order hierarchically, when it is actually an equal philosophy – in the sense that we speak of Western philosophy – with only a different approach to the investigation of the truth. On this note, Ozumba and Chimakonam (2014) are right when they argue that Western thought and African philosophy differ in approach: whereas Western thought is exclusive and dichotomised in nature, African thought is complementary, integrative and inclusive. Chimakonam’s (2011) cry for a pronounced African Logic is worth considering as it is this logic that acts as the identity mark of African philosophy. Chimakonam’s critical question: “Why can’t there be an African Logic?” and his further explanation on the uniqueness of African philosophy is apt:
Among the characteristics of African logic is the uniqueness of its approach. Western logician, for instance, takes the middle position between A and B and only asserts one when he has fully drawn out his proof. The African logician, however, asserts one A and B before drawing out his proof to justify this position. This is principally why, by the standard of Western logic, any such reasoning pattern is said to be guilty of bias and prejudice and is accused of lacking in objectivity. It is by this standard that African thought pattern is said to be illogical (p. 143).
We add that, why can’t there be African epistemology? Why can’t there be African metaphysics? Why can’t there be African ethics? The existence of areas such as these would, in doubt, show the uniqueness of African philosophy as well as the context in which the philosophy in question – African philosophy – is studied. (Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya, African Philosophy and Thought Systems, p.46-49)

B-The philosophical Trends of African Philosophy

Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya present an outline of Henry Odera Oruka’s trends of African Philosophy as follows,
In response to the acrimonious debate on the existence of African philosophy, racist pronouncements and claims against Africans’ ability to reason, worse still to philosophise, the Kenyan philosopher, Henry Odera Oruka, enunciated what has come to be widely known invariably as trends in African philosophy (Oruka 1997), schools of African Thought /Philosophy (Oruka 1987), or currents in African philosophy (Outlaw 1987).
Henry Odera Oruka was a dexterous and well-read scholar who wrote a number of books, journal articles and presented many papers in conferences around the world. He contributed significantly to almost all fields of philosophy which included but not limited to logic, philosophy of religion, philosophy of culture, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and African philosophy. However, it is in the latter field that Odera Oruka is best remembered and credited. He identified and branded six approaches – trends – in his response to the question on what African philosophy really is or could be. These are ethno- philosophy, philosophic sagacity, professional philosophy, nationalistic-ideological philosophy, hermeneutic philosophy, and artistic or literary philosophy (Odera Oruka 1998: 101) although he outlined and elaborated only the first four of these trends. The two other trends – literary philosophy and hermeneutical philosophy – Odera Oruka claims to be trends in contemporary philosophy also worth considering. But given that these two trends easily fall within the purview of the four trends of contemporary philosophy especially ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy, we will not discuss them in this book. For now let us look at Odera Oruka’s aforementioned four trends of contemporary philosophy in some detail.

Ethno-philosophy

The term ‘ethno-philosophy’ is not unique to Henry Odera Oruka. Prior to its usage by Odera Oruka, it had been used in the context of the discourse on the nature of African philosophy by Kwame Nkrumah (1970) and Paulin Hountondji in his 1983 publication, African philosophy: Myth and reality. Hountondji, for example, used the term ethno-philosophy to refer to the philosophy that Placide Tempels and many others across the African continent such as Alexis Kagame, Fouda, Mgr Makarakiza, Marcien Towa, Lufuluabo, Bahoken and Mulago (Hountondji, Ibid) were ‘discovering’ or rather unearthing. We should note that though it is often assumed that the word ethno-philosophy was coined by Hountondji, it was in fact Kwame Nkrumah who coined it. Nkrumah had actually registered for a PhD dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania in 1943 and had proposed to work on what he termed ‘ethno-philosophy.’ This means that even though the term is now largely associated with Odera Oruka, ethno- philosophy as an approach to African philosophy is directly linked to Nkrumah and later Tempels, particularly his book La Philosophie Bantoue, first published in 1945 and later (in 1959) translated under the title ‘Bantu Philosophy.’
The book by Tempels marked the birth of modern African philosophy – particularly ethno-philosophy – given that it was, in many ways, contrary to what many scholars in the West were writing about Africa. For this reason, Tempels’ book generated a lot of debate among scholars in both Europe and those that were beginning to emerge in Africa. But what ethno- philosophy is all about?
For scholars like Bodunrin (1984: 1) ethno-philosophy refers to the seminal works of anthropologists, sociologists and ethnographers who interpret the “collective world views of African peoples, their myths and folk wisdom” as that part of the treasure of the African people that can be considered as African philosophy. Serequeberhan (1991) shares the same view as that of Bodunrin. He explains ethno-philosophy as characterised by the conviction that the starting point of African philosophy is the “mythical religious conception, world views and ritual practices” (p. 17).
As could be seen from the above discussion, the idea behind ethno-philosophy is that unlike Western philosophy which is more of an individual exercise, African philosophy is a lived communal philosophy. This means African philosophy is exercised as a collective wisdom of the people and not as a preserve, exercise or adventure of any one person. African philosophy, thus, belongs to every member of the society, young or old, born or yet to be born, from which it is rooted. It is rooted from the shared lived experiences of the African people as a whole. On this note, African philosophy includes proverbs, idioms, folktales, maxims, and aphorisms, among other shared experiences and wisdoms of the African people.
Ethno-philosophy is very much closer to culture philosophy and philosophic sagacity although Odera Oruka tells us that the former [culture philosophy] is a first order activity while the latter [philosophic sagacity] is a second order activity. Philosophic sagacity is a second order activity in that it involves critical reflection of the first order conformity [culture philosophy]. In other words, philosophic sagacity is generally reflective and rationalistic as compared to culture philosophy and ethno-philosophy which are in fact deeply embedded in culture and tradition. However, an ordinary sage though is also known as a culture philosopher, there is a thin line of difference between culture philosophy and ethnophilosophy. As Odera Oruka, tells us:

Culture philosophy consists of the beliefs, practices and myths, taboos and general values of a people which govern their everyday life and are usually expressed and stored in oral vocabulary of the people. Ethno-philosophy, on the other hand, is a written work of some scholars claiming to offer an objective description of the culture philosophy of a people. As a trend of thought, ethno-philosophy is much recent than culture philosophy which dates back to the days of the first ancient. In historical order, philosophic sagacity antedates ethno-philosophy but is second-order to culture philosophy (Odera Oruka 1991: 6-7).

While ethno-philosophy is undoubtedly believed to be rich in philosophy, it has met with serious criticisms from many scholars over the years. In fact, there is a significant amount of literature that is critical of ethno-philosophy as a trend of contemporary African philosophy. One of the novel criticisms levelled against ethno-philosophy is offered by Paulin Hountondji. In one of his numerous critiques of ethno- philosophy, Hountondji (2002: 107) writes:

The return of the real thus shatters into smithereens the founding myths of ethno-philosophy: the myth of primitive unanimity – the idea that in ‘primitive’ societies, everyone is in agreement with everyone else – from which it is concluded that there could not possibly exist individual philosophies in such societies, but only belief-systems. In reality an unbiased reading of the existing intellectual production reveals something else. The African field is plural, like all fields, a virgin forest open to all possibilities, to all potentialities, a host to all contradictions and intellectual adventures like all other sites of scientific production.

Similarly, scholars like Barry Hallen (2010) view ethno- philosophy as debased philosophy unworthy of the name philosophy given that it emphasises the myth of unanimity through its embracing of communality. Hallen (Ibid), thus, notes:

(1) It presents itself as a philosophy of peoples rather than of individuals. In Africa one is therefore given the impression that there can be no equivalents to a Socrates or a Kant. Ethnophilosophy speaks only of Bantu philosophy, Dogon philosophy, Akan philosophy; as such its scope is collective (or ‘tribal’), of the world-view variety; (2) Its sources are in the past, in what is described as authentic, traditional African culture of the pre-colonial variety, of the Africa prior to ‘modernity’. These can be found in cultural by-products that were primarily oral: parables, proverbs, poetry, songs, and myths – oral literature generally. Obviously, since such sources do not present their ‘philosophies’ in any conventionally discursive or technical format, it is the academic scholars, rather than African peoples, who interpret or analyse them, and thus come up with what they present as the systematised ‘philosophy’ of an entire African culture; (3) From a methodological point of view, ethnophilosophy therefore tends to present the beliefs that constitute this ‘philosophy’ as things that do not change, that are somehow timeless. African traditional systems of thought are therefore portrayed as placing minimal emphasis upon rigorous argumentation and criticism in a search for truth that provides for discarding the old and creating the new. Tradition somehow becomes antithetical to innovation. Disputes between academic ethnophilosophers, thus, arise primarily over how to arrive at a correct interpretation of a static body of oral literature and oral traditions (p. 75-76).

The historian of philosophy, Wamba-dia-Wamba (1991) in his: Philosophy and African Intellectuals: Mimesis of Western Classicism, Ethno-philosophical Romanticism or African Self-Mastery? also argues against communal philosophy as embraced by ethno-philosophy. For him, in Africa as elsewhere in the world, the question of philosophy should and indeed is necessarily connected to the formation and development of intellectuals as a social class. And, intellectuals, as a social class, emerged as a result of the need to distinguish manual labour from intellectual labour in a given society. The separation between intellectual labour and manual labour is necessary and was prompted by the desire to increase production in society through the means of production. The need to increase production, in turn, necessitated the need to clearly distinguish between manual labour and intellectual labour. Making reference to the historical evolution of humankind, Wamba- dia-Wamba goes on to argue that now that the human society has evolved in relation to its social division of labour, this separation resulted in a social class of intellectual producers who kept growing not only in numbers but diversity and even complexity. Examples of such intellectual producers are philosophers. This means that for Wamba-dia-Wamba, bunching African philosophy as communally owned hinder philosophical progress in African societies such that we cannot talk of philosophy where ideas are collectively owned. Wamba- dia-Wamba (1991: 8), thus, says: Philosophy

Philosophy-doing, as a relatively autonomous social activity, emerged as a historical outcome of that separation. In pre-class divided communities, where intellectual work was not fundamentally separated from manual labour, philosophy as a social activity did not exist. This does not mean, however, that people were not thinking. But most likely they were not thinking systematically about thinking.

As could be seen in the paragraph above, Wamba-dia- Wamba denies the existence of philosophy in societies where ideas are communally owned. He, in fact, argues that the emergence of African philosophy as a specific way of philosophising cannot be traced to pre-class divided African societies but must be traced to the colonial as well as neo- colonial forms of separation between intellectual labour and manual labour. Wamba-dia-Wamba, therefore, sees African philosophy as a product of colonialism in Africa that was used as watch-dog to safeguard the colonial ideology. For him, the watch-dogs (what he calls intellectual workers) were found in the name of missionaries and ethno-philosophers. The works of these intellectual labourers was not only critical to the colonial regime that founded them but even to the militant propagandists of dominant ideas towards the masses, Wamba- dia-Wamba would argue. Basing on this reasoning, Wamba-dia- Wamba (1991: 10) asserts: ‘ethno-philosophy is a philosophy of and for the dominated Africa. It does not matter whether or not actual ways of thinking of some real Africans fit in this way of viewing things. The fact is that this specificity is discovered, theorised in the face of humanity that dominates it and requires it to be so dominated.’
In short, Wamba-dia-Wamba views ethno-philosophy as philosophy of the dominating group or of the dominated if at all it could be considered as philosophy. It is in this view that ethno-philosophy is viewed by Wamba-dia-Wamba as a suspicious contribution to African philosophy and, in fact, as a philosophy of domination that falls short as an authentic philosophy: ethno-philosophy as an approach to African philosophy, thus, is guilty of misrepresenting Africa and its values.
Yet besides all the challenges that ethno-philosophy encounters, Bonudrin (1984), is still confident that it has potentials worth waiting, and thus, warns that:

The African Philosopher cannot deliberately ignore the study of the traditional belief system of his people. Philosophical problems arise out of real life situations. In Africa, more than in many other parts of the modern world, traditional culture and beliefs still exercise a great influence on the thinking and actions of men. At a time when many people in the West believe that philosophy has become impoverished and needs redirection, a philosophical study of traditional society may be the answer (p. 13).

(Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya, African Philosophy and Thought Systems, p.56-63)

Professional philosophy

Professional philosophy as an approach to African philosophy was a direct response or rather an antithesis of ethno-philosophy or what Peter Bodunrin (1984) referred to as ‘cultural philosophy’. Those scholars who considered themselves as professional philosophers like Bodunrin argue for a ‘universal philosophy’ as posited against the idea of ‘cultural philosophy.’ For Bodunrin, philosophy, whether Africa, Asian, American, or European, is culturally neutral in so far as philosophy is a professional and theoretical discipline which like physics and mathematics has a universal application, character, and methodology. Thus for Bodunrin, ethno- philosophy as an approach to African philosophy was too simplistic and uncritical. Instead, philosophy (and in fact any approach to African philosophy) was supposed to be “critical, discursive and independent, contrary to the insinuations of ethno-philosophy” (Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo 2012: 174). Scholars in the professional philosophy thus rallied together and accused ethno-philosophy and its proponents of doing a disservice to African philosophy by their embracing of myths and denial of reason to ethno-philosophy. For this group of scholars, Tempels’ hands (and those of all his disciples) were not all that clean for he was the one who championed ethno- philosophy arguing that it is a philosophy embedded in myths, extra-rational traditionalism and magic (Tempels 1945/1959). Tempels (1959: 24) expresses this view when he avers:

We do not claim that Bantus are capable of presenting us with a philosophical treatise complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our own intellectual training that enables us to effect its systematic development. It is up to us to provide them with an accurate account of their conception of entities.

From the assertion above, it is clear that while Temples agrees that there is philosophy in Africa and among Africans, he admits that the ‘owners’ of that philosophy are unable to express it in clear terms unless they are trained by the Westerners. It is for this reason that scholars like Wamba-dia- Wamba argues that ethno-philosophy is a tool for the colonialists who use it to safeguard their interests. For him and others in the camp of professional philosophy, ethno- philosophy and its proponents they seem to have an Afro- centric tone are “settling for an inferior and idiosyncratic conception of philosophy which lacks the intellectual rigour of Western philosophy and thereby virtually guarantees its own marginalisation in the world market” (Van Hook 1993: 36).
While professional philosophy has accused ethno- philosophy of doing a disservice to African philosophy, it “too can and indeed has been accused of the same” (Ochieng- Odhiambo and Iteyo 2012: 175). Professional philosophy and its proponents have been accused of working within a framework that is distinctively Western and not African. This framework continue privileging the West: the West remains more of a compass with the mandate to dictate the rules of the philosophical game. As Ochieng-Odhiambo (2010: 108-109) rightfully put it in professional philosophy, “there is an apparent over-glorifying of how philosophy is practiced in the West in the name of universalism. They thus play the game as the West would have it played, and by that very token, guarantee its irrelevance to issues, problems and struggles of Africa.” In fact for Ochieng- Odhiambo, professional philosophy only does copy-paste of Western philosophy. It lacks originality as a trend of contemporary African philosophy.
Besides the above critique, some scholars argue that professional philosophy just like Western philosophy from where it emanates is essentialistic in nature. In fact what professional philosophy (and Western philosophy at large) claims to be universal is indeed not universal in so far as it is drawn from the historical and ideological context of the Western world. Hallen (2009), for example, takes a particularistic stance. He argues that universalist philosophers “such as Wiredu, have embraced a paradigm of cross-cultural rationality that is too extreme and too Western in orientation and therefore unfairly discriminates against the rationality of certain African modes of thought and beliefs” (p. 57). Outlaw (1987) also criticises the critique offered by professional philosophers that African philosophy should be rational and disengage itself from its cultural roots. For Outlaw, rationality is in fact a cultural product (particularly Western culture) in much the same way ethno-philosophy is a cultural product (of the African culture) (see p. 35). Onyewuenyi (1982) and other particularists like Outlaw, Hallen and Sogolo (2003) voice their concern against the emphasis on universalising this or that aspect of human cultures. Their reason for rejecting universalism is that each culture is different or unique to itself such that to universalise a particular aspect will not do enough justice to other cultures. For them universalise a particular feature will result in some cultures losing their essential features that are unique to themselves.
(Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya, African Philosophy and Thought Systems, p.63-65)

Philosophic sagacity

The phrase ‘philosophic sagacity’ was used by Odera Oruka to describe a reflective evaluation of thought a particular distinguished individual African elder/sage (and not a group of people) who is a repository of knowledge, wisdom, and painstaking critical thinking and logical reasoning: it is not a communal but purely an individual enterprise. Philosophic sagacity, thus, is more of a conversational or dialectical approach to philosophy given that it involves interviews,discussions, and dialogue/conversations with specific individuals who are known, believed to be sages or are well versed with the wisdom and tradition of their people. In this sense, philosophic sagacity describes the kind of philosophic activity which the Nigerian philosopher, Campbell Momoh, calls “Ancient African philosophy” (Momoh 1985: 77-78, 1988, 1989) and the Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, referred to as ‘Traditional African thought or philosophy’ (Wiredu 1980). By the latter, Wiredu meant a critical evaluation of thought by an individual African sage who is a repository of knowledge, wisdom, and rigorous thinking. Philosophic sagacity is one of Odera Oruka’s most cherished contributions to African philosophy. Emphasising Odera Oruka’s contribution to African philosophy, Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012: 170) comment:

Odera Oruka is best remembered, especially with respect to philosophic sagacity which he is credited to have introduced within academic circles. In philosophic sagacity emphasis is laid on reason in matters pertaining to African cultures and belief systems [...] Odera Oruka’s major contribution to philosophy in general, and to African philosophy in particular, is his philosophic sagacity.

But how philosophic sagacity has been understood by other philosophers? How does it differ from professional philosophy and ethno-philosophy?
Philosophic sagacity or what Hountondji (1983: 81) terms a literature de pensee was criticised by Hountondji, who himself is normally criticised2 for being too theoretical, eliticistic and insufficiently political for an African philosopher. Yet, following Odera Oruka’s understanding of philosophic sagacity, Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012) describe it [philosophic sagacity] as a philosophy deeply connected to culture and worth pursuing. Making reference to the Kenyan culture, Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012: 181) describes philosophic sagacity as:

The map in intellectual terms (based on reason) of the disposition of forces which will enable Kenyan society to digest the inconsistent ethnic elements in Kenya, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the Kenyan personality. The Kenyan personality is the cluster of humanist and coherent principles which underlie the traditional Kenyan society.

Unlike ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity is considered by scholars like Wamba-dia-Wamba as a de- colonising philosophy, an emancipatory endeavour meant to liberate human mind.
Besides, philosophic sagacity was a philosophical trend meant to address the problems associated with both ethno- philosophy and professional philosophy. Elaborating on the objective of philosophic sagacity Odera Oruka (1978: 17) wrote that its purpose was to “invalidate the claim that traditional African peoples were innocent of logical and critical thinking.” Odera Oruka made it clear that African philosophy in its uncontaminated traditional form does not begin and end in folk thought and collectivity as professional philosophers thought. For him, African people even before their contact with the outside world have always been logical, critical and engaged in debates and dialogue such that that to say their philosophy begin and end in folk is a misnomer that should not go unchallenged. In his seminal work: “sagacity in African philosophy” (1983), Odera Oruka, thus, maintained that among the traditional folk of Africa, uninfluenced by modern education, there are genuine philosophers – individuals capable of fundamental reflection on man and the world, and able to subject the folk philosophy of their own communities to criticism and modification. He referred to such individuals as ‘philosophic sages’. Put differently, Odera Oruka argued that philosophy can be found in African traditional cultures because there are indigenous thinkers – philosophic sages/opinion leaders – who although they lack modern education think logical and critically without even resorting to ethno- philosophy or to professional philosophy, the latter of which is yoked in Western framework. This important feature of philosophic sagacity is confirmed by Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012: 181) who remind us that:

Philosophic sagacity is a product and a reflective evaluation of the culture philosophy. The philosophic sage makes a critical assessment of the culture and its underlying beliefs. He produces a system within a system, an order within an order. He operates at a second-order level, which is generally open-minded and rationalistic.

No wonder scholars like Azenabor (2009: 74) is careful to remind us that ‘philosophic sagacity is a reflection of a person who is both a sage and a critical thinker, because a person can be a sage and not a critical thinker (this would be an ordinary sage), while the one who is both a sage and a critical thinker is a philosophic sage’. It is on the basis of this understanding that Oruka then makes an elucidatory distinction between an ordinary sage, who he calls a ‘culture philosopher’, and a philosophic sage. Being a sage, “does not necessarily make a philosopher, some of the sages are simply moralists and the disciplined, die-hard faithful to a tradition. Others are merely historians and good interpreters of the history and customs of their people” (Oruka 1983: 177). Yet, a ‘philosophic sage’ is not only wise, but also capable of being rational and critical in understanding or solving the inconsistencies of his or her culture, and coping with foreign encroachments on it.
Given that philosophic sagacity is rich in logic and critical analysis, Odera Oruka is of the view that philosophic sagacity should put as its major objective to “trace African Philosophy by wearing the uniforms of anthropological fieldwork and using dialogical techniques to pass through anthropological fogs to the philosophical ground” (Odera Oruka 1991: 3). By this, Odera Oruka meant that the major task of philosophic sagacity was to prune both ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy of undesirable features while maintaining those that are desirable for purposes of progress in African philosophy. Odera Oruka, thus, was one progressive African philosopher who had the dream of merging the African quintessence in ethno-philosophy with the professional perspicacity in professional philosophy so as to come up with a genuine objective African philosophy, a philosophy that is devoid of both myth and hegemonic character as is the case of ethno- philosophy and professional philosophy respectively. Odera Oruka, thus, writes in one of his works that philosophic sagacity “is the only trend that can give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy. Neither of the other two trends – nationalist/ideological philosophy and professional philosophy – can objectively play this role” (Odera Oruka 1983: 384 -385). However, we should be quick to comment that for him philosophic sagacity was not meant to exterminate ethno-philosophy. Neither was it meant to throw professional philosophy into the dustbin of oblivion. Instead, Odera Oruka’s philosophic sagacity was meant to build bridges between ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy to produce one African philosophy that is more objective and unadulterated.
(Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya, African Philosophy and Thought Systems, p.65-69)

Nationalistic-ideological philosophy

Nationalistic-ideological philosophy (also known as African partisan philosophy) is more concerned with the prescriptions of African statesmen (or politicians) and intellectuals strategically involved in the emancipatory project and complete independence of Africa and the African people from the shackles of foreign colonial imperialism. It is a concerned with the preservation, upholding of African ideological ideas. The philosophy is, to a larger extent, partisan to a particular ideology, and in this case African political ideology. Okot p’Bitek (1979: 7) captures well the imperative task of an African scholar and in particular African nationalistic- ideological philosopher, for example, when he asserts:

The African scholar has two clear tasks before him. First, to explore and destroy all false ideas about African peoples and culture that has been perpetuated by Western scholarship. Vague terms as Tribe, Folk, Non-literate or even innocent looking ones such as Developing, etc., must be subjected to critical analysis and thrown out or redefined to suit African interests. Second, the African scholar must endeavour to present the institutions of African peoples as they really are.

What p’Bitek means is that the genuine responsibility of a real African philosopher is to serve the African interest in the global community deconstruct, and to reconstruct what was destroyed by imperialists in a way that promotes the identity and consciousness of the once vanquished and marginalised African cultures. For Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012: 176) ‘this is the role ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy never took up.’ Thus, Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (Ibid) concur with Imbo (2002: 160) who observes that:

Sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, a very tensed, gendered northern European rationality came to claim universality […] One legacy of this claim has been the definition of rationality as the true discovery by the human mind of the pure essence of reality with the result that non-European influences have been consigned to the realm outside positive knowledge and in some cases accused of irrationality.

Spelling out the role and responsibility of an African scholar and in particular an African philosopher especially one who identifies himself/herself as an African nationalistic/ideological philosopher, Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012: 176) follow p’Bitek’s understanding elaborated above as they say:

The genuine African philosopher, besides being concerned with discussing the subject matter and finer points of philosophy as a discipline, has the special responsibility of deconstructing mainstream philosophy with a view to liberating the identity, consciousness and culture of the marginalised African “other”. This is the role ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy never took up.

What Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo say is what African nationalist figures have emulated and gallantly and chivalrously displayed in their participation in the struggle for the liberation of Africa and the African people. Most of these figures – Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Muammar Gaddafi, Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe, Nelson Mandela, Keneth Kaunda and Seko Toure, among many others – have managed to demonstrate, throughout history, their unwavering bottomless support of African identity, culture and consciousness.
(Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya, African Philosophy and Thought Systems, p.70-72)

Cited Works

Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya. 2016. “African Philosophy and Thought Systems - A Search for a Culture and Philosophy of Belonging”, Langaa Research & Publishing CIG, Mankon, Bamenda, Cameroon.

Reading

What Philosophy Is and Is Not
in Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya. 2016. “African Philosophy and Thought Systems - A Search for a Culture and Philosophy of Belonging”, Langaa Research & Publishing CIG.